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N E W  F E L L O W S
A S E F  B A Y AT These rituals and practices, shared largely by ordinary Muslims, 
represent what one may term “popular piety.” They signify a fu-
sion of religious sensibilities and mass culture, the sacred and 
the everyday. As a cultural expression of piety, they embody a 
humanized, multi-faceted, pluralistic and a concrete religios-
ity. Popular piety is indeed the antithesis of what Olivier Roy, 
in reference to the construction of an often fundamentalist 
“pure” or abstract religion, called the “de-culturation” of faith. 
It is no surprise, then, that popular piety is often downplayed 
both by Islamist hardliners and secular modernists. The reli-
gious purists charge practices like mawlid festivals as signs of 
bid‘a, idolatry, and moral vice, while modernists see in them 
elements of backwardness, traditionalism, ignorance, and su-
perstition. But in truth, ordinary Muslims project an alternative 
set of religious sensibilities. They wish to exercise a religion of 
life, a spirituality of the subaltern whose plebian lives disturb 
the sensibilities of the elites, political, or religious, who aim to 
compel rigid structures to ensure social control. Popular piety 
defies rigid structures and questions the monopoly of divine 
truth. 
This issue of the ISIM Review, unlike previous ones, was de-
veloped by an editorial team consisting of ISIM Chairs with 
Martijn de Koning acting as Assistant Editor. A new editor for 
the future issues will replace Dick Douwes who left ISIM as of 
1 January 2006 (p.52). The ISIM Review remains committed to 
unraveling the complexities of current processes in Islamic 
landscapes, furnishing a forum for scholarly exchange, while 
retaining a format, language, and style accessible to lay au-
dience.
At times one is compelled to lay stress on what is obvious. 
And regrettably ours is such a time. Stating that matters in 
Islam and Muslim societies are much more complex than 
what presents itself might be obvious for some, but certainly 
not for the general perception that is informed by a black 
and white view of the world. The current preoccupation 
with the powerful images projected by, albeit, small-scale 
extremist and “Jihadi” streams, has precluded from sight an 
Islam practiced by the majority of Muslim humanity which 
cherishes life, beauty, as well as spirituality. 
Looking beyond the official Islam of the state in Iran, scores 
of ordinary people gather in the evenings to share poetry, 
mysticism, and a spiritual journey. Every year millions of 
Egyptian Muslim men, women, and children join the Mawlid 
festivals to celebrate, often for days and nights with food 
and fair, the birth of revered saints (Schielke, p.6). In Syria, as 
happening elsewhere, Sufi orders, distant from the jingoism 
of political Islam and the incumbent regimes, are engaged 
in rituals that serve ethical enhancement and “moral reform 
of the self” (Pinto, p.14). Each week, al-Saha village in South 
Beirut brings together thousands of pious people who also 
yearn for distraction and the pleasures of daily life (Harb, p. 
10). Indian lower and middle class Muslims generate a vast 
market for a unique popular art form- “religious posters in 
which Islamic themes derive liberally from the images and 
symbols of Hindu iconography”; an art form which redefines 
the very concepts of Islam’s monotheism and iconoclasm 
(Saeed, p.8).
Editorial
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A B D U L K A D E R  T A Y O B
Caricatures of the Prophet
European Integration
The European debate about the Danish 
caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad 
turned to the integration of Islam and 
Muslims in Europe, although questions 
of iconography, freedom of expression 
and international relations were raised. 
The traces of this debate can be identi-
fied at several levels. Flemming Rose, 
the Danish editor, justified the print-
ing of the cartoons by appealing to the 
integration debate: “We are telling the 
Muslims that we are integrating you in 
the Danish culture of satire, because 
you belong to us.” But before Rose, a 
different approach to integration was evident when children’s book-
writer, Kåre Bluitgen, searched in vain for an illustrator for his book on 
Muhammad and the Quran. Apparently, it was his inability to find an il-
lustrator for the figure of Prophet that provided the immediate context 
for the newspaper to test the tolerance of Muslims. Both Bluitgen and 
Rose wanted, so they claimed, to make Islam a part of Europe in very 
different ways.
When the conflict expanded into demonstrations and riots broke 
out in different parts of the world, the question of integration quickly 
became, in parts of Europe, even more prominent. The usual commen-
tators were quick to point to the glaring difference between the free-
dom of expression respected and enjoyed in Europe, in contrast with 
its place in Muslim cultures. It provided as yet another opportunity to 
demonstrate the essential difference between Islam and Europe. 
Freedom of expression
As freedom of expression became an integration issue, it took on a 
very different meaning. It became the right to hurl insults and deni-
grate the sacred symbols of a large number of people. The freedom of 
expression was, thereby, transformed from the right to express one-
self in the midst of a powerful state or institution to a right directed at 
some of the weakest segments of society. The glaring contradiction of 
this European virtue was also revealed in the ongoing trial in Austria 
against David Irving’s Holocaust views.
I do not mean to suggest, by this, that the freedom to write critically 
about religion and its values should be controlled by law. On the con-
trary, freedom of expression against non-state actors such as radical 
Muslims presents a challenge to people living in all parts of the world. 
The European integration question, however, framed the freedom of 
expression as a unique European value under singular threat from 
Islam. A little reflection, however, shows that Europe is far from excep-
tional in facing this challenge. 
But the focus on Islam as the main culprit in this issue cannot be sum-
marily dismissed. Unlike the French riots, the conflict deals clearly with 
both a theological and a religious level. Unlike the radical groups who 
were causing havoc in Amsterdam and elsewhere, this controversy 
concerns more than a small group of radical Muslims. The cartoon issue 
brings virtually all Muslims under the spotlight, and places Islam in the 
centre of the debate.
Can Islam change?
A deeper reflection on the aftermath and responses to the cartoons 
forces, once more, into the open a recurring question at the heart of 
the integration debate. Can Islam adapt itself to Europe? Is it flexible 
enough to adopt the secular liberal values of Europe? Almost all sides 
of the debate work with the assumption that Islam belongs to a tra-
ditional culture that has resisted change and modernization. In par-
ticular, European secular fundamentalists and Muslims radicals thrive 
on the vision of an unchanging pri-
mordial Islam. The two sides cannot 
deal with the fact that Islamic radical-
ism can be both Islamic and European. 
Ironically, the cartoon controversy has 
highlighted some of these changes 
within Islam as represented in the pub-
lic debate. The controversy illustrated 
how any form of secular polity has 
become the natural enemy of Islam. 
The dossier of the Danish Muslims that 
was prepared to mobilize world opin-
ion particularly lamented the lack of 
respect for religions in secular Europe. 
But secularism for them only implied the freedom to insult religions, 
particularly Islam. This caricature of secularism has become integrated 
into Islam in public debate. Among other things, it successfully obscures 
from view the huge failure of religious (particularly Islamic) states in 
the second half of the twentieth century.
Another such feature of public Islam thrown 
up in the controversy is its progressive desacra-
lization. Apart from the newspapers that rushed 
to reprint the cartoons to demonstrate their 
commitment to freedom of expression, Mus-
lims themselves played an equally large role in 
spreading the reach of cartoons. Emails were sent 
around the globe to gather support for the pro-
test actions, but, ironically, in many cases these 
very emails contained all the cartoons. The first 
Egyptian newspaper that carried the story of the 
cartoons also carried one of the cartoons on its 
front page. The protests have in more ways than 
one reproduced the caricatures, and demonstrat-
ed some of the desacralization at work in public 
Islam.
Thirdly, and in relation to this, the image of the 
Prophet became as important for many Muslims 
as it had been for the cartoonists.  In the last few 
decades, Muslims have become preoccupied by 
the bad image that they enjoyed in the press and 
in public representation in general. The cartoons 
illustrated this negative image in graphic detail. 
But the reactions pointed out to how deep-seated 
the representation of Islam had been internalized 
as a component of public Islam. The image had 
become everything. 
The integration debate in Europe clearly framed 
and shaped the reception of the controversy. 
Under its distorting influence, freedom of expression took on a new 
meaning. But the controversy also manifested the weakness of one of 
the central assumptions of the integration debate: Islam had to change 
to accommodate change. It showed that Islam had already changed to 
take on a new public role. If anything, this should be the starting point 
of a future debate.
The caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad 
in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten 
have certainly taken on different meanings 
since they were first printed in September 
2005. In Europe, the larger debate about the 
integration of Islam and Muslims became 
the framework for the discourse on this most 
recent controversy over Islam and Muslims. 
Nevertheless, the cartoon controversy provides 
an opportunity to question this framework as it 
both obscures as much as it clarifies the public 
debate on the controversy in particular, and 
about Islam in general.
Abdulkader Tayob holds the ISIM Chair at Radboud University Nijmegen.
Email: a.tayob@let.ru.nl
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The protests have 
in more ways than 
one reproduced 
the caricatures, 
and demonstrated 
some of the 
desacralization 
at work in public 
Islam.
Popular Piety
S A M U L I  S C H I E L K E In the early 1880s, Egypt was in a state 
of turmoil. European powers were ex-
erting increasing pressure on the Khe-
divial government, and escalating po-
litical conflicts were about to lead the 
country to the Urabi rebellion and con-
sequent British occupation. In this mo-
ment, a new kind of debate on religion 
and society emerged in Egypt. Festive 
traditions and ecstatic rituals that were 
a central part of the religious and com-
munal life of the country quite suddenly 
became the subject of intense criticism, 
accompanied by attempts to reform or 
to ban them. The most important issue 
at stake was mawlids, popular festivals in honour of the Prophet Mu-
hammad and Muslim saints. These festivals, which combine the commu-
nal experience of a pilgrimage, the ecstatic rituals of Islamic mysticism, 
and the libertine atmosphere of a fair, had always been to some degree 
controversial, and some scholars and intellectuals had lamented votive 
rituals at the shrines, the use of music in rituals, and the general licen-
tious character of the festivities. But theirs was a minority opinion, while 
orthodox scholars of al-Azhar, mystics (who often 
were scholars of al-Azhar at the same time), politi-
cal elites of the country, merchants, and peasants 
all participated in the festivals that took place at 
the central squares of major cities.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, a growing number among the intellec-
tual elites of Egypt began to rally against mawlids 
and other festive traditions. In 1881, the debate 
culminated with the ban on the spectacular ritual 
of dawsa that used to conclude the mawlid an-
nabi (birthday of the Prophet Muhammad) fes-
tival in Cairo, where the shaykh of the Sa‘diyya 
Sufi brotherhood would ride with a horse over 
his disciples (who were not injured, a feat seen as 
a demonstration of God’s grace) together with attempts to curb the 
ecstatic rituals of Sufi brotherhoods and to impose strict state control 
upon them. In the following decades, however, mawlids continued to 
flourish and the criticism grew more radical, so for example in a press 
article from 1929 calling for complete abolition of mawlids because of 
the alleged danger to society at large, they presented:
“Mawlids are nothing but superstitions, un-Islamic innovations and 
dangerous customs that must be abolished. […] They are a suicide of vir-
tue, and they are in reality worse than that, but we lack the expression 
to describe it exhaustively. Because mawlids, especially in the cities, and 
what goes on in them, are nothing but various expressions of religious, 
moral and social vices and truthful expressions of the moral deficiency 
latent in the minds of a large group of people. And those mawlids incite 
them and assist them in increasing it (i.e., the moral deficiency). […] Thus 
why not abolish these dangerous customs that let loose the bonds from 
all people civilized or on the way to civilization, and that are the source 
of moral and religious corruption, and which furthermore are a cause for 
the contempt of the foreigners on us and an incentive to make us doubt 
in religion and the authority of those who stand to it.”1
The invention of society
Not only was the increasing popularity of such views novel, also the 
very discourse that emerged in this period represented a radical de-
parture from the way religion, morality, and communal life had been 
conceived of and practised until then. In earlier debates on festive 
and ritual behaviour, Muslim schol-
ars had been mainly concerned with 
the legal status of discrete practices 
and their implication on the salvation 
of the individual believer. While their 
concern was to determine how to act 
according to God’s commandments 
and, ultimately, to get to paradise, the 
modernists of late nineteenth century 
spoke in very different tones. Abstain-
ing from sin and the company of the 
deviant was no longer enough: society 
and religion as a whole had to be pu-
rified, reformed and modernized. The 
behaviour of people at public festivals 
became a problem of national scale, and reforming them a key to the 
nation’s progress.
In these views, an old (although throughout much of Islamic his-
tory, marginal) Islamic tradition of suspicion towards ecstatic emo-
tional states, ambivalent festive traditions, and anything that would 
compromise a rigid and purified state of the body and soul, comes 
together with the radically novel concepts borrowed from European 
intellectual traditions: society—the organic whole in which different 
ethnic, confessional and professional groups belong to an organic and 
interdependent whole; nation—the ideological frame of such society; 
progress—the linear and rational development of the nation towards 
a growing perfection and power; and religion—the moral and meta-
physical foundation of the society that was to be judged by its ability to 
serve the nation’s progress. Self-evident as these concepts may seem in 
our time, in nineteenth-century Egypt it was radically new to see elites 
and commoners, Turko-Circassians and Arabs, Muslims, and Christians 
as part of one organic whole, and even more new was it to measure 
religion by its functionality for a secular political programme.
Selective synthesis
Where did this new discourse come from, and why was the opposi-
tion to festive traditions so important for it? It cannot be reduced to 
either the pre-existing Islamic tradition or the colonial hegemony. It 
was an innovative synthesis of both, attempting to reform society and 
its religion to stand against the European challenge, and in doing so, 
creating a new and dramatic split between “orthodox” and “popular” 
Islam and “modern” and “backward” culture. When European observers 
claimed Islam to be a backward and irrational religion, Muslim intellec-
tuals replied with a twofold strategy: reinterpreting part of the religious 
and cultural traditions as the true, authentic heritage that would match 
European standards and serve as the moral foundation of the nation’s 
progress, while excluding other parts from the modernist project by 
labelling them as backward superstitions at worst, popular religion 
and folklore at best, but never equal to the true, at once authentic and 
modern culture.
Islamic reformism and nationalist modernism, in their shared at-
tempt to bestow religion and society with a rational and progressive 
spirit, were never based on a simple takeover of European concepts but 
rather developed in confrontation with and inspired by them, just as 
they, in their construction of true authentic heritage, never were based 
on a simple reference to the past but rather invented and interpreted 
it anew. Its sources of inspiration included the older Islamic tradition 
of ritual and moral reform, colonial administrative practice, Victorian 
piety and ethics, and French social theory, but the outcome of this se-
lective reinterpretation was historically new, and cannot be reduced, 
in causal or structural terms, to any of the traditions it drew upon by 
evoking or opposing them.
Mawlids & Modernists
Dangers of Fun
Abstaining from sin 
and the company of 
the deviant was no 
longer enough …
One possible solution to the puzzle of how 
to conceptualize the complex interplay of 
pre-existing Islamic traditions, the influence 
of European intellectual discourses, and 
colonial administrative practices is to focus on 
the genealogy of intellectual traditions and 
administrative practices, i.e., the conditions of 
their emergence and transformation. The case 
of one particular transformation of popular 
festive traditions shows the novelty of the 
project of modern Islam which drew upon 
Islamic and European traditions, local and 
global power struggles without being reducible 
to any of its sources of inspiration.
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Insofar as the genealogy of modern Islam is a case of a major paradig-
matic shift it cannot be grasped by the concept of “discursive tradition” 
introduced by Talal Asad and increasingly popular in Islamic studies. 
Speaking of Islam as a discursive tradition is a convenient way to say 
what Islam “is” while avoiding the pitfalls of essentialism, nevertheless 
the range of the concept is limited. While it can be very useful for un-
derstanding the continuity and persistence of certain topics, it is not 
very helpful for grasping transformations. This is not so much to criti-
cize Asad (who in his work has demonstrated an outstanding ability 
to trace historical transformations of both the subtle and the dramatic 
kind) than the inflationary use of “discursive tradition” as a trendy label 
and a politically correct way to speak of Islam as something substan-
tial and concrete. Instead, the concept of genealogy, developed by 
Foucault and elaborated by Asad, appears to be more useful to detect 
and analyze both the subtle shifts and the dramatic breaks both of 
which tend to be obliterated by the successive consolidation of discur-
sive formations (rather than traditions, in this case). This is, as Michael 
Feener demonstrates in another article in this issue, by no means the 
only possible approach, and we certainly should not fall in the trap of 
just replacing one “magic” word by another. It does, however, call to at-
tention that intellectual history should be aware of both the traditions 
and continuities it deals with, as well as of their often subtle and invis-
ible transformations and reinventions.
Distinction and exclusion
The debate on popular festivals shows to what extent the tradition 
of Islam, its past and present, is invented, how this invention can dra-
matically shift the lines that mark religion, and how the projection of 
contemporary discourse to the past can make such shifts largely in-
visible to later generations. “Invented” does not mean “false” here, but 
calls attention to the historical shifts of and struggles over Islam among 
Muslims. By reconfiguring religion to serve the newly invented nation, 
members of the emerging middle classes claimed power for them-
selves, and denied it to other groups in society: peasants, the urban 
poor, guilds, mystical brotherhoods, and the Turko-Circassian political 
elites. Taking the role of the avant-garde, an elite at once distinguished 
from “the masses” and committed to their uplifting, nationalist intel-
lectuals could claim the unity of the nation while excluding other con-
tenders from the power to define it. For this purpose, it was necessary 
not only to create a reading of Islam and modernity that would stand 
the European challenge, but also to exclude other readings as back-
ward, superstitious, immoral, and erroneous.
Such exclusive tendency has been characteristic of the project of mo-
dernity around the globe, and should stand as a reminder that emanci-
pation, enlightenment and empowerment, so much celebrated as key 
moments of modernity, have been essentially—not coincidentally—
accompanied by discipline, exclusion, and domination. And indeed the 
search for distinction has been characteristic for the aspirants of mo-
dernity in Egypt from the very beginnings of the modernization poli-
cies, as was noted by Georg August Wallin, a Finnish Orientalist who in 
1844 met “one of those scamps whom the Pasha has sent to Europe for 
study, this one a mechanician, and who have returned half-educated 
and thousand times worse than before.” In the house of a German fam-
ily in Cairo where both were invited, the discussion turned to the mah-
mal procession, a colourful parade which used to mark the transport 
from Cairo to Mecca of a new kiswa to cover the Ka‘ba prior to the Hajj, 
and Wallin who had greatly enjoyed the procession the same day, was 
annoyed to hear the Austrian-trained mechanician “condemn and ridi-
cule these customs of his religion, and calling them nonsense.”2
More than a century later, the distinction through criticism of festive 
traditions that was undertaken by a member of 
this (at the time very small) professional class was 
to become the “normal” point of view concerning 
religion and society to the degree that its novelty 
and innovativeness have become invisible, and its 
adherents able to claim their point of view as the 
self-evident orthodox Truth.
Mawlid 
festivities 
in Cairo
Notes
1. Hanafi ‘Amir, “al-Mawalid: ‘adat yajib al-
qada’ ‘alayha,” as-Siyasah al-Usbu‘iyya, 
21 December 1929, 24.
2. Georg August Wallin, in Georg August Wallins 
reseanteckningar från Orienten åren 1843-
1849: Dagbok och bref, ed. Sven Gabriel 
Elmgren (Helsingfors: Frenckell, 1864), 2:265.
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Y O U S U F  S A E E D
An Image Bazaar 
for the Devotee
Walk on any street of an Indian town, 
and you cannot miss the buzz of pop-
ular visual art—cinema billboards, 
commercial ads, religious images, and 
even political heroes in giant cutouts. 
But the most vibrant images are the 
religious posters and calendars depict-
ing deities, saints, and shrines, sold at 
shops or roadside stalls near temples, 
mosques, and shrines. While it is easy 
to find a large variety of posters for a 
Hindu devotee, it is also not difficult to 
buy images depicting Muslim themes 
and folklore. The majority of Muslim 
posters in India portray the shrines in Mecca and Medina, or Quranic 
verses in calligraphy, but one can also find portraits of local saints, their 
tombs, and miracles, represented as vividly as in any Hindu mythologi-
cal scene. 
Many buyers of the Muslim posters happen to be pilgrims visiting 
large shrines from small towns and villages. They embark on these 
pilgrimages, covering in one trip many tombs 
of saints such as Haji Ali at Mumbai or Moinud-
din Chishti at Ajmer, especially during the urs 
(death anniversary); naturally, they need to take 
back souvenirs. And what better gift than a poster 
that is bright and colourful, has religious as well 
as decorative value, and helps them relate to 
the big shrine and its fervour back home. Many 
posters purchased at major festivals such as Eid 
or Ramadan, decorate a newly painted house or 
a shop (as many Hindus do at the festival of Di-
wali). In the market where these posters are sold, 
the devotee cannot ignore the many other devo-
tional items such as songbooks, prayer manuals, 
shiny stickers, 3D images, framed and gold-plated 
pictures, revolving lampshades, clocks and elec-
tronic gizmos, all with the necessary symbols of 
Mecca and Medina. 
Interestingly, the artists, manufacturers, and 
sellers of these images are not necessarily all Mus-
lim. The publishers are often those entrepreneurs 
who deal with posters of any religion, irrespective 
of their own faith. One can easily spot the byline 
of the printer in a corner of the poster: Brijbasi, 
Khanna; or of the artist such as Balkrishna, Raja, 
or Swarup. Whether it is a Hindu artist drawing 
a Muslim theme, or vice versa, does not seem to 
bar him from expressing the characteristic pathos 
and devotion particular to the image. In the entire 
process of image manufacture, no one, including 
the commissioning person, artist, printer, or dis-
tributor, seems to bother about which religion 
they cater to, as long as their product augments their client’s devotion 
and their client’s spending power. But in the process, they do seem to 
transplant the icons, symbols, and myths across the borders of faith, 
making these images so unique to their subject.
Between iconoclasm and idolatry
It is important to explore how this iconography has not only been 
legitimized in Islam, but also allowed to thrive in the form of an urban 
mass culture in South Asia. So far, no one hears a complaint or blas-
phemy charge from the orthodox Muslim clergy about these graphic 
depictions, some of which could look 
rather provocative to the purists. Is it 
because these images circulate only 
between the lower middle class or rural 
Muslims rather than amongst elite/
urban brethren, who define Islam to be 
purely monotheistic and iconoclastic? 
Do the purists overlook these posters 
simply as part of the larger bid‘ati cul-
ture—to be shunned as un-Islamic? Or, 
are the market forces too powerful to 
be affected by the purists? 
Among the common users of Muslim 
devotional posters interviewed, many 
seemed unclear and sometimes confused about the status to be given 
to these images, unlike, say Hindu devotees, who would use the image 
or idol of a deity solely for worshipping. Since most Muslim users of 
these images come from poor or lower middle class or rural areas, 
many are probably not familiar with the concept of iconoclasm in 
Islam. They broadly know that idolatry is certainly taboo (and that this 
is what differentiates them from the Hindus), but the images of local 
saints, shrines, Islamic folklore, and many symbols of shared culture, 
transmitted orally in their families, are openly accepted and venerat-
ed, without drawing a line between Islamic and non-Islamic—that is, 
until someone with a Wahhabi bend of mind “shirks” them from doing 
so. Some devoted Muslims who shun iconography do so because of a 
popular hadith (tradition) ascribed to the Prophet that anyone drawing 
the picture of a living thing would be asked on the Day of Judgment to 
fuse life into it. Though one may mention here that the Quran while it 
does taboo idolatry it does not have a single line prohibiting the draw-
ing of living organisms.
In a Hindu devotional image, there is absolutely no hesitation about 
the use of figurative icons or plurality of gods. In fact, iconography and 
pantheism are the very founts of an average Hindu devotee’s faith. 
Hence, an artist’s liberty to interpret and use the representative icons 
results in a variety of Hindu images that reflect her/his own religiosity, 
as well as a collective memory of the myth. Pantheism is also a boon for 
the industry—the more the gods and deities, the better the econom-
ics. However, in the case of Muslim images, the publisher is catering to 
a client who seems to fall in a grey area. While some artists and pro-
ducers are extremely sensitive about Islam’s iconoclasm, and consider 
it a taboo to portray any figurative image, others have less inhibition 
and draw freely portraits of saints and holy men. But on the whole, 
one does notice a sense of reluctance of iconography in many Muslim 
posters—although it does not seem to limit the diversity of visuals and 
concepts in them. 
Sometimes an absolute (or partial) iconoclasm forces an artist to look 
for more creative ways to illustrate a concept or folklore without rep-
resenting the taboo figures. Since the Muslim images are not meant 
for worship, unlike the Hindu ones, they also provide limitless possi-
bilities to an artist to choose the subject matter and innovative sym-
bols. One cautious poster, for instance, simply shows a large knot of 
a rope with Quranic text at the bottom: “Hold on tight to the rope of 
the God’s message…and do not disperse….” A rosary, a rose plant, a 
setting sun, and some flying birds, probably to enhance its mundane 
look, surround the knot. Another creative poster shows 6 arches, each 
labelled with a prophet’s name—Adam, Noah, Moses, Muhammad and 
so on—showing symbols of popular folklore related to each: an arc for 
Noah, fire for Abraham, a cradle for Jesus, and so on—but not the per-
sona of any prophet. Thus, there always remains an unlimited scope for 
commissioning new works based on innovative visual interpretations 
of Islamic themes without using human or living figures. 
India’s publishing industry nurtures a unique 
popular art form—the religious posters in 
which Islamic themes derive liberally from the 
images and symbols of Hindu iconography 
and vice versa. There is more to the diversity 
of these images, however, than simply the 
tactics of the industry—the very concepts 
of Islam’s monotheism and iconoclasm are 
often redefined here. Ironically, some of these 
images are commonly venerated in south 
Asia’s Muslim society and reveal a liberalism 
that would mock the current cartoon crisis 
around the Muslim world.
And what better 
gift than a poster 
that is bright and 
colourful, has 
religious as well 
as decorative 
value, and helps 
them relate to the 
big shrine and its 
fervour back home.
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Printers of the divine
The mass-production of devotional 
and calendar art was probably pio-
neered in India by a lithographic col-
our press established in 1894 by Ravi 
Varma (b. 1848), the self-taught por-
traitist from the Travancore royal fami-
ly, whose realist style of painting Hindu 
gods and goddesses has remained 
popular till now. Some images dating 
back to 1920s from the Ravi Varma 
Press portray Islamic themes such as 
Mecca, Duldul and Burraq (mythical 
stead of the Prophet), in a somewhat 
company school style.1 Ravi Varma’s 
enterprise was followed in 1950s by 
Hemchandra Bhargava (Delhi), and 
much later by Brijbasi and many others 
who focused mainly on Muslim images. 
Even though Mumbai and Chennai re-
mained for decades the most produc-
tive centres of religious art, presses in 
other towns such as Delhi, Sivakasi, 
Meerut, Calcutta, Nagpur, and Mathura 
also turned out cheap posters in large 
numbers. 
The publishers often rely on feed-
back from the streets of what images 
sell and where. Local competition com-
pels them to commission new work 
all the time. But, since some of the old masters who painted the clas-
sic images of Mecca, Medina, Karbala, or pious Muslim women in the 
1960s, are not active any more, a lot of recycling does take place. Some 
posters today are hurriedly done remakes of the old images, further 
decorated with tasteless frills to dazzle the innocent buyer. An artist’s 
quest for showing maximum attributes of a saint and his shrine, using 
minimum effort, sometimes ends up in a pastiche where the arch and 
dome come from separate faded photos, the saint’s person comes from 
an old painting, the trees and hills are cut out from a Swiss landscape, 
the lion from a wildlife magazine, and the diyas (lamps) from a Hindu 
poster. Such cost-cutting measures and cheap assembly lines often 
produce collages that seem devoid of any visual harmony. 
However, among the more competitive and successful publishers 
in India today, the Chennai-based J.B. Khanna & Co., works at a dif-
ferent plane altogether. With a three-generation old business, Rajesh 
Khanna, the proprietor, has recently acquired some of the latest state 
of the art equipment from Mitsubishi that allows him to produce devo-
tional posters at an extremely low-price but with much good quality. 
The computer makes even his recycling and pastiches as seamless as 
new. His countrywide business is dominating the small printers. The 
biggest threat to the J.B. Khanna poster business comes from the fre-
quent piracy of their designs and images.2 Besides pirating full images, 
many unscrupulous printers plagiarize Khannas’ images or image parts 
by making slight changes. The new technology, however, gives Khanna 
a comfortable edge over their competitors, as their dazzling but cheap 
posters flood the market every Diwali and Eid.
Images for utility
Among the Muslim images that do brisk business are the tantras or 
talisman printed in attractive style. The traditional practice of treating 
or solving day-to-day problems of health, business, family, security and 
so on, through the use of amulets has existed in the Muslim societies 
since ages. Some of the 99 names or attributes of God are commonly 
used in talismans: Ya Razzaq (O, Sustainer) calligraphed repeatedly in 
a poster found in many Muslim shops is meant for makan aur dukan ki 
khair-o barkat (the welfare and prosperity of the home and the shop). 
The small print at the bottom of the poster says, “the enemies of the 
householder/shopkeeper would bite the dust; the shop would prosper, 
the profits would soar; the home would be secure from diseases; oth-
ers’ spells would go vain…” For its utility, one cannot help but compare 
it with Hindu posters of the goddess Lakshmi doling out coins from her 
hands, with mini astrological charts in the backdrop. 
Most amulets are issued for specific problems and users, and cannot 
be used in general. Some were originally drawn or hand-written in 
one colour. But when a publisher decided to print these for mass con-
sumption, the artist copying them added colour, floral patterns, and 
the necessary icons of Mecca and Medina, crescent and star, and so 
on. But according to a senior aalim who issues talismans, “these artistic 
additions may affect the potency of an amulet, as they are not a part 
of prescribed prayer.” The common believers buying them do not pay 
much attention to these, as long as the poster describes in small print 
the benefits of the talisman. An image that both looks beautiful on the 
wall and “benefits” their lives is an ideal gift to buy. Hence a compact 
disc printed with the safar ki dua (prayer for a safe journey) hanging 
from your rearview mirror is the most attractive way to show off your 
car as well as guard yourself from road accidents in India. 
Today, the publishers of traditional Muslim images face a new kind of 
challenge, in the form of a “sanitization” of religious iconography by the 
purists. Some new publishers, many of them Muslim, have started pro-
ducing “educational” charts for the elite and educated class of urban 
Muslims, or those settled abroad. The producers of such charts com-
pletely ignore the earthy folklore of the past, and start from scratch—
teaching a young Muslim how to make an ablution (washing before the 
prayer), the correct postures of a prayer, the family tree of the prophets, 
the timeline of Islam’s history, and various moral commandments, in a 
visual language and symbolism that does not connect with the syn-
cretic past. Such sanitized images may look pretty on a whitewashed 
wall of a rich Muslim home, but probably not in a roadside haircutting 
saloon, which continues to be blessed visually with a saint’s miracles. 
Yousuf Saeed, an independent researcher and filmmaker, has been collecting religious posters 
for the last decade in South Asia. 
Email: Ysaeed7@yahoo.com
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1. Erwin Neumayer and Christine Schelberger, 
Popular Indian Art, Raja Ravi Varma and the 
Printed Gods of India (Oxford University 
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2. NK: JB Khanna and Company, in Indian 
Printer and Publisher (NOIDA, June 2003).
A stereotyped 
image of an 
Indian Muslim 
boy wearing 
a Turkish 
cap, with the 
backdrop of 
Mecca and 
Medina
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Pious Entertainment 
Al-Saha Traditional Village
M O N A  H A R B Lebanon is well known for being a 
major tourist attraction for Arabs and 
foreigners, who enjoy its position as a 
“bridge between East and West” and 
who are seduced by its advertised 
function as the “Paris of the Middle 
East.” During the post-war reconstruc-
tion period, Lebanon’s main priority 
was to confirm this service role and 
to enhance its infrastructure for tour-
ist attractions. Large public and pri-
vate investments were made towards 
this aim: the reconstruction of Beirut’s 
downtown, the building of highways 
and roads, the restoration of major ar-
chaeological and historic sites, as well 
as the development of a variety of consumption venues such as cafés, 
restaurants, beach resorts, hotels, and amusement parks. Away from 
mainstream tourism avenues, in the southern suburb of Beirut, alterna-
tive forms of entertainment have been developing for other types of 
constituencies. 
The southern suburb of Beirut, labelled al-Dahiya, 
is inhabited by half a million residents, mostly 
Shia. For the past fifteen years, al-Dahiya has been 
operating predominantly under the management 
of Hizbullah which organizes service delivery to 
its residents through its elected local govern-
ments as well as its network of social institutions. 
Under Hizbullah’s umbrella, an Islamic sphere has 
emerged organizing social and cultural practices 
in al-Dahiya around a variety of piety principles. 
Analysis of the features of this sphere goes beyond 
the scope of this paper. In recent years, the Islamic 
sphere has been materializing into new physical 
places providing entertainment services to the 
pious, such as restaurants and cafés, amusement 
parks, sports centres, private beaches, exhibition 
halls and summer youth camps. Al-Saha Tradi-
tional Village belongs to this world of pious enter-
tainment and forms an interesting case study for 
understanding more closely the cultural features 
of the rising Islamic sphere in Lebanon. 
Building heritage in al-Dahiya
Inaugurated in 2001, al-Saha is located on a 
major urban artery linking the international air-
port of Beirut to the renovated city centre. The 
Traditional Village includes, on a surface area 
of seven thousands square metres restaurants, 
cafés, terraces, shops, a wedding hall, a motel, a 
small museum, a library, a children’s playground 
and prayer rooms. Al-Saha does not serve alcohol 
and provides an environment complying with 
pious Muslim practices, or what are commonly 
referred to as shar‘i practices. Al-Saha is managed 
by al-Mabarrat, a philanthropic organization led 
by Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah,2 who 
also administers an array of education and charity 
associations for orphans and needy children. All 
profits made by al-Saha go to al-Mabarrat. 
Al-Saha is designed according to a representa-
tion of “traditional” Arabic and Islamic architecture. 
Flanked by a gas station (also owned by 
al-Mabarrat), the building stands in the 
landscape of al-Dahiya as a strange ad-
dition that does not relate to the con-
text: its façades are covered with carved 
stones, domes stand out from its ceiling, 
a minaret-like structure appears from 
within its volume, architectural elements 
and features that the public is accus-
tomed to seeing in nineteenth century 
historic buildings of Mount Lebanon are 
pasted here and there. The ensemble 
was designed by Jamal Makki, an archi-
tect heading the architectural firm of al-
Mabarrat. He clearly spells out his vision 
for al-Saha:
“Al-Mabarrat needed a financially productive project. I started think-
ing about a project that would fit the role given to the city of Beirut. 
Tourism seemed like an appropriate choice. However, how would you 
make a tourism project in a site that has no tourist assets?! There is 
no sea and no mountains here! Moreover, we are in an area known for 
its ugliness and its urban pollution. So, I thought of creating a project 
turned inwards and which acts as a tourist attraction in itself. I wanted 
something everybody would visit: Lebanese, Arabs, foreigners. I start-
ed thinking what is the idea [in English] that could mobilize a mosaic 
of different publics? … Of course, it is nostalgia, history, tradition! Eve-
rybody feels good about remembering history and tradition! People 
travel to Spain to admire Islamic and Arab architecture!”3
The project is, without doubt, impressive in its scale and in its density 
of details. The interior conveys a “traditional village” mood that is en-
hanced by a multitude of features and objects that appeal to the col-
lective memory of the visitors and to the perceptions they probably 
have of Arabic and Islamic heritage. The architect explains that the 
challenge was to translate the concepts of history and tradition into 
elements that materialize their meanings to people:
“I was inspired by the books of Anis Freiha [a famous Lebanese novel-
ist who has written extensively about Lebanese traditional village life]. 
I took all the descriptive elements from Freiha’s books and material-
ized them in built form, in architectural details, and through artefacts 
and objects. Here you have Abou-Ahmad house, and here you have 
Abou-Khalil house, this is the well of the village, this is the ‘alliya (ter-
race), this is al-saha (the open space)… All the objects you see here are 
mentioned in his books. I want to show that Anis Freiha was right: the 
village life is the genuine true life that inspires good and generosity. 
Rida was wrong [in reference to Freiha’s son, who rejects his father’s 
nostalgia in his famous book Isma’ ya Rida, and tells him that the village 
life is fake and full of romantic lies]. This project is about the values of 
the Lebanese traditional village, and how these values will invade the 
city!”
Hybrid meanings of tradition
The meanings of tradition in al-Saha are multiple and hybrid, borrow-
ing meanings from varied sources. First, tradition is Lebanese, as por-
trayed through the reference made to Anis Freiha. Interestingly, Freiha’s 
romantic narratives of the old Lebanese village have inspired various 
national popular culture productions, which largely privilege Christian 
representations of (Mount) Lebanon, at the expense of other histories. 
Thus, the spatial and physical materialization of tradition through Frei-
ha’s narratives for the purpose of creating an Islamic friendly environ-
ment highlights a clear claim to the Lebanese traditional values. Sec-
ond, tradition is Arab and Islamic (both levels are confused in the dis-
course): al-Saha proudly claims its belonging to an Arab/Islamic world, 
In the southern suburb of Beirut (al-Dahiya), 
away from mainstream tourism avenues 
privileged by the post-war reconstruction 
agendas of Lebanese entrepreneurs and elites, 
alternative forms of entertainment have been 
developing for specific types of constituencies. 
Fifteen years after the organization of the 
“Islamic sphere,” under Hizbullah’s umbrella, 
into financial, political and social networks, 
new places providing the pious with popular 
culture services have been multiplying in al-
Dahiya. “Al-Saha” belongs to this world of pious 
entertainment and forms an interesting case-
study for understanding the cultural features of 
the Islamic sphere in Lebanon.1
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[Al-Saha] provides 
an alternative 
entertainment 
experience to 
the visitor—an 
entertainment rooted 
in an eclectic mélange 
of Lebanese, Arab, and 
Islamic “traditions”, 
imbued with an 
“educational” message 
about the value of 
heritage and of piety.
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renown for its poetry, its music and 
its arts and aims to show that “Islamic 
groups in Lebanon can participate to 
the production of culture and heritage 
in a superior way.”4 Its goals have been 
met, as the project was awarded in 
2005 an architectural prize by the Arab 
Cities Association for its “daring design 
and its contribution to traditional ar-
chitecture.” 
Tradition in al-Saha is not only physi-
cally materialized for reasons of iden-
tity or for the pleasure of aesthetics. 
As the architect reminds us, “Tradi-
tion is profusely displayed in al-Saha 
to force itself upon the users so they 
learn about their origins and their 
identity while they are being enter-
tained.” Thus, the mission of al-Saha 
seems to be also educational and 
aims at dealing with its consumers as 
active individuals/“citizens.” For that 
reason, al-Saha is setting up an Arabic 
poetry library which will be part of a 
network of Arab poetry houses, and 
will also act as a meeting place for 
poets. In addition, al-Saha prides itself 
on hosting specific types of musical 
performances, such as zajal (a specific 
type of collective chanting that praises 
traditional Arab values of pride, honour and nationhood), as well as 
anashid (songs which convey messages related to religion, identity, 
and resistance). 
Since its opening in 2001, with one restaurant, al-Saha has been a ris-
ing success: al-Mabarrat did not expect such high financial returns. Rap-
idly, the project expanded to include the variety of services it includes 
today, and is still planning further developments within the Village it-
self, but also beyond national borders, as al-Mabarrat will be opening a 
branch of al-Saha in Qatar. Today, the Village attracts between 700 and 
1,000 users daily: families and couples, youth and elderly. Several asso-
ciations hold their fundraising activities in al-Saha as well. The variety 
of dress codes reveals the eclectic profiles of users. Though al-Saha is 
a “pious” place, its customers do not all abide by the pious dress code 
(several women are not veiled and dressed provocatively while men 
follow fashionable dress and hairstyle codes not particularly compat-
ible with Islamic norms). Users of al-Saha mostly spend time eating, 
chatting, gazing and smoking hubble-bubble. They are often gathered 
in family groups, although exclusive female or male clusters are found. 
Typically, youth groups take their own tables and spend their time play-
ing computer games, surfing the Internet or chatting on laptops rented 
from al-Saha. There are also many tourists, Arabs as well as foreigners, 
especially during holidays and summers. The large numbers of pious 
Arabs discloses the recent growth of the transnational demand for an 
entertainment respectful of Islamic codes and values and simultane-
ously characterized by quality and aesthetics.5
How to explain such a success? In a city where public spaces are 
scarce and have been increasingly replaced by private spaces of con-
sumption, such as cafés, restaurants, shopping centres and malls, al-
Saha’s ability to attract such a large and varied number of users is not 
very surprising. Located in a dense area housing half a million people, 
of mostly middle-income, al-Saha meets the demands of a big pious 
clientele, wary about its Islamic identity and in need of entertainment. 
As one of our informants told us: “Who said that pious Muslims do not 
want to have fun?! We are in more need for fun than anybody else.”6 
Moreover, al-Saha provides pious Arab tourists with opportune spaces 
to spend their money (for Islamic charity) and their time (learning her-
itage through consumption), while granting foreign tourists an exotic 
flavour of “traditional” heritage mixed with the “thrill” of being in the 
notorious al-Dahiya. Indeed, al-Saha also aims at proposing an alter-
native image of al-Dahiya which is stigmatized as the Shia ghetto of 
the capital, or also the stronghold of Hizbullah: the project “encour-
ages visitors to come to a place of the city that always inspired fear 
and to see that it is just a part of the city.”7
Consuming piety?
Al-Saha reveals and materializes a culture that has been hidden to 
the eyes of the Lebanese and to those of the average tourist. In this 
sense, it provides an alternative entertainment experience to the visi-
tor—an entertainment rooted in an eclectic mélange of Lebanese, 
Arab, and Islamic “traditions”, imbued with an “educational” message 
about the value of heritage and of piety. In addition, al-Saha discloses 
the extent to which the Islamic sphere in Lebanon 
has become part of an every day life for many and 
how this sphere holds transnational linkages with 
other pious publics. 
However, several questions arise about how 
these forms of entertainment, largely rooted in 
consumerism, affect pious practices and, more 
generally, the Islamic sphere they relate to. Is 
the Islamic sphere losing its moral authority and 
legitimacy by accepting the market logic of con-
sumption? Is al-Saha related to “the rising phe-
nomenon of religious consumption within the 
wider context of increasing consumerism and 
the global market” like Abdelrahman explores in 
the case of Egypt?8 Will such places lead to social 
polarization within the Islamic sphere and reveal 
hidden social inequalities? Or will we observe, 
on the contrary, a reinforcement of the Islamic 
sphere, which is carving its own niche within the 
popular culture landscape, and thus appealing to 
a broader potential constituency? More fieldwork 
on the practices of consumption and the proc-
esses of commodification are necessary before 
we attempt to answer those questions which will 
guide our future investigations.9
Mona Harb is Assistant Professor at the graduate programme in 
Urban Planning and Policy at the American University of Beirut. 
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J U L I A N  M I L L I E
Creating Islamic Places
Tombs and Sanctity in West Java
The Muslim traditions of West Java, the 
region occupied by the Sundanese eth-
nic group, share a characteristic com-
mon to those of many of Indonesia’s 
Islamic communities; they often rep-
resent local conceptions of spirituality 
and power within specifically Islamic 
frameworks. In literary representations 
of the early Muslims of West Java, for 
example, these figures inevitably trav-
el to Mecca to meet famous Muslims, 
often returning with an object that grants them power in their pros-
elytizing efforts. This article explores Pasir Jengkol, a site notable for 
the tomb of Shaykh Jaelani whose name brings to mind Abdul Qadir al-
Jaelani (561/1166), one of Islam’s most revered intercessors. Apart from 
giving information about the site, this article discusses two contrasting 
ways in which holy sites in West Java are interpreted as sacred places. 
The first is by the connection of the site with a saintly person (wali). This 
connection is largely biographical and textual in nature. The second is 
through the landscape of the place itself, a connection which is experi-
enced in an unmediated way by the pilgrim. I argue that Pasir Jengkol 
succeeds only through the second of these processes, in contrast to 
more successful sites in West Java at which the two processes operate 
together to create a sacred quality. One of these successful sites, the 
tomb of Shaykh Abdul Muhyi at Pamijahan, is referred to for compara-
tive purposes.
The tomb
Pasir Jengkol lies above a small hill in a densely forested location in the 
regency of Tasikmalaya, West Java Province. The site is serene, and the 
complete absence of vendors testifies that this is not a popular site for 
pilgrimages. A number of people from the nearby village act as kuncen 
(guardians) and are able to guide pilgrims through a supplication ritual 
at the tomb. The first step in the ritual visit is the entry to the tomb; the 
guardian pauses at the threshold before entering while loudly offering 
three blessings to the ruh (spirit) of the Shaykh. He is believed to main-
tain a non-corporeal presence in the tomb. The tomb’s interior is domi-
nated by the casket containing the Shaykh’s body. The ritual continues 
with the oral invocation known as ta-
wassul (supplications to mediators), 
in which gifts of al-fatihah (the first 
chapter of the Quran) are offered up to 
various parties, including the Prophet 
Muhammad, Abdul Qadir al-Jaelani and 
Sunan Gunung Jati (the figure held by 
tradition to have brought Islam to West 
Java). After this, visitors are asked to 
verbalize their hajat (intention) directly 
to the Shaykh. The ritual ends with the 
recitation of Quranic verses.
It is not surprising to find Jaelani as-
sociated with a tomb. His name bears 
great authority for Muslims in West 
Java, where rituals in which his interces-
sion is sought are popular. By its associ-
ation with this most illustrious of wali, Pasir Jengkol derives legitimacy 
as a potent place for making supplications. Such appropriations are 
not uncommon in Indonesian traditions: Abdul Qadir is held to be the 
bearer of Islam to some Gayo communities in the north of the island of 
Sumatra1 and Martin van Bruinessen has noted the existence of a simi-
lar narrative cherished by the Kanoman kraton (royal house) of Cirebon, 
West Java.2 Abdul Qadir is not the only wali whose name is associated 
with a sacred site in West Java. Not far 
from Pasir Jengkol is Cipareuan, where 
the tomb of Jafar Sidik is located. Jafar 
Sidik (died 148/765) is remembered as 
a Shiite Imam and Sufi teacher.
The tomb of Shaykh Jaelani is not 
counted among the well-known tombs 
of the area. Not far to the west of Pasir 
Jengkol, at Pamijahan, is found a far 
more celebrated site, the tomb of Shay-
kh Abdul Muhyi. This man is recorded 
in genealogies as the khalifah (successor) of the famed Acehnese mys-
tic of the Shattariyah Sufi Order, Abdul Rauf of Singkel (Aceh). Abdul 
Muhyi’s tomb is also connected to Jaelani. A cave at the complex is 
thought to have been used by Abdul Muhyi to meditate with Abdul 
Qadir al-Jaelani. 
Sacrality and biography
Pasir Jengkol lacks biographical or genealogical details about the 
holy person lying at rest there. The primary guardian of the tomb, Has-
sanuddin, claims no line of descent to Shaykh Jaelani. According to 
him, nobody in the village knows much about the tomb’s history or 
its occupant. They know that Shaykh Jaelani was of Arab descent, that 
he had studied in Cirebon (on Java’s north coast), and later had joined 
Abdul Muhyi in his struggle for Islam in the highlands of West Java. 
They had fought battles against what Hassanuddin described as “Java-
nese followers of the Hindu-Buddhist religion.”
Hassanuddin was not aware that there previously existed a consider-
able body of information about Shaykh Jaelani, most notably in the 
oral traditions of the area. Some of this is preserved in an academic 
exercise by Edi Haer, a recently deceased employee of the Depart-
ment of Education in Tasikmalaya.3 His thesis contains tales concerning 
Shaykh Jaelani collected from elders of the villages near Pasir Jengkol. 
According to these tales, Shaykh Jaelani was delegated by Sunan Gu-
nung Jati, the famous sixteenth century proselytizer of Islam on Java’s 
north coast, to spread Islam in the area of Pasir Jengkol. He was assisted 
by Shaykh Abdul Muhyi, who was performing the same task in nearby 
Pamijahan. Abdul Muhyi’s wife was from the Pasir Jengkol area, and 
the two Shaykhs were companions. 
They would perform the Friday prayer 
together in Mecca, making the journey 
from West Java using the tunnel from 
a cave in Pamijahan that, according to 
tradition, was utilized by Abdul Muhyi 
for that purpose. 
One of the stories collected by Edi 
Haer is as follows: Shaykh Jaelani was 
travelling to Pamijahan with Abdul 
Muhyi. Suddenly they were confronted 
by three thieves intent on murdering 
them. Shaykh Jaelani used his powers 
to overcome one with tiredness, the 
second with itchiness, and the third 
with fatigue. The two Shaykhs then 
escaped. But the three assailants used 
their own powers to throw off their impediments and chased the Shay-
khs. Shaykh Jaelani then transformed the road upon which the thieves 
were chasing them into a dead-end (jalan buntu), frustrating the villains. 
Nowadays, the village of Cibuntu marks that spot.
Yet this material seems to have dropped from memory in Pasir Jeng-
kol, and hence Shaykh Jaelani is a saint lacking biography and gene-
alogy. Sundanese are acutely aware of losses of heritage such as this. 
[T]he physical attributes 
of the landscape became 
the vehicle for expressing 
the site’s sacred power.
Identification with authoritative Islamic figures 
and concepts extends to landscape elements, 
and many topographical features in West Java 
become Islamic landscapes through names 
of Islamic saints and leading figures of Sufi 
tradition. Such places are regarded as sites 
of karamat (sacred power), and are visited 
by Sundanese Muslims, whose penchant for 
making supplications at graves supports 
a domestic tourist industry.
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One often hears the lament that “all our 
books were taken to Holland,” referring 
to the plentiful material relating to Sun-
danese Islamic tradition collected by 
Ch. Snouck Hurgronje and others. Dis-
continuity in oral tradition is also rel-
evant. The sasakala (origin stories) are 
protected by ritual practitioners who, 
for various reasons may be reluctant 
to pass on their knowledge. This oc-
curs simultaneously with a cultural shift 
whereby the religious legitimacy of ritu-
als associated with sacred places is not 
so apparent for a younger generation 
receiving its education in state funded 
schools and whose cultural awareness 
is mediated by modern media. Finally, 
Tasikmalaya has suffered great insta-
bility. The area had been destabilized 
in the war of independence in the late 
1940s, and in the decades after that 
havoc was caused by the Darul Islam 
separatist movement. During this pe-
riod, according to some residents of 
Tasikmalaya, many items of heritage 
significance were destroyed.
For all these reasons, Pasir Jengkol is 
textually poor. This is not the case with 
the nearby tomb of Jaelani’s compan-
ion, Abdul Muhyi. Abdul Muhyi’s name 
appears in a number of genealogies linking him to other sacred sites in 
West Java and to well known teachers in Aceh and Banten. The tomb 
derives authority from these influential associations. Furthermore, 
a number of teachers living near his gravesite in Pamijahan possess 
manuscripts containing Sufi teachings and genealogies in which they 
themselves appear as successors of Abdul Muhyi. Cultivation of this 
legacy adds to their status. A Ph.D. thesis has been completed about his 
tomb and the related traditions, a textual creation which significantly 
enhances the tomb’s stature.4 For these reasons, Abdul Muhyi is per-
ceived as a figure whose influence extends outside of Pamijahan. This 
type of construction of sacrality does not occur in Pasir Jengkol, which 
simply lacks the discursive materials necessary for it to take form.
Sacrality and place
Yet, a saintly biography is not the only means leading people to 
perceive graves as places of sacred power. The physical location also 
stimulates this. Topography can create a sacrality that is independent 
of the saintly identity associated with the place. As noted, Pasir Jeng-
kol is currently poor in terms of narratives involving the saint, but the 
landscape itself nevertheless leads pilgrims to construct the place as 
sacred. An incident that occurred during my visit to Pasir Jengkol nicely 
illustrates how this occurs. As we were leaving Pasir Jengkol, one of my 
Sundanese companions named Atam commented on a massive tree 
located by the enclosure’s entrance. Atam lived in a village about two 
hour’s drive from Pasir Jengkol, but had never previously been there. 
Hassanuddin (the guardian) said that the tree had in the past been cut 
down, but had then righted itself. Later that evening, when Atam and 
I were conversing socially with a group of people in his village Atam 
conveyed only two pieces of information to his friends about our visit 
to Pasir Jengkol. He firstly described its whereabouts, and then spent 
some time retelling the anecdote about the tree. No information was 
offered about Shaykh Jaelani. Instead, the physical attributes of the 
landscape became the vehicle for expressing the site’s sacred power. I 
observed that although Atam found this sufficiently interesting to tell 
his friends, he, nor his friends, was not overly impressed by it. Perhaps 
this was because many Sundanese conventionally associate locations 
of natural beauty or unusual features such as large rocks or trees with 
non-corporeal beings. An isolated tomb in a beautiful location auto-
matically creates an aura of sacrality. Against this background, his un-
derstanding of the sacred quality of Shaykh Jaelani’s tomb required no 
reference to the individual himself. 
If we compare this with the situation in Pamijahan, we realise how 
much wealthier that site is in terms of its sacred references. Pamijahan 
is no more beautiful than Pasir Jengkol, but at Pamijahan the guardians 
tell stories that bring authoritative Islamic figures in contact with the 
landscape. Take this example, which concerns a deep cave or tunnel 
visited by pilgrims to Pamijahan: Abdul Muhyi would use the tunnel 
to attend the Friday prayer in Mecca. Once he arrived late, puffing be-
cause his habit of smoking had left him breathless. Abdul Qadir al-Jae-
lani appeared to him and reprimanded him for smoking. The Pamijahan 
enclosure to this day remains a non-smoking zone. These stories see 
the biographical and landscape elements brought together. For the 
pilgrim, the Sundanese landscape is transformed into a specifically Is-
lamic one by the “presence” of canonical Islamic figures in the stories. 
Conclusion
Pamijahan and Pasir Jengkol contrast in the way visitors are able to 
construct the places as sacred. Textual resources affirm Abdul Muhyi 
as a figure of influence throughout Indonesia, and the guardians of 
the tomb make the site an Islamic landscape through stories in which 
topographical elements are brought into contact 
with Islamic notables. People approach the site 
confident that the tomb’s occupant is an interces-
sor of potency. It is no wonder that bus groups are 
continually ferrying visitors to the tomb, granting 
the local community a constant flow of income 
from parking and entrance fees, and from the 
sale of souvenirs, cigarettes, food, and drinks. The 
historical representation of the person buried at 
Pasir Jengkol, by contrast, is weak. The lack of oral 
and written textual resources makes it difficult for 
Shaykh Jaelani to appear as a compelling inter-
cessor for pilgrims, and it attracts few visitors. It 
is to some degree the natural environment of the 
place that sustains its sacrality, and in this way the 
tomb is not remarkable amongst the many sites 
of natural beauty in the sacred topography of the 
Sundanese.
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P A U L O  G .  P I N T O
Embodied Morality and 
Social Practice in Syria
The religious landscape in Syria encom-
passes a plurality of interpretations 
and practices of Islam, ranging from 
text-oriented Salafi religiosity to Sufi 
mysticism, which are experienced and 
expressed in a context of enhanced 
public display of individual and collec-
tive piety.1 Islam as a lived and/or ide-
alized religious tradition constitutes a 
major source of meaning and identity 
in the Syrian society, providing the in-
dividuals with both collective support 
and moral justification for their social 
practices. Therefore, there is a constant expression and affirmation of 
various Islamic symbols, practices, and values as the normative frame-
work for participation in the public sphere. 
The establishment of particular interpretations and practices of the 
Islamic tradition as public norm in the Syrian society is done less by 
the elaboration and circulation of discourses aiming to inscribe Islam in 
the political institutions of Syrian society, than through the continuous 
enactment of embodied religious dispositions in the ordinary practices 
of Muslims in their social interactions. The overtly political interpreta-
tions of Islam that were fostered by the Muslim Brothers gained so-
cial appeal as a form of opposition to the Baathist regime during the 
1970s and 1980s. However, Islamist discourses declined as a factor of 
mobilization in the Syrian society since the military confrontation be-
tween the Islamic opposition and the Syrian army in the city of Hama 
in 1982.2 On the other hand, the strength of Islam as a symbolic and 
normative framework for social practice remained unaltered and actu-
ally increased during this same period. 
The conspicuous public display of signs of in-
dividual and collective Muslim piety—such as 
veiling for women, wearing a beard for men, and 
mosque attendance for both sexes—became a 
common sight throughout Syria, constituting 
both an affirmation of religious identity and a par-
ticular form of participation in the public sphere. 
While these religious identities are clearly con-
nected to various forms of idealization and imagi-
nation of an “Islamic society,” they do not amount 
to an integrated and coherent project with a clear 
plan of action in the realm of formal politics. In 
general, we can say that the efforts in affirming 
Islam as the normative framework for the Syr-
ian society shifted from an overarching Islamist 
project centred in the political control of the state 
to a plurality of religious discourses and practices 
focusing on the moral reform of the individual.
Sufism has an important role in channelling and 
shaping the growing demand for religious knowl-
edge and Islamic forms of personal piety that 
characterizes contemporary Muslim religiosity in 
Syria. The charismatic character of the Sufi com-
munities allows them to spread their influence 
over a large social spectrum. Reformed forms of 
Sufism that try to limit the mystical path to Quranic principles, such as 
the one proposed by Shaykh Ahmad Kuftaru (d. 2004), who combined 
the functions of Mufti of Syria and head of the Kuftariyya Sufi Order, 
have a strong influence among middle-class Muslims in Damascus.3 On 
the other hand most Sufi communities in Aleppo and, also, Damascus 
have their religious practices and power relations shaped by shared 
understandings of baraka (grace/sacred power) and its expression in 
karamat (miraculous deeds) performed 
by the shaykh and his disciples. Re-
formed and traditional forms of Sufism 
are often combined in the discourses 
and practices of Sufi shaykhs and their 
disciples in Syria.
Ritual and embodiment: 
Sufi constructions of the self
In order to understand the impact of 
the normative framework of Sufism in 
the social practices of its adherents we 
have to look to the processes of em-
bodiment of its symbols and values as mystical experiences and forms 
of religious subjectivity, which constitute the basis of Sufi identities. 
The Sufi communities in Syria have the rabita (personal and devotional 
link) between shaykh and each disciple as their main structuring prin-
ciple. This personal relation of murshid (master) and murid (disciple) 
can be lived as an intense reorganization of the disciple’s self if he/her 
enters the process of tarbiya (mystical initiation) in tariqa (Sufi path) 
under the shaykh’s guidance, or in more a diffuse way through the at-
tendance of the collective rituals of the zawiya (ritual lodge). 
The disciplinary practices that constitute Sufi initiation aim to con-
trol and reshape the nafs (self ) of the disciple, so as to detach it from 
the material universe of worldly appearances and direct it towards the 
esoteric universe of haqiqa (divine reality/truth). The Sufi initiation var-
ies greatly in content, length, and elaboration, but my ethnographic 
observations in zawiyas linked to the Qadiriyya, the Rifa‘iyya, and the 
Shadhiliyya in Aleppo revealed an overall structure that starts with the 
memorization and recitation of the Qur’an, proceeds to the study of 
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and continues with the study of classical 
and modern Sufi texts. As the disciple moves further in the initiation 
path the shaykh assigns him more complex and extenuating mystical 
exercises. 
These exercises can range from the silent recitation of the names of 
God with the help of a masbaha (prayer-beads) to a period of complete 
khalwa (reclusion), which takes place in some Qadiri and Shadhili za-
wiyas in Aleppo in order to make the disciple engage his whole self in 
the practice of meditation and the dhikr (mystical evocation of God´s 
names). These mystical exercises allow the disciple to embody religious 
values and moral dispositions as body positions, corporeal sensations, 
and physical abilities. The passage from textual study to mystical exer-
cise symbolizes for the Sufis the progression from the zahiri (exoteric) 
intellectual understanding of religious truths to the batini (esoteric) ex-
periential apprehension of the divine reality.
The religious experiences that are lived by the Sufis as both mystical 
states and stages in the Sufi path are not purely subjective phenom-
ena, as they must be expressed and validated within the normative 
framework of the Sufi tradition. The achievement of a certain degree in 
the Sufi initiation must be constantly proved through the performance 
of ordeals and the public expression of mystical states in the collective 
rituals of the Sufi communities. These rituals are usually open to anyone 
who wants to participate, gathering the shaykh’s disciples, members of 
the community, occasional participants in the ritual, and visitors.
Therefore, the hadra (ritual gatherings) of the Sufi communities con-
stitute arenas of production, expression, affirmation, and dispute of 
mystical experiences and the religious identities that they ground. The 
main Sufi collective ritual is the dhikr. It varies in content and style of 
performance not only between different Sufi orders, but also among 
zawiyas that are linked to the same Sufi order. The dhikr enacts ideas of 
order, both social and mystical, and power as they are embodied in the 
religious persona of the shaykh who presides it. 
Sufism plays an important role in shaping 
contemporary Muslim religiosity in Syria. 
In order to understand the impact of the 
normative framework of Sufism in the social 
practices of its adherents we have to look at the 
processes of embodiment of its symbols and 
values as the forms of religious subjectivity 
that constitute the basis of Sufi identities. The 
enactment of these embodied principles as 
moral performances allows the emergence of 
new circuits of solidarity, moral authority, and 
social distinction in the Syrian public sphere.
 [T]his man 
presented both his 
religious piety …, 
and his “modern 
asceticism” …, 
as complementary 
parts of his moral 
performance.
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This is well expressed in the dhikr of 
the two main zawiyas of the Qadiriyya 
in Aleppo, the zawiya al-Hilaliyya, and 
the zawiya al-Badinjkiyya. The dhikr of 
these zawiyas have almost identical 
symbolic content, but differ greatly in 
terms of their ritual performance. The 
dhikr of the Hilaliyya enacts an ideal 
of harmonious articulation of the in-
dividual mystical experiences within 
the religious and social order framed 
by the Sharia and embodied by Shay-
kh Hilali. The dhikr of the Badinjkiyya 
emphasizes emotional intensity in the 
performance of mystical states. The in-
dividual mystical experiences achieved 
in this ritual are hierarchically ordained 
as effects of Shaykh Badinjki’s baraka, 
which is constantly expressed in the 
performance of miraculous deeds, 
such as religious healing. 
The influence of Sufism in the Syrian 
society extends beyond the Sufi com-
munities via services performed by 
the Sufi shaykhs for a wider audience, 
such as the dispensation of religious 
knowledge, religious healing, conflict 
mediation, and charity. In addition to 
that, various forms of individual piety or pragmatic religiosity are also 
channelled into the religious framework of Sufism through the use of 
amulets, the cult of saints, and the reading of mystical texts.
Social practice as moral performance: 
Sufism in the public sphere
The process of mystical initiation as well as the ritual socialization in 
the Sufi communities aims at embodying the symbolic, practical, and 
normative framework of Sufism as a set of moral dispositions that guide 
the social practices of its adepts. This embodied sense of morality is 
usually referred by the term adab, which in its Sufi usage means more 
than the simple compliance with rules of civility or social behaviour, as 
it is a practical expression of inner qualities of the self in their posture, 
gestures, glances and emotional states. It is thus not by chance that 
the acquisition of adab is usually coupled with the notion of akhlaq 
(morals) in the discourse of the adepts of Sufism. The centrality of the 
notion of akhlaq for the definition of Sufi identities can be seen in the 
frequently repeated Sufi adage, “all Sufism is akhlaq (morality), so those 
who advance in terms of morality are also advancing in terms of Suf-
ism.”4
The acquisition of adab has to be constantly proven and validated 
through moral performance in the public sphere, creating a framework 
of individual exemplarity upon which are built social evaluations and 
expectations about the proper social behaviour in the public sphere. It 
is common that the disciplinary reconfiguration of the self within a Sufi 
framework also leads to the reorganization of the social relations of the 
individual and gives an exemplary character to the individual perform-
ance in various social settings. 
An example of this kind of “inner conversion” was the case of a 
young engineer in his thirties from a very secular and rich family who 
became a disciple of Shaykh Nadim, a Shadhili shaykh of Aleppo. He 
not only adopted a very strict moral behaviour, growing a beard, stop-
ping to drink and to intermingle freely with women, but also gradu-
ally reshaped all his social relations according to the moral principles 
preached by his shaykh. It is interesting to note that this man present-
ed both his religious piety, such as regular mosque attendance and 
participation in the Sufi hadra, and his “modern asceticism,” such as the 
practice of sports and a strong work ethic, as complementary parts of 
his moral performance.
Sometimes this process can create challenges to shared assumptions 
about the common good social practices that are culturally legitimate 
can be abandoned or changed as a result of the moral performance of 
individuals grouped together by their affiliation to a Sufi shaykh. For 
example, three disciples of Shaykh Nadim who owned shops in the 
district of Bab al-Faraj in Aleppo decided to abandon the practice of 
bargaining and haggling over prices in their commercial activities, as 
they felt that it was contrary to the Sufi principle of sidq (correctness). 
When asked these disciples whether this was not bad for their busi-
ness, one of them answered, “We have good people who buy from our 
shops because they know they can trust us. More than that, our master 
[pointing to Shaykh Nadim’s picture hanging on the wall of his shop] is 
ever protecting us from temptation.” 
The meaning of the principle of sidq was shaped by an experiential 
universe defined by a strong sense of personal and public morality 
combined with trust and respect towards the shaykh, which was en-
acted by the moral performance of the disciples in their ordinary prac-
tices. While other merchants criticized this methodical moral perform-
ance as excessive and exhibitionistic, the organization of a moral space 
for economic exchange, symbolically demarcated by Shaykh Nadim’s 
picture, attracted a regular clientele. Therefore, this orchestrated col-
lective moral performance created the possibility of the emergence of 
stable circles of shared anticipation and trust even in a public arena as 
volatile as the marketplace. 
This emergence of new circuits of solidarity, moral authority, and so-
cial distinction can bring about the re-signification of social practices 
and the redistribution of prestige, power, and authority in the public 
sphere. The processes of social change and reconfiguration generated 
by the performative mobilization of Sufi subjectivities and embodied 
principles in the public sphere constitute important elements to un-
derstand the constraints and possibilities present in the Syrian society, 
as Syria faces serious political and economic challenges in the interna-
tional arena.
Paulo G. Pinto is a Ph.D. candidate in Anthropology from Boston 
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A L I X  P H I L I P P O N
Bridging Sufism 
and Islamism
Founded in Jhang, Pakistan, in 1981 
by maulana Tahirul Qadri, the Min-
hajul Quran (MUQ - the method of the 
Quran) is not per se a Sufi order even 
though the structure of the organiza-
tion, its ideology and functioning does 
betray strong Sufi influence. Reformist, 
this movement inscribes itself in the 
activist wave of modern Islamic reviv-
alism without denying a strong sense 
of belonging to the Sufi tradition. At 
first a religious organization aimed at 
preaching, educating and providing 
welfare, the MUQ has turned overtly 
political in 1989 through the creation 
of a party, Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT). It contested general elections 
before withdrawing from electoral politics after the leader decided to 
resign from his seat at the National Assembly in October 2004, seem-
ingly in strong protest against Musharraf. In more than two decades, 
the movement has become a trans-national politico-religious organiza-
tion numbering, besides those in Pakistan, more than 25000 members 
in more than 20 countries, and sympathizers in more than 80 countries 
-mainly of Pakistani background. 
The MUQ describes itself as a “revolutionary movement of revival-
ism.” It has a rationalized organizational model with a strict hierarchy 
inspired from the biggest Islamist movement of Pakistan, the Jamaat-i 
Islami. It has been active in re-islamizing Pakistani society from below 
through a chain of educational institutions, active preaching activities, 
and the diffusion of the thought of Qadri through hundreds of titles 
ranging from religion to science in the shape of books, tapes, CDs, and 
an extensive use of the Internet.2 The same tools are used to spread the 
message abroad. Most of the centres in 
the “West” have been set up as sponta-
neous initiatives from Muslims of Paki-
stani origin won over by the message 
and the interpretation of Islam given 
by Qadri and who felt the need to or-
ganize community centres in order to 
consort and practise their faith togeth-
er according to these guidelines.
By its organization and activities, the 
MUQ does not differ much from other 
Islamist movements in Pakistan. Its 
specificity in the Pakistani context is 
its effort to create institutions in which 
the spiritual energy and the values as-
sociated with Sufism can be channelled in socializing sets. Qadri has 
reclaimed spirituality as the specific stamp of Islam and as the true rep-
resentative of the subcontinent’s cultural ethos. He is therefore very 
defensive as far as Sufism is concerned. Mahfil-e sama (spiritual recita-
tions) including qawwali music and dhikr recitations are regularly held 
in the headquarters in Lahore, and one can download recordings of 
naats (praises to the Prophet) and spiritual music, be it Abida Parveen 
or Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, from the web site. Folk and pop music is also 
available online. The concept of intermediation, which is at stake in the 
ongoing debate among Islamic groups, is being defended as a legiti-
mate practice in Islam. Although critical of some ritualistic aspects of 
the cult of the saints, the members of MUQ do perform ziyarat, tomb 
visitation, which is, to them, the “granite foundation” of the beliefs of the 
Ahl-e-Sunnah. The values of peace, love, tolerance, and brotherhood, 
identified as Sufi, are promoted as universal references informing the 
ideology and the modes of action of the organization. The great Sufis 
are perceived as role models and mysti-
cism as a tool to be used for the ethical 
reformation of the people in order “to 
bring peace, harmony, and humanism 
in society.” The greater jihad, the proc-
ess of self-purification, is the prerequi-
site for the lesser jihad, whose aim is to 
purify social and political evils. 
Thus, the enemy is clearly identified 
as the “Wahhabi” trend, which tends to 
promote a purified Islam while rejecting 
traditions and customs associated with 
Sufism and to “monopolize the rhetoric 
of religious legitimacy.”3 Identified by 
the leader of MUQ as being a deviation 
of Islam, it is charged with promoting 
terrorism and extremism, two evils for-
eign to Sufism. Qadri was one of the 
few maulanas of Pakistan to have taken 
a strong stance against Bin Laden. In a 
country where there is a nexus of the 
sectarian and jihadi groups with main-
stream Islamist organizations, MUQ 
and PAT seem to have offered an alter-
native to many Muslims, mainly Barel-
wis. They have reacted to the construc-
tion of the new Islamic identity and 
thus religiosity, based on an exclusive 
idea of purity, which have character-
ized Pakistani activism and militancy 
mainly since the beginning of the 80’s 
Sufism, perceived as the mystical strain of 
Islam, and political Islam, labelled as Islamism, 
has often been presented as quite simply 
antagonistic both by Muslim actors as well as 
by scholarly discourse. Recent studies have 
however, emphasized the fact that the frontiers 
between the two are far more ambivalent and 
porous than is generally thought.1 A Pakistani 
based Islamic politico-religious organization 
has tried to reorganize these categories of 
Islam in a religious reformulation granting 
centrality to Sufism, thus challenging the 
stereotypical representations of reformism 
in its society.
Spiritual dance 
during a qawali 
session, 
Pakistan, 2005
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and have promoted a path of “moderation” in rejecting radicalism. For 
them, revival is not synonymous with conflict, violence or opposition 
to the West, but with cooperation and dialogue among cultures and re-
ligions, with ethical reformation, and with modern and Islamic educa-
tion. The organization of Qadri has thus tried to avoid sectarian divides 
in conceptualising an ideology based on universal values.
A charismatic leadership with a Sufi twist 
“Shaykh,” “Leader,” “murshid (guide)” are a few of the numerous ex-
pressions used to designate Tahirul Qadri. His work has consisted in 
composing a complex partition of competences and registers of legiti-
mization where the religious, political, academic, and spiritual domains 
have together composed a unique symphony of power. A prolific au-
thor, a respected religious leader, a leader of a political party and of a 
trans-national organization, a lawyer, a poet, a Sufi venerated by his 
devotees, Qadri shows his followers the countenance of an absolute 
guide endowed with great authority.
Within his composite leadership, the Sufi repertoire is of particular in-
terest, for it reinvents a contested tradition, though still very much alive in 
Pakistan—that of the pir (Sufi), whose resources Qadri mobilizes in a mod-
ernizing way. A disciple of a Qadiri Shaykh (Pir Tahir Alauddin Al Gilani) 
under the spiritual guidance of whom he has placed his organization, 
Qadri has always refused to assume the responsibility of spiritual succes-
sion, stopping short of ever initiating disciples through the traditional 
vow of allegiance-bai‘at. By doing so, in his own words, he has avoided 
becoming the rival of all other pirs of the country as well as limiting him-
self to this traditional status. Therefore, the procedures for membership 
have been modernized: filling a form is the only requirement, along with 
a fee. In a way, the traditional authority of the Sufi has been converted 
into a modern leadership. Notwithstanding, Qadri makes it clear to his 
followers that a faithful and active commitment within the organization 
makes them automatically disciples of the tariqa Qadiriyya and that they 
become the disciples of Abd al-Qadir Gilani. Therefore, if the members are 
not “disciples” per se of Qadri, his own initiation within the Qadiri broth-
erhood operates as a spiritual channel providing a relay back with the 
original founder of the order. But most members consider Qadri as their 
true spiritual leader, the one who can help and guide them, very often 
through dreams. Furthermore, the leader keeps promising his devotees 
a place in paradise. As such, he does claim the power of intermediation 
of a wali Allah, a friend of God. This spiritual bond is a strong incentive 
for activism: members deploy their energies often voluntarily to keep the 
organization working, especially in the MUQ centres abroad, and donate 
their money to finance its numerous activities. Therefore, if Qadri is the 
“patron-in-chief” of an NGO, the leader of a political party and is not a 
traditional Sufi master as such, for he does not wish his organization to 
become a Sufi brotherhood, the charismatic element is still dominant in 
the construction of his authority. 
The 2005 spiritual tour of MUQ 
Even if not actualized for the sake of modernization, the master/disciple 
scheme remains the prevalent form of authority within the movement. 
Last summer, I had the opportunity to join a “spiritual tour” where 250 
members of MUQ from the European diaspora accompanied their leader 
to Syria and Turkey for two weeks. We visited the tombs of great Sufis 
(such as Ibn Arabi and Rumi), pre-Islamic Prophets (such as Yahya and 
Zacharia), and illustrious characters of Islamic history (companions, fam-
ily members of the Prophet, and Umayyad Caliphs). As I have witnessed, 
the devotion, love and adab the members displayed towards their guide 
recalled the ones traditionally owed to a Sufi master. For example, during 
the qawwali sessions organized in Damascus, Konya, and Istanbul, Qadri 
was performing the duty of a traditional shaykh, mediating between the 
qawwals and the audience, and between them and God. Some members 
were dancing in honour of the Shaykh with ferocious and spontaneous 
joy in a style more reminiscent of bhangra (Penjabi folk music and dance) 
than of the whirling dervishes. They sometimes prostrated at his feet in 
a display of emotion and respect. Labelled as “the true representative of 
the Holy Prophet” in the present age during a speech delivered by a sen-
ior MUQ officer from England, Qadri was presented as an intermediary 
taking people closer to the Prophet, representing all the Sufi orders, and 
showering the grace of past Muslim scholars onto all those following his 
“mission.” For example, Qadri made of all the present members of the con-
gregation the “intellectual disciples” of Ibn Arabi during a ceremony held 
at his shrine in the Syrian capital city. 
Two mahfil-e sama were also organized with Syrian Sufis of the Shadhili-
yya while in Damascus, where dhikr as well as musical spiritual sessions 
were held. One Syrian scholar, Shaykh Yaqubi, had visited the organiza-
tion in Lahore in May 2004 during the celebration of the birthday of the 
Prophet. Following this visit, Qadri was honoured with the title of shaykh-
ul islam by Syrian religious scholars, such as Ustad Shaykh Assad Asghar, 
a muhaddith and imam at the Umayyad mosque, and scholars from the 
Shadhiliyya. Qadri was thus acknowledged as none less than the lead-
ing religious authority in the present era. This title was bestowed on the 
basis of his spiritual qualities, his achievements in the fields of education, 
preaching, as well as his religious and intellectual productions. This vali-
dation by Arab religious leaders has considerably enhanced his prestige 
among his followers and worked as a legitimization tool both in Pakistan 
and abroad.
A Sufi attempt to build a new political modernity 
for Islam?
The ideological system of MUQ has been established on the basis of a 
critical approach to Islamism in its relation with Sufism. It shows an aware-
ness of the fact Sufism has been excluded from the symbolic resources of 
Islam by many Islamists. It also acknowledges the corruption within some 
Sufi practices and the necessity to come out from 
traditional institutions and evolve a modern form 
of organization. It is critical of the doctrines and 
actions of what they call “Wahhabis” and has taken 
into account the way this category of Islamists has 
shaped Western opinion on Islam. In other words, 
it has rationalized the terms of the heated ongoing 
debate about Islam, modernity, and the West and 
tried to evolve a suitable alternative evolving Suf-
ism as a cultural, ethical, intellectual, and political 
resource for the Muslim world.
Despite the ups and downs of its history, PAT has 
attempted to reconcile the Islamic symbolic system 
with the values of political modernity. A partisan of 
ijtihad, the independent reasoning and interpreta-
tion, Qadri believes that Islam is a “dynamical proc-
ess and an evolutionary system.” For him like for 
other Islamists, Islam is at the same time a compre-
hensive code of human conduct, and the legal and 
symbolic basis for a socio-economic and political 
order. However, the fact that the name of the party 
does not include “Islam” is a conscious decision to 
differentiate this political formation from other “re-
ligious” parties. 
Opposed to any sectarian position, PAT has made 
an effort towards inclusiveness, and it is open to Shi-
ites as well as Christians. In the frame of the debate 
about whether Islam is compatible with democ-
racy, the leader of PAT has made a point that the 
Islamic paradigm is convertible into the modern political idiom evolved 
in the West. His will to reduce antagonism with Western thought has led 
him to claim, like the father of Islamic reformism Muhammad Abduh, that 
“Islamic State means a pure democratic State,” even though there might 
be differences in interpretation and definition. There is a common set of 
institutions and values shared by both systems: pluralism, human rights, 
equality, social justice were all present, according to him, in the nizam-i 
mustafa, the political system built on the model of the Prophet’s com-
munity. “All things which West wants are already in Quran,” says Qadri. In 
a way, PAT has secularized the Islamic principles to 
make them compatible with the conceptual frame-
work of political modernity. Inscribed in a context 
of globalization and tense national debate, the ide-
ology of MUQ has probably worked successfully at 
conquering new religious markets. As for PAT, it has 
so far seemingly failed in mobilizing the masses. 
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M.A. thesis, “Sufislamism: the paradoxical invention of a new political modernity in Islam? 
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The Story of a Picture
Shiite Depictions 
of Muhammad
Shiite Muslims in Iran have a very lively 
tradition of depicting members of the 
Prophet’s family and the Prophet Mu-
hammad himself. Since the end of the 
nineties, popular selling “posters” are 
printed in Iran showing the Prophet 
Muhammad as a beautiful young man, 
with a turban, a tunic slipped from the 
shoulder and a languorous expres-
sion.3 The Iranian religious “posters” 
of today are printed by modern proc-
esses, which allow countless variations 
through the use of paintings, photo-
graphs, drawings, or a collage of various images and techniques. Even 
if the technique is modern, the representation remains traditional: the 
background is plain-coloured, and the colours are juxtaposed. The im-
ages of these venerated persons are depicted with stereotyped fea-
tures, postures, and attributes that make their identification easier, 
Ali”s double pointed sword for instance.4
But the portrait in question today is significantly different from the 
previous images: it shows a very attractive adolescent, with tender 
eyes and a delicate face, evoking the 
mannerism of the late Renaissance, es-
pecially the male adolescents painted 
by Caravaggio, for instance, the Young 
Boy Carrying a Fruit Basket (Roma, 
Borghese Gallery) or the Saint John the 
Baptist (Capitole Museum); same velvet 
softness of the cheeks, same half-open 
mouth, same caressing look. Though 
there are several variants of the por-
trait, they all represent the same youth-
ful face, generally identified by the 
inscription “Muhammad, Allah’s mes-
senger” or by a more precise caption referring to an episode of the life 
of the Prophet and to the supposed origin of the image. We will come 
back to that later on. 
Surprising discovery
By chance, in 2004 we were able to identify the origin of the Iranian 
poster image when visiting in Paris an exhibition dedicated to the pho-
tographers Lehnert & Landrock. It was a photograph made by Lehnert 
in Tunis, probably between 1904 and 1906, and printed and circulated 
as a postcard in the early twenties.
Originating from Bohemia, Rudolf Franz Lehnert (1878-1948), associ-
ated with the German Ernst Heinrich Landrock (1878-1966), settled in 
Tunis in 1904, the former as photographer, the latter as manager and 
publisher. Having sojourned in Tunisia the previous year, Lehnert had 
been sensitive to the charm of its landscapes and its habitants. The firm 
(L&L) specialized in picturesque views of Tunis, later of Cairo and Egypt 
after the first World War, and in scenes corresponding to an exotic-colo-
nial aesthetic. L&L produced thousands of photographs and postcards 
of Tunisia, Egypt, and other Near-Eastern countries. 
Lehnert, who studied at the Institute of Graphic Arts in Vienna, had 
ties with the pictorialist movement, which considered photography as 
a work of art. Lehnert’s photographs show not only the desert, rolling 
sand dunes, picturesque markets, and indigenous areas of old Tunis, 
but also the prepubescent, as pubescent girls and young boys, half un-
dressed, posing against the “oriental scenery” of his old Tunisian palace. 
With their graceful look of an age that hesitates between childhood and 
adolescence, between feminine and masculine, these boys and girls as 
pictured by Lehnert corresponded to the tastes of a European clien-
tele, sensitive to Oriental phantasms and seductions. The publication in 
1902 of L’immoraliste of André Gide is more than a coincidence.5
Lehnert has certainly made use of the register of exoticism and of 
its phantasms, but with great talent. His images were published in ar-
gentic prints, in heliogravure, in four-colour process, or hand-painted. 
Most of the postcards were printed in Germany from 1920 on and dis-
tributed from Cairo.
Matching prints and texts
No doubt that the sepia postcard, number 106 following the numera-
tion of L&L (picture 1) served as model to the Iranian posters. There are 
traces of sepia visible on some of the Iranian posters. Moreover, the 
postcard number 106 alone is entitled “Mohamed,” which no doubt was 
one of the reasons why this one was chosen as the prototype for the 
Iranian portraits. Clearly, the different variants of the Iranian posters all 
stem from the single postcard number 106; they are all its unmistak-
In spite of the relative prohibition of graphic 
representation of living beings, especially 
members of the Prophet’s family,1 as expressed 
by religious authorities in the Islamic world, 
colourful paper prints showing Ali, son-in-
law of Muhammad, and his sons Hassan and 
Hussayn, even the Prophet himself, are not rare 
in contemporary Iran. In this article the authors 
tell the story of how a picture of a Tunesian 
boy became the model for popular selling 
posters depicting the Prophet Muhammad 
as a beautiful young man.2
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Picture 1. 
“Mohamed”, 
postcard 
number 106, 
by Lehnert 
and Landrock. 
14 x 8,9 cm
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able reproduction with the first editions of the Iranian posters being the 
most similar to the postcard. Unwittingly, Lehnert is at the origin of a 
kind of mystification, which based on the use, by the Iranian publishers, 
of an ambiguous and colonial portrait that had been given the name of 
Mohamed.
The question of the correspondence between the traditional descrip-
tions of the Prophet, the written or oral Traditions, and the image of the 
young Tunisian boy is open. This postcard shows the portrait of a smil-
ing adolescent, with parted lips, a turbaned head, and a jasmine flower 
over the ear. The same young boy appears in other postcards coloured 
or sepia, in slightly different poses, and with different names: Ahmed, 
Young Arab, Young Arab nomad….
We have not been able to discover the path that lead from the 
postcard printed in the twenties, to Tehran and Qom where the post-
ers have been published since the beginning of the nineties. But we 
were intrigued by the question of which idea or evidence could have 
suggested to the Iranian publishers a shared identity between the 
Prophet of Islam in his young age and the picture of the Tunisian ado-
lescent? 
Already before the First World War, the photograph of “Mohamed” 
was reproduced, for instance in The National Geographic Magazine of 
January 1914, illustrating an article entitled “Here and There in North-
ern Africa,” with the caption “An Arab and his Flower.” In the twenties, 
the Tunisian postcards of L&L were very popular among the French 
troops in North Africa and the Levant. Recently, in the eighties and 
nineties, several books including the portrait of the young adolescent 
were published, but always with other designations than “Mohamed.” 
The present Iranian versions, touched up, keep something of the seduc-
tiveness of the adolescent, but soften his excessively sensual expression, 
while trying to reconcile the sacred character of the Prophet to the dis-
turbing beauty of the young man. The left shoulder is lightly covered by 
a drape, the mouth and gaze have been modified. On several posters, the 
flowers on the ear are fused with the folds of the turban. By many ways, 
the Iranian artists tend to erase the feminine tones of the photography of 
Lehnert or what gives the young man a too sensual a character. 
The caption on one of the poster images (picture 2) specifies: “Bless-
ed portrait of the venerated Muhammad, at the age of eighteen during 
his journey from Mecca to Damascus 6 when accompanying his vener-
ated uncle on a trade expedition. Portrait due to the paintbrush of a 
Christian priest; the original painting is at present in a ‘Muze-i Rum’.”7 In 
another poster, the designer has touched up the face by adding dim-
ples on the chin of the adolescent; the green-striped turban is held by 
a green and golden braid. In a poster, dated 2001-2002, lines draw rays 
illuminating the head of the future Prophet. The mountainous back-
ground of another print refers to a later event, when, during the flight 
from Mecca, Muhammad took refuge in a cave, on whose entrance God 
ordered a spider to spin a web so as to hide the Prophet from his pur-
suers. 
Christian origins?
As previously noted, an inscription attributes the work to a Christian 
origin, and not to an Islamic one, which exculpates the Muslims from 
the non-observance of the image prohibition and from the sacrilege of 
representing the Prophet. This attribution also asserts the recognition 
by the Christians of the sacred character of Muhammad, already in the 
Prophet’s early years.8 It speaks of a Christian priest, which would ap-
pear to be the Nestorian or Orthodox priest Bahira who, according to 
a story going back to the ninth-tenth century, should have recognized 
the “Prophet-to-be” by a sign—a mark of prophethood between his 
shoulders—during his sojourn in Syria. The future Prophet should have 
said : “When I look at the heaven and the stars, I see myself above the 
stars,” from where the inspiration for the background of some variants 
showing the vault spangled with stars. 
The textual tradition does not say anything on Bahira being a painter. 
The supposed Christian origin of the portrait refers, perhaps, to another 
story according to which the Emperor Heraclius of Byzantium (610-641) 
would have shown to a delegation of Muhammad’s companions com-
ing from Mecca the portraits of all the prophets including Muhammad, 
the last of all prophets.9
Even though we have no physical description of Muhammad as an ado-
lescent, there exist descriptions of his features as an adult, transmitted by 
several sources: he was said to have a white complexion, slightly blushed, 
black eyes, smooth cheeks, bushy eyebrows in a shapely curve, well sepa-
rated teeth, and lightly wavy hair. These are also the 
features of the adolescent on the Iranian posters as 
well as of many others. It is the portrait of a portrait, 
a representation of a representation. Thus the Irani-
an publishers have chosen a model of the Prophet 
Muhammad representing an ideal of youth, beauty, 
and harmony.
Picture 2. 
Portrait of 
the young 
Muhammad. 
Poster printed 
in Tehran.  
49,5 x 34,5 cm. 
Bought in 
Tehran, 
November 
1998.
The Iranian publishers 
have chosen a model 
of Prophet Muhammad 
representing an ideal 
of youth, beauty, 
and harmony.
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M I C H I E L  L E E Z E N B E R G
Approaching Modern 
Muslim Thought
It is not easy to circumscribe the field 
of the intellectual history of the mod-
ern Islamic world, nor is it immediately 
clear with what conceptual tools it is 
best handled. First, contemporary Is-
lamic thought is not institutionally dis-
tinguished, as an autonomous academic 
discipline; it is thoroughly intermingled 
with various other flows of knowledge. 
Second, it is far from clear whether Is-
lamic thought can or should be treated 
in isolation from secular currents of 
modern thought, be they liberal, na-
tionalist, or Marxist. Third, it remains an 
open question in how far the intellectual 
experience of the Islamic world over the 
last two centuries is radically different, 
or can even be treated in isolation, from 
those of, say, South Asia, China, or Africa. 
In fact, it displays both an obvious geo- and demographic overlap and 
a common political experience with all of them: all have witnessed so-
cial, political and intellectual modernization under (quasi-) colonial rule 
followed by a—typically nationalist, populist or even socialist—phase of 
decolonization and the Cold War, and more recently by what have been 
called ethnic and religious revivals. 
The modernizing Islamic world
Premodern Islamic intellectual history is rather easier to delimit. During 
the classical Age, ranging roughly from the tenth to the seventeenth or 
eighteenth centuries, the Islamic world knew a relatively clearly delineat-
ed field of knowledge, or more generally intellectual activity, subdivided 
into the two paradigms of, respectively, the Greek/rational and the Arab/ 
traditional sciences. Moreover, legitimate forms of higher learning were 
generally reproduced through recognized institutions of learning like 
madrasas, in which the individual contact between teacher and student 
was at least as important as written texts or fixed curricula. As an autono-
mous discipline, philosophy (falsafa, or hikma) never acquired an official 
status in the madrasas; but under the guise of logic, theology, and even 
mysticism, it exerted a lasting formative intellectual 
influence, especially in Shiite centres of learning. 
Further, there was a widespread conviction that 
philosophical and other forms of higher learning 
were to be the preserve of the educated elites, and 
should not be divulged to the masses. Last but not 
least, virtually the entire corpus of premodern Is-
lamic knowledge was written in Arabic.
Starting around the nineteenth century, however, 
all of this was to change. Gradually, new genres of 
writing emerged, such as the newspaper article, the 
novel, and the theatre play; new institutions of edu-
cation opened, often based on modern English or 
French curricula; while new forms of language were 
articulated for expressing new ideas and practices. 
On the one hand, languages hitherto considered 
unworthy of communicating higher learning, most 
notably Turkish, came to be adopted as media of communication and 
instruction; on the other, classical languages, like Arabic and Persian, un-
derwent drastic changes in vocabulary, syntax, and style. Together, these 
trends not only increased but radically transformed the reading public. 
Nor were they merely a matter of slavishly copying Western models and 
influences: they were at least in part driven by changing domestic con-
cerns of central authority and local opposition. 
The story of the modernizing Islamic 
world is highly complex and poorly un-
derstood; in the current constellation, 
there is a particularly pressing need 
for up-to-date works of synthesis that 
capture its broader outlines. Over the 
past decades, valuable studies on cul-
tural and intellectual changes have ap-
peared, but remarkably few attempts 
at providing comprehensive and ac-
cessible overviews. Worse, a focus on 
individual authors, or a restriction of 
analyses to specific countries or lan-
guages may, despite their inherent 
value and validity, tend to overlook the 
large-scale convergences and patterns 
that transcend national and linguistic 
boundaries.
Tenacious assumptions
Existing overviews, no matter how good, are by now largely outdated. 
It may be just a coincidence that in the early sixties, a number of studies 
appeared in succession, all of which have since established themselves 
as classics: Albert Hourani’s Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (1962), 
Niyazi Berkes’s Development of Secularism in Turkey (1964), Bernard 
Lewis’s Emergence of Modern Turkey (1961) and Serif Mardin’s Genesis 
of Young Ottoman Thought (1962). In retrospect, all of these appear to 
share some significant, and rather problematic, assumptions. First, to 
some extent, all proceed from modernization-theoretical assumptions 
of a progressive and irreversible process of secularization towards a lib-
eral modernity in both the political and the economic sense. Secondly, 
they insufficiently thematize the nation state and nationalist ideology. 
Although they are obviously not nationalist in the political sense, they 
all tend to assume secular modern states and national languages, in-
cluding distinct language-based cultural traditions, as the inevitable 
end-point if not a self-evident framework of their analyses. 
One of the prime questions to be answered, however, is precisely 
why it was specific forms of nationalism (rather than, say, Ottomanism, 
Islamic Modernism, Pan-Islamism, let alone Socialism) that carried the 
day in the formation of new states in the region, and how religion was 
rearticulated against the background of these modern states. 
Since then, few works of synthesis have appeared concerning the 
Islamic world as a whole. Exceptions, like Aziz al-Azmeh’s important 
studies in the history of ideas tend to be formulated in diffusionist 
terms of how various Arab and Islamic movements copied or imitated 
post-Enlightenment Western models. Such analyses are a useful anti-
dote to the persistent rhetoric of an essentially anti-modern and unen-
lightened Islam; but they tend to reproduce stereotypes of the Arabo-
Islamic world (and more generally the non-Western world) as the mere 
passive recipient, if not the helpless victim, of a political and intellec-
tual modernity that originated elsewhere. Recently, such widely-held 
assumptions about modernity as exclusively European in origin have 
been forcefully challenged by historians like Christopher Bayly.1
Although most present-day exercises in the intellectual history of 
the Islamic world clearly derive their analytical categories and indeed 
their inspiration from political, social and economic history, there have 
been few attempts to link these respective fields more systematically. 
Indeed, there seems to be little if any exchange between works in these 
different areas of specialization. For example, Inalcik and Quataert’s vo-
luminous overview of Ottoman social and economic history (1996) is 
silent on cultural and intellectual developments; and Hourani’s History 
of the Arab Peoples (1991) does not even mention the nahda, the nine-
The intellectual history of the modernizing 
Islamic world remains relatively isolated from 
research in related fields, and from theoretical 
debates elsewhere. In consequence, it remains 
dominated by modernization-theoretical, 
nationalist, and secularist assumptions, 
whether in the guise of liberal or of 
Marxist-inspired approaches. Alternatively, 
a genealogical perspective is outlined, which 
places the rise of the secular nation state in 
a broader perspective of changing ways of 
governing, taking neither Western economic 
or cultural dominance as all-determining, 
nor individual agency as given. Rather, it 
systematically focuses on changing relations 
of power as constitutive of new states, 
new actors, and new forms of knowledge.
The story of the 
modernizing Islamic 
world is highly 
complex and poorly 
understood…
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teenth- and twentieth-century Arab literary and cultural renaissance, by 
name. References to recent research on, for example, South Asia, not to 
mention theoretical debates, are relatively rare in works on the Middle 
East. Conversely, theoretical discussions in intellectual history are either 
silent on the Islamic world, or rely on outdated or one-sided sources of 
information. Thus, a recent issue of the Journal of the History of Ideas (vol. 
66, no.2 (2005), devoted to intellectual history in an era of globalization, 
makes little reference to anything Islamic other than the September 11 
assaults.
Consequently, frameworks of modernization theory and Marxist po-
litical economy continue to exercise a tenacious influence. Thus, Ber-
nard Lewis’s flawed but highly influential overview What Went Wrong? 
(2002) is dominated by modernization-theoretical assumptions and 
oppositions; and Ibrahim Abu Rabi’s Contemporary Arab Thought: Stud-
ies in Post-1968 Intellectual History (2004) is informed by a vocabulary of 
imperialism and cultural hegemony. Neither approach is in and of itself 
invalid or illegitimate; but it may be of more than academic importance 
to find a way of avoiding the extremes of, or of transcending the antag-
onisms between, a self-congratulating narrative of liberal and secular 
modernity and a repetitive if not stagnant oppositional third-worldism. 
Books like Lewis’s and Abu Rabi’s are as much theoretical reflections as 
practical contributions to an ongoing ideological and political strug-
gle. Faced with the apparently inevitable onslaught of world capital-
ism, and more recently of neoliberal cultural hegemony, it is tempt-
ing to deny non-Western subjects all agency; but in fact, actions on 
all sides appear thoroughly intermingled, and indeed mutually con-
stitutive. Thus, to mention but one example, Ernest Renan’s doctoral 
research on Averroes and Averroism, and his early sojourn in Lebanon, 
contributed to the shaping of his later views on nationalism, religion, 
and civilizational progress; his views on Islam were famously discussed 
(and in part accepted) by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani; and Renan’s reading 
of Averroes has demonstrably shaped both secular and Islamist think-
ers in the Arab world, such as Farah Antoun, Muhammad Abduh, and 
Muhammad Abed al-Jabri. 
Because of the pervasive intermingling and interaction between au-
thors from the West and the Muslim world (not to mention complex 
patterns of migration, especially among academic authors), it becomes 
increasingly difficult to maintain the initially plausible distinctions 
between objective science and subjective ideology, between profes-
sional academic knowledge and local opinion, or between scholarly 
and practical reason. It therefore makes sense to look beyond ideas or 
doctrines as either autonomous or self-sufficient entities or as mere 
reflections of an underlying economic or political logic, and to study 
them in the context of changing channels and institutions of knowl-
edge production, and of the changing ways of legitimizing and del-
egitimizing knowledge.
A genealogical approach
It is at this point that we may see what is to be gained from a genea-
logical mode of analysis, that is, an approach that looks at the changing 
ways in which knowledge is involved in changing practices of exercis-
ing—and resisting—power. Such a genealogical approach, pioneered 
by Michel Foucault, cannot be straightforwardly operationalized for 
the Islamic world, however: what Foucault has to say about the Islamic 
world is either deeply problematic (witness his much-misunderstood 
writings on the Iranian revolution), or inexplicably absent (witness his 
silence regarding French colonial rule over Algeria). More recently, au-
thors like Talal Asad have been trying to open genealogical perspec-
tives on the modern Muslim world.2
It may be useful to determine what is central to a genealogical per-
spective. First, unlike Marxist approaches, it does not proceed from 
an assumed cleavage between economic base and economic super-
structure, but questions how such distinctions emerged historically, 
especially through changing practices of government. Neither does 
it treat “ideology” as necessarily false or distorting, and as opposed to 
some power-free objective scientific truth; rather, it assumes that all 
forms of knowledge and truth are constituted by relations of power. 
Most importantly, it takes power not as repressive or negative, but as 
productive of both knowledge and actors. Thus, new vocabularies cre-
ated by pioneers like Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi in Cairo and Ibrahim Shinasi not 
only helped in thinking about or describing a rapidly changing social 
reality; in a very real sense, they helped in bringing it about. Thus far, 
the Arabic literary renaissance or nahda has been studied primarily 
by philologists and literary historians rather than scholars working in 
intellectual history but its intellectual and even political implications 
went far beyond literary circles. It is hard to overemphasize the lasting 
and irreversible effects of such work in cultural translation.
Second, a genealogical approach need not proceed from the as-
sumption that all of modernity was imported or imposed from the side 
of the imperialist West, or that all non-Western action in this process 
was a matter of either adaptation and collaboration, or of resistance 
and contestation; rather, it opens the question of what kinds of agency 
were shaped and constituted by processes of modernization. Thus, 
new local elites and intelligentsia were constituted by new practices 
of education, publishing, and government playing various new, and 
highly contested, roles in the intellectual developments of the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, increasingly writing and speaking as 
rights-bearing citizens rather than the ruler’s subordinates.
Third, genealogical approaches focus not on individuals or institu-
tions, but on practices; moreover, they raise questions of how these 
practices are justified by different kinds of norms, and how they are 
constituted by different kinds of power. In this way, a more differen-
tiated account of various new forms of non-academic and unofficial 
“amateur knowledge,” produced by lay intellectuals, comes into view. 
The proof of the utility of such methodological 
innovations lies, or course, in their practical value 
in raising new questions, and in providing new an-
swers. This is not the place for such an evaluation; 
but it may be that among the more interesting in-
sights to be gained from a genealogical approach 
is, on the one hand, an awareness of similar or con-
verging patterns across national boundaries, and 
between thinkers conventionally labelled “Islamic” 
and “secular”; and on the other, a more thorough 
questioning of the framework of the nation-state 
than has hitherto been undertaken. 
Michiel Leezenberg teaches in the Department of Philosophy and in the M.A. Programme, 
Islam in the Modern World, at the University of Amsterdam. He has written a Dutch-language 
history of Islamic philosophy, an English translation of which is forthcoming.
Email: m.m.leezenberg@uva.nl
Albert 
Hourani, Arabic 
Thought in the 
Liberal Age, 
Oxford, 1962; 
Bernard Lewis, 
The Emergence 
of Modern 
Turkey, Oxford, 
1962; Niyazi 
Berkes, The 
Development 
of Secularism 
in Turkey, 
Montreal, 1964.
Notes
1. Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, 2nd 
ed. (Verso, 1996); C.A. Bayly, The Birth of the 
Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections 
and Comparisons (Blackwell, 2004).
2. Cf., most famously, Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison (Random House, 1977); Talal Asad, 
Genealogies of Religion (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993). 
C
O
U
R
T
E
S
Y
 O
F
 L
E
ID
E
N
 U
N
IV
E
R
S
IT
Y
 L
IB
R
A
R
Y
, 
2
0
0
6
I S I M  R E V I E W  1 7  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 6  2 1
Muslim Intellectuals
M A R T I N  V A N  
B R U I N E S S E N
Nurcholish Madjid 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectual
Nurcholish Madjid’s career as a public 
intellectual was closely correlated with 
the emergence and demise of Indone-
sia’s New Order, the political system 
put in place by General Suharto. He 
was a prominent member of the stu-
dent generation of 1966, which played 
an active role in the demonstrations 
that weakened Sukarno and prepared 
the way for Suharto’s final takeover 
in 1966. In that crucial year he was 
elected the chairman of the Muslim 
student union, HMI—a position he 
held for two consecutive three-year 
terms. A number of provocative public 
statements he made about the need 
to rethink petrified modes of Muslim 
thought and patterns of action in the 
name of Islam received wide press cov-
erage and gave him the reputation of chief legitimizer of the New Or-
der’s policies towards Islam. His statements could be, and were, read as 
a devastating critique of the existing Muslim parties and organizations, 
their obsession with the ideal of an Islamic state, and the general stale-
ness of their religious ideas. A comment he made on secularization as 
the “de-sacralization” of concepts and institutions that had been turned 
into sacred objects by the Muslim community was misread as a call for 
secularism. This all went down well with the regime, which was bent on 
depoliticizing society and destroying the political muscle of Islam, but 
it earned Nurcholish the lasting enmity of many of the older genera-
tion of Muslim political leaders—especially those 
of the Masyumi party, who had been jailed or 
pushed into the political margin by Sukarno and 
were never rehabilitated under Suharto. 
In the final days of Suharto’s rule, when the 
president made a last-ditch attempt to form 
a new cabinet in response to the ever louder 
protests and calls for reform and invited nine 
Muslim leaders to give him advice, Nurcholish 
was the only one who had the courage to tell 
Suharto in polite words that those calls for re-
form meant that the people wanted him to step 
down. This was the other side of Nurcholish’ po-
sition as New Order legitimizer: he could with-
hold legitimization, as he had been one of the 
few who could exercise the moderate criticism 
of a loyal but independent supporter of the re-
gime. Unlike many others, including some who 
once had been vocal critics, Nurcholish never 
lost his independence. 
Islam, nationalism, intellectual
heritage
The impact of Nurcholish’ thought on the ideas 
and attitudes of the educated members of his own 
generation and the generations following can 
hardly be overestimated. At a time of rapid eco-
nomic and social change, he argued for a rational 
and dynamic interpretation of Islam, in which 
change and development are natural processes 
and God is the only unchanging Truth; established 
practices and received ideas should not be made 
into sacred icons, for that would be tantamount 
to shirk. In his numerous lectures and 
papers, quotations of Quranic verses 
and references to American sociolo-
gists and such thinkers as Bertrand Rus-
sell and Jean-Paul Sartre stand side by 
side. Doctoral studies at the University 
of Chicago during 1978-84, under Le-
onard Binder and Fazlur Rahman, fur-
ther broadened his horizon. He wrote 
his dissertation on reason and revela-
tion in the thought of Ibn Taymiya, the 
thinker most venerated by the Islamists 
who were his opponents at home, and 
his first major public statement upon 
return was a collection of translations 
of Muslim philosophical thinkers, from 
Kindi and Farabi to Afghani and Abduh, 
with a lengthy introduction on the intel-
lectual heritage of Islam. 
Nurcholish saw himself, and wished to be seen, as standing in a re-
form-minded and philosophically oriented Muslim intellectual tradi-
tion, and he was anxious to point out the genealogy of the ideas for 
which some of the old Masyumi leaders branded him a heretic. Dur-
ing his years in Chicago, he entered into correspondence with another 
Masyumi leader, the moderate Mohammad Roem, to explain his ideas 
in a form acceptable to the older man, and he made sure copies of this 
correspondence were—against Roem’s wishes—widely disseminated. 
Roem was famous as one of the men who had negotiated Indonesia’s 
independence, a former minister in several cabinets, and a Masyumi 
politician who had always had excellent relations with secular national-
ists; recognition by Roem was very important to Nurcholish, for it gave 
him, as it were, a legitimate pedigree in Indonesia’s Islamic movement 
and pointed to a respected earlier case of Muslim accommodation with 
secular nationalism. 
For Nurcholish, there was no contradiction between devotion to Islam 
and nationalism. Throughout his career he frequently made the argu-
ment, in one form or another, that the Indonesian nation owed its exist-
ence to Islam, for it had been Muslim rulers who had led the struggle 
against colonial occupation, and Muslim traders who united the archi-
pelago through their trading networks and their lingua franca, Malay. 
The only art forms that were all-Indonesian and not specific to a single 
ethnic group are those associated with Islam, such as the musical qasi-
dah and dangdut genres, with their Arab and Indian Ocean influences. 
One senses in Nurcholish’ understanding of “Indonesian-ness” the in-
fluence of Marshall Hodgson’s concept of “Islamicate” civilization, with 
which he became acquainted during his stay in Chicago. Christians, Hin-
dus and Buddhists are equal citizens in Nurcholish’ view of Indonesian 
society, but Islam provides the overarching civilizational unity. 
Muslim-Christian relations
Tense relations between Muslims and the Christian minority consti-
tuted an important but mostly hidden backdrop to the history of the 
New Order, occasionally erupting in riots and attacks on churches but 
soon submerged again, until violent power struggles became a domi-
nant part of the political scene after the fall of Suharto. Muslim lead-
ers, especially the old Masyumi politicians, were obsessed by perceived 
Christian efforts to undermine the Muslim ummah, to convert nominal 
Muslims and to expand their control of key positions in the state ap-
paratus through a conspiracy of businessmen, military officers, and for-
eign sponsors. Against that background Nurcholish’ friendly relations 
with (at least some of ) his Christian peers and his consistent defence 
of the thesis that Jews and Christians are the Muslims’ brothers-in-
Nurcholish Madjid, Indonesia’s best known 
Muslim intellectual, died in August last year 
after a prolonged and painful illness. At the 
time of his death, the country appeared to 
be drifting away into increasing religious 
intolerance: physical attacks by radical Muslims 
on makeshift churches and assaults on the 
main centre of the Ahmaddiyah movement, 
death threats against liberal Muslim thinkers, 
fatwas of Indonesia’s Ulama Council, once a 
paragon of moderation, against “liberal Islam,” 
secularism and religious pluralism. 
The days in which Nurcholish’ voice of 
moderation and inter-religious understanding 
was almost hegemonic, at least in the media, 
are rapidly fading away, and memories 
of Nurcholish resonate with nostalgia 
for times of greater harmony. 
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natural processes 
and God is the only 
unchanging Truth. 
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faith and that in several passages the Quran subsumes them 
under the label of Muslims represented a major departure 
from the apologetic or hostile attitudes of earlier reformist 
Muslim leaders. Along with the traditionalist leader Abdur-
rahman Wahid, who was to become an even more commit-
ted defender of the rights of religious minorities, Nurcholish 
was an effective builder of bridges between religious com-
munities: not only between Muslims and Christians but also 
with Hindus and Buddhists (who, he insisted, should also be 
considered as ahl al-kitab, “People of the Book”). 
He did share the elder leaders’ concern about the inten-
tions of some Christian leaders, however, and was wary of 
being used as a legitimizer of efforts to spread Christian-
ity and to weaken Islam. In the notorious Monitor affair of 
1990—the popular magazine Monitor had published an 
article that many Muslims perceived as a deliberate insult 
of the Prophet Muhammad—he responded furiously. The 
magazine belonged to Indonesia’s largest, Catholic-owned, 
press conglomerate. Militant Muslim groups, which had long 
nurtured grievances against the Christian domination of the 
press, organized angry and violent demonstrations against 
its offices. When the leading daily of the same conglomerate 
attempted to elicit a conciliatory statement from Nurchol-
ish to deflate the issue, he angrily refused to be used, and 
made some uncharacteristically harsh comments to other journalists. It 
was left to Abdurrahman Wahid to try to calm down the situation and 
remind his fellow Muslims of the example that the Prophet himself had 
given of patience and forgiving in the face of insults. 
The Monitor affair remained long on Nurcholish’ mind and made him 
suspicious of Christian intentions. In later years he occasionally com-
plained that Muslim tolerance went unanswered and that certain Chris-
tian circles plotted to weaken Islam and keep Muslims in a subjugated 
position. The only factor that might prevent future outbursts of inter-
religious conflict, he believed, was the government’s development pol-
icies, notably the educational revolution, which benefited especially 
the relatively underprivileged Muslim masses. 
Rise of the Muslim middle class
Young educated Muslims of Nurcholish’ generation were in fact 
among the main beneficiaries of the rapid economic growth and ex-
pansion of education during the New Order period. The peer network 
of HMI alumni moreover provided strong mutual support, and the en-
tire cohort experienced unprecedented social mobility, which enabled 
them to facilitate the same process for younger HMI members and 
alumni. By the mid 1980s, people became aware that a Muslim mid-
dle class has come into existence: Muslim in cultural background and 
self-identification, middle class in economic position and taste for 
consumption. A large proportion of this new Muslim middle class had 
been HMI members, and many looked up to Nurcholish as the thinker 
who best embodied Muslim modernity. 
Nurcholish returned from Chicago convinced that a strong middle 
class was a necessary condition for democratization, and from that 
time on his efforts appeared to be focused on educating and Islamizing 
the Indonesian middle class. Aided by friends of his HMI days who were 
experienced organizers and others who were economically successful, 
he set up a sophisticated “religious studies club” named Paramadina, 
which was to disseminate “inclusive” religious thought and stimulate 
intellectual debate. Paramadina provided a new type of religious ser-
mons, or rather seminar lectures, presented in posh modern surround-
ings, catering to the spiritual needs and intellectual ambitions of the 
new Muslim middle class. The country’s leading intellectuals were invit-
ed to deliver lectures at Paramadina, in tandem with a response in the 
form of a second lecture by Nurcholish himself and followed by a very 
free discussion. This was so successful that Paramadina had to gradu-
ally increase the number of lectures and offer courses on a broader 
range of religious subjects, among which Sufism became increasingly 
prominent and the positive appreciation of other religions remained 
a conspicuous element. Paramadina has played an important role in 
enriching the intellectual content of public discourse on Islam, and it 
has not shied away from controversial issues. 
Nurcholish continued to value his independence highly; he never ac-
cepted prestigious and well-paid official positions and, unlike many of 
his peers, stuck to a very modest, simple lifestyle. His prestige, however, 
was enormous; many former HMI activists reached high positions in 
politics, the media, business, education, and the bureaucracy, and they 
kept looking towards Nurcholish for moral and intellectual guidance. 
In the first freely elected parliament after Suharto’s fall, the number of 
delegates with HMI affiliation (present in all major parties) was over 
fifty per cent—more seats than any single party had won. In an impor-
tant sense, these elections crowned the success of HMI’s political as-
cension and of Nurcholish’ project of building a strong Muslim middle 
class as a step towards establishing liberal democracy. 
Critics and heritage
At the same time, Nurcholish continued to be the target of often 
fierce criticism, from the right as well as the left. Conservatives and 
hardliners objected strongly to his liberal religious views and his plu-
ralistic acceptance of divergent views within Islam as well of other re-
ligions. The controversies that had surrounded him in the beginning 
of his career stayed with him throughout his life. In some of the at-
tacks on Nurcholish in the Islamist media one also senses something 
of a class antagonism, expressions of disgust with the lifestyle of the 
affluent middle class with which Nurcholish became increasingly as-
sociated. This element is more explicitly present in some of the criti-
cism from the left, inspired by liberation theology. Early in his career, 
Nurcholish spoke much of social justice as a core element of Islam’s 
message and this dimension of his thought, some young critics assert, 
has gradually disappeared while he was serving the middle classes. His 
“bourgeois pluralism” (as one critical book is titled) engages with rela-
tions between religions but is blind to the greed and corruption of the 
middle class and the blatant impoverishment of the masses. 
Yet in an important sense these left-wing critics also owe much to 
Nurcholish and continue aspects of his work. He did not establish a 
school of thought and did not groom favourites to become his succes-
sors. Rather, he stimulated many younger people to think independ-
ently and facilitated their intellectual development. Although Para-
madina was established as the forum to present his thought to a wider 
audience, he never imposed his own version of Islam on the younger 
people who came to work there and who have their own concerns and 
personal spiritual and intellectual interests, often quite different from 
his. The role of provocative, innovative and liberating thinker and bro-
ker of ideas that he played for his own generation is now played by 
a highly varied group of younger men and women, in various institu-
tions, NGOs, and informal networks. In his youth, Nurcholish was often 
called “the young Natsir,” after the most influential reformist thinker of 
an earlier generation. It is his lasting merit that there are many “young 
Nurcholishes,” none of them a clone of the original.
Martin van Bruinessen is anthropologist and holds the ISIM Chair at Utrecht University.
Email: martin.vanbruinessen@let.uu.nl
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R .  M I C H A E L  F E E N E R The recent ISIM Conference on Modern 
Islamic Intellectual History in Com-
parative Perspective (Utrecht, 29-30 
September 2005) brought together 
scholars working on developments in 
a diverse range of Muslim societies to 
discuss the production, transformation, 
and reception of Islam in the modern 
period. It was also a much-welcomed 
opportunity to raise issues of meth-
odological and theoretical relevance 
for scholars working on Muslim intel-
lectualism of the twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. This is an ex-
tremely complex field that requires not 
only high levels of linguistic expertise and area-specific knowledge, 
but also a careful attention to the broader political and epistemological 
contexts of globalization. The truly trans-regional nature of develop-
ments affecting contemporary Muslim societies pose new challenges 
to scholars of Islamic Studies in which traditional “Area Studies”-type 
training will continue to be valuable in preparing for scholarship in this 
field, but it is no longer sufficient in itself to deal with the global dimen-
sions of regional developments. 
Attempts at understanding contemporary Islam through its intellectual 
history demand new analytical frameworks to be brought to bear on 
both Muslim religious thought and the academic study of religion. The 
established Islamic Studies methodologies developed to deal with the 
medieval period, such as philological analyses of texts and the docu-
mentation of chains of teacher/student transmissions of knowledge, 
are simply inadequate for dealing with the intricacies of the modern 
period. What is needed are new approaches to modern Muslim intel-
lectualism that build upon the traditional strengths of Islamic Studies 
while also taking into account contem-
porary realities, which add new dimen-
sions to the processes of producing 
and transmitting knowledge. 
The problematics of conceptualizing 
such a project, however, are consider-
able, for beyond the boundaries of 
Islamic Studies the very field of “Intel-
lectual History” itself has experienced 
a rather tumultuous time in modern 
scholarship. Both internal debates and 
critiques from outside have charac-
terized the historiographies of ideas 
and intellectual history since the early 
twentieth century. Much can be gained 
from a critical and selective engage-
ment with recent developments in the 
field. However in doing so students of 
modern Islam must negotiate several 
significant obstacles, including that 
posed by the fact that intellectual his-
tory has been heretofore almost ex-
clusively focused on ideas and texts 
produced in the “West.” Recognizing 
this fact and facing this challenge can, 
in fact, provide opportunities to recon-
sider the ways in which various “voices” 
in modern discourses are presented 
and placed in conversation with each 
other. 
Modernity, media, and
Muslim thought
One of the central issues in debates 
on intellectual historiography is that 
of “contextualization” and the prob-
lematizing of the selection of particu-
lar contexts within which to situate 
our discussions of specific texts. This 
becomes an especially complex ques-
tion for studies of modern Muslim 
writings; should, for example, modern 
Islamist elaborations of Sunnatullah as 
a “natural law” concept be read against 
the background of medieval falsafah, 
twentieth-century Neo-Thomism, or 
the works of Leo Strauss? In selecting specific texts to be subjected to 
such contextual analyses, the historian must devote careful attention 
to the identification of texts that might be considered as particularly 
illuminating examples of the intersection of established traditions and 
contemporary concerns and insights situated in concrete historical 
moments.
Striking a balance in scholarly attention between a focus on the par-
ticularities of a given text and a work’s embodiment of broader trends 
within the cultural contexts of its creation requires considerable ef-
forts to resist the pulls of polar methodological orientations toward 
either an over-emphasis on idiosyncratic attributes or a tendency to-
ward some form of contextual reductionism. A nuanced treatment of 
both a book’s unique qualities and the general cultural background 
against which they are elaborated can make it possible to open up 
new discussions of the ideas presented and the processes by which 
they are symbolized, thus facilitating the recognition of connections 
between various facets of the broader cultural histories of Muslim so-
cieties and the diverse social functions 
of ideas and rhetorical formulations in 
changing historical contexts. What is 
called for then is not the dogmatic ad-
herence to the abstracted ideals of any 
one school of historiography, but rath-
er a theoretically aware—as opposed 
to conceptually oblivious—methodo-
logical flexibility that self-consciously 
moves back and forth between text-
specific and broader cultural dimen-
sions of analysis. 
Interpreting modern Muslim thought 
and its public impact also requires a 
nuanced appreciation of the media 
through which ideas are developed 
and distributed. Thus approaches need 
to be developed that can address is-
sues of both the production of knowl-
edge and its reception by diverse pub-
lics. This will require thinking through 
new ways of situating the works of 
prominent writers in relation to read-
ers in the creation of contemporary 
discourses on Islam. Here there are rich 
developments in other academic fields 
including the History of the Book and 
Media Studies that can be drawn upon 
to construct models for contextualiz-
ing the production, distribution, and 
Attempts at understanding contemporary 
Islam through its intellectual history demand 
new analytical frameworks to be brought to 
bear on both Muslim religious thought and 
the academic study of religion. Contemporary 
scholars must thus begin to explore new 
approaches that build upon the traditional 
strengths of Islamic Studies while also taking 
into account contemporary realities that add 
new dimensions to the processes of producing 
and transmitting knowledge. This will require a 
self-conscious engagement with developments 
in fields ranging form the sociology of 
philosophies to media studies. 
 This situation…, has not 
been a result of disembodied 
developments …, but rather one 
that arose within a specific set of 
historical circumstances within 
contexts of colonialism and its 
accompanying asymmetrical 
systems of knowledge 
and power ...
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reception of texts in modern Muslim intellectual history. An acknowl-
edgement of the significance of media and communications technolo-
gies in the modern period should not, however, be taken as implying 
any totalizing role for technological determinism in the development 
of new forms of discourse. Rather these technologies should be re-
garded as important factors that present new possibilities for, as well as 
new restrictions on, the production and dissemination of knowledge. 
Such an approach, for example, could help us to better understand the 
diverse impacts that “media muftis” and celebrity preachers such as 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Amr Khalid, or A.A. Gym are having upon Muslims 
in diverse societies all across the contemporary world. Pace McLuhan, 
modern media, while important in its own right, still conveys messages 
that need to be carefully parsed. 
Insiders, outsiders, and the production of knowledge
In the modern period definitive lines between “Muslim” and “West-
ern,” as well as “academic” and “confessional,” conversations on Islam 
have often been obscured in the permutations of public discourses of 
identity and power politics. Given this historical reality, any rethink-
ing of the field of modern Muslim intellectual history must start with 
a frank recognition of the fact that for well over a century now the 
blending of emic and etic discourses on Islam has been a complex and 
creative dynamic in Muslim thought. Perhaps the most high-profile in-
dividual example of the politicized intellectual interactions of Western 
and Muslim scholars can be found in the late nineteenth-century po-
lemics between Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Ernst Renan over the rela-
tion between “Islam” and the complex of “science” and “progress” that 
was considered to comprise “modernity” at that time. 
All across the Muslim world during the modern period, Western 
scholarship came to exercise complex influences on the development 
of internal Muslim conversations—sometimes with very specific con-
nections. One thinks, for example of the impact of modern Orientalist 
“discoveries” of Ibn Khaldun on Muslim social scientists in North Africa, 
and the impact of Geertz’ work on conversations among Indonesian 
Muslims. Such works held prominent place within a rather eclectic set 
of canons formed out of some rather odd combinations of Western 
authors frequently cited in modern Muslim literatures—with colonial 
classics such as Carlyle’s portrait of Muhammad in On Heroes, Hero-
Worship, and the Heroic in History and Lothrop Stoddard’s New World of 
Islam gradually giving way to works like Maurice Bucaille’s La Bible, Le 
Coran, et la science, and Samuel Huntington’s Foreign Affairs article on 
“The Clash of Civilizations” in more recent years.
Beyond this, however, over the latter decades of the twentieth century, 
there developed in the work of some Muslim scholars and authors trends 
toward an increasing openness to and influence of “Western” thinkers be-
yond those dealing with issues of Islam and Muslim societies. The first 
influences were most commonly from the social sciences, as seen for ex-
ample in the impact of modern social sciences theories on the work of 
Ziya Gölkap, Ali Shariati, and Nurcholish Madjid in modern Turkey, Iran, 
and Indonesia, respectively. More recently, however, international devel-
opments in hermeneutics and other fields of the Humanities have also 
come to be both reflected and further developed in the writings of such 
thinkers as Muhammad Arkoun and Nasr Abu-Zayd. Over the course of 
the twentieth century, the works of various “Western” authors on Islam 
began to serve as major points of reference in the rhetoric of modern 
Muslim authors across a diverse range of African, Middle Eastern, and 
Asian societies, producing a rich range of modern Muslim thinkers. 
Post-“Orientalism” and globalization
In assessing the impact of “Western” academic writings on the scholar-
ly and public discourses of twentieth century Islam, particular attention 
must be directed toward interpreting the legacies of “Orientalist” schol-
arship in modern understandings of Islam among particular Muslim 
communities—the nature and history of which have been both more 
profound and more nuanced than may be apparent in the treatments 
of the subject developed in circles of literary critics. To cite just a few 
examples from mid twentieth century Indonesia: In his oft-republished 
history of Sufism, the popular preacher and novelist Hamka praised 
Louis Massignon as “the great pillar of all Orientalists” and cited ap-
provingly his work on Hallaj, as well as the Frenchman’s speculations on 
the relevance of this tenth century figure for the later development of 
Islam in the Indonesian archipelago.1 Well outside of Sufi Studies, H.A.R. 
Gibb’s observation on the totalizing, holistic nature of Islam became a 
dominant trope in the public speeches and published writings of the 
prominent Islamist politician M. Natsir during the middle decades of the 
twentieth century.2 Indeed, the impact of essentialized conceptions of 
Islam that were originally developed in Western scholarship upon the 
formulation of modern “fundamentalist” understandings of Islam as a 
system and a “total way of life” is something that must be more widely 
recognized and understood in any future analysis of modern Muslim in-
tellectualism. 
This situation, it is important to recognize, has not been a result of dis-
embodied developments on a purely theoretical level, but rather one that 
arose within a specific set of historical circumstances within contexts of 
colonialism and its accompanying asymmetrical systems of knowledge 
and power—contexts about which modern Muslim thinkers have been 
acutely aware and critical. Likewise, for historians of these modern de-
velopments, such political, economic, and social realities must be kept 
in mind when examining the use of religious and cultural symbolism as 
analytical tools for rethinking and re-conceptualizing modern religious 
thought and practices in Muslim societies. Attention to the complex so-
cial locations of those producing and distributing ideas and texts, and 
the networks within which they interact, thus becomes another im-
portant aspect of formulating an interdisciplinary approach to Islamic 
thought. Such a development requires moving beyond simply critiquing 
the power dynamics of early scholarship in attempts to come to terms 
with the diverse and complex ways in which earlier European works on 
Islam and Muslim societies have become a part of conversations not only 
between “Muslims” and “non-believers” but among Muslims themselves 
in various ways over the past century. The convergence of such con-
versations in the era of globalization has been a 
major aspect of the development of modern Mus-
lim thought, and for contemporary researchers in 
Islamic Studies interpreting these developments 
now demands that our usual philological proclivi-
ties now share more time in our studies with theo-
retical modes of reflection.
Ziya Gökalp, 
Hilafet ve milli 
hakimiyet. 
Ankara, 1921; 
Jamal al-Din 
al-Afghani, 
al-‘Urwa 
al-wuthqa. 
Reprint, 
Cairo 1928; 
Ali Shariati, 
Ummat wa 
Imamat. [S.l.], 
1972; and 
Muhammad 
Arkoun, al-Fikr 
al-islami: qira’a 
‘ilmiyya. Bayrut, 
1987.
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Notes
1. Hamka, Perkembangan Tasauf dari Abad ke-
Abad (Jakarta: Pustaka Keluarga, 1952), 116.
2. “Islam is much more than a system of 
theology; it is a complete civilization.” 
(Whither Islam?, 12), was repeatedly quoted 
by Natsir and other prominent Islamists in 
the twentieth century. See, for example: 
M. Natsir, Islam Sebagai Ideologie (Jakarta: 
Penjiaran Ilmu, 1950), 7.
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M O R G A N  C L A R K E thus debate is perhaps more immedi-
ate than elsewhere. Techniques such as 
IVF are widely available and utilized in 
Lebanon. However, no consensus has 
been reached on the ethical regula-
tion of such technology between the 
religious communities, and so even 
ethically controversial procedures such 
as those involving donor eggs remain 
relatively freely practised; and indeed 
patients come from other Middle East-
ern countries to benefit from this rela-
tively relaxed regime. Of course, not 
everyone pays strict attention to the opinion of religious experts, and 
the relationship between fatwa and practice has formed an important 
part of my research.
Shiite opinions on IVF
The lack of consensus in Lebanon over these matters, and the wide-
spread practice of donor egg procedures, among other controversial 
measures, is in no small part due to the position adopted by Ayatol-
lah ‘Ali al-Khamene’i, spiritual leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
and thus widely followed amongst Lebanese Shiites. Khamene’i does 
not prohibit the use of sperm or eggs from a third, or even fourth 
party, by a husband and wife2 (nor, by implication, does he prohibit 
surrogacy arrangements), as, he holds, zina requires the physical act 
of sexual intercourse. This opinion, stated in a fatwa collection widely 
available in Lebanon and confirmed for me by Shaykh Muhammad 
Tawfiq al-Miqdar, Khamene’i’s representative in Beirut, has proved 
highly influential in the practice of such procedures in Lebanon.3 Doc-
tors keep Khamene’i’s fatwa collection on the shelves of their surgeries 
to demonstrate the permissibility of such procedures to sceptical Mus-
lim patients; and many such patients have profited from it to under-
take donor sperm and egg procedures, even surrogacy arrangements, 
with a clear conscience. Amongst the ulama, however, it is viewed with 
some astonishment, consistent with a common lack of high regard for 
Khamene’i as a legal thinker. I was strongly advised by those in Shiite 
jurisprudential circles in Lebanon to go beyond Khamene’i’s opinion to 
look at those of other authorities.
Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Lebanon’s most prominent 
Islamic figure, does not hold with the entirety of Khamene’i’s opinion, 
finding the use of sperm from a third party unacceptable. He does, 
however, permit the use of donor eggs.4 While, according to doctors, 
patients were previously advised by Shiite authorities that it was advis-
able, or essential, for the egg donor to marry the husband, albeit tempo-
rarily, this condition seems recently to have been lifted. This holds true 
of Fadlallah’s position, as I discovered from my interviews with him and 
other members of his staff. For his part, Khamene’i clearly stipulates in 
his fatwa that marriage is not required. This removal of the need for such 
a marriage is significant for the practice of egg donation, not so much 
because of the difficulty of persuading an egg donor to undertake such 
a marriage, as due to the fact that egg donation very frequently occurs 
Islamic medical ethics are a burgeon-
ing topic among ulama and academic 
scholars alike. Organ transplantation, 
cloning and euthanasia have pro-
voked widely documented Muslim 
debate. Some of the most interesting 
issues are those centring on the new 
reproductive technologies (NRT) such 
as in vitro fertilization (IVF). Muslims 
have for the most part welcomed 
these new medical techniques as a 
remedy for infertility. And yet some 
of the possibilities such procedures 
raise are still problematic for many, coming from a variety of ethical 
perspectives. IVF involves fertilizing an egg outside the body with 
a sperm and then transferring it to the uterus of a woman for ges-
tation and delivery: this allows eggs, sperm and uterus to be from 
unrelated parties, unrelated that is, in terms of marriage or “partner-
ship.” Commentators in the West have sensed that such possibilities 
herald a new age in kinship thinking and prac-
tice, or at the very least force people to ques-
tion the meaning of even the most basic kinship 
concepts, such as motherhood: is motherhood a 
genetic relation, or one earned through the car-
rying and delivery of the child? My own research 
has investigated to what extent such transfor-
mations and interrogations might apply in the 
Islamic Middle East, both in theory and in prac-
tice: for, beyond the discussions of the ulama, 
IVF and allied technologies are now widely 
available and utilized in the region.1
Sunni ulama have reached a broad consensus 
that medical interventions in human reproduc-
tion should restrict themselves to a husband and 
(one) wife couple, without the involvement of any 
other parties, as would be the case in those proce-
dures using donor sperm and eggs, and gestational surrogates (where 
another woman carries an embryo formed from the couple’s sperm and 
egg). Such third party procedures are seen as akin to, if not identical 
with, zina: that is, illicit sexual relations, such as fornication and adul-
tery. They, like zina, imply a “mixing up” or “confusing” of relations. This 
is consonant with a wider popular unease concerning such procedures. 
However, while many scholars have assumed that this Sunni consensus 
signifies the end of the matter, some Shiite opinions are at stark odds 
with this position, and these issues are far from finally resolved in Shiite 
jurisprudential circles.
I have been studying these debates and examining their conse-
quences for kinship thinking, and have carried out extensive fieldwork 
in Lebanon, in both medical and religious settings. Lebanon is rich in 
religious diversity: for one thing, clearly, Christian opinions are impor-
tant as regards religious debate and medical practice; but, furthermore, 
Shiite and Sunni opinions are to be found alongside one another, and 
Doctors keep 
Khamene’i’s fatwa 
collection on the 
shelves of their 
surgeries.
Lebanon has a thriving and diverse 
reproductive medical sector: procedures are 
practised that have aroused much ethical 
controversy, such as those using donor eggs 
and sperm. Sunni ulama have reached a broad 
consensus on these matters, and do not allow 
donor procedures. However, Shiite opinion 
remains diverse: some Shiite authorities 
allow their followers these controversial 
treatments, but have evolved concomitant 
rulings that entail surprising new patterns 
of kinship relations.
Shiite Perspectives on
Kinship and 
New Reproductive 
Technologies
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between sisters. In Islamic law, a man 
is forbidden from marrying two sisters 
simultaneously; but the way has now 
been cleared by this new wave of Shiite 
rulings for what is, doctors assured me, 
a relatively common procedure in Leba-
non nowadays.
However, again, Fadlallah is consid-
ered somewhat “hasty” by many others 
in jurisprudential circles, and I was fur-
ther recommended to check the think-
ing of some other authorities, notably 
Ayatollahs ‘Ali al-Sistani and Muham-
mad Sa‘id al-Tabataba’i al-Hakim. Both 
these authorities advise caution in these 
matters, and view third party interven-
tions as most likely unacceptable.5 But 
in terms of the practice of these pro-
cedures in Lebanon, and despite the 
widely acknowledged and growing su-
premacy of Sistani’s opinions more gen-
erally, these other standpoints regard-
ing IVF are not widely known. No doubt 
this is because they are not as immedi-
ately useful for patients or practitioners: 
while it is commonly sensed that the use 
of donor sperm or eggs is in some way 
ethically dubious, those opinions that 
hold otherwise are valuable evidences 
for the moral permissibility of undertak-
ing such a course.
Debating kinship
What of the potential “confusion” of kinship relations identified by 
the Sunni ulama? Khamene’i, Fadlallah and many other Shiite authori-
ties hold that paternity and maternity follow the sperm and the egg: 
that is, the genetic relation. This is not, one should note, the opinion of 
Sistani, who follows the late Ayatollah Abul-Qasem al-Khu’i in holding 
that it is the gestational carrier who is to be considered the mother, 
and not the provider of the egg. This latter is also the opinion of those 
Sunni authorities who deal with this problem, and, for that matter, that 
of the British Human Fertilization and Embryology Bill of 1990. The con-
sequence of following the genetic principle is that, in the case of the 
use of sperm or eggs from third parties, new and unconventional—al-
beit clear—patterns of relation are created. A child of donor sperm will 
be the child of the sperm donor and not of the man who raises that 
child. This has consequences for concomitant principles: veiling and 
inheritance. A girl born of donor sperm, for instance, would have to 
veil before her unrelated “social father” (an anthropological rather than 
Islamic phrase). This would seem to raise considerable problems for the 
practicalities of domestic life, not to mention undermine the objective 
of undertaking such a procedure in the first place. However, Shiite doc-
tors working within circles following Khamene’i assured me that these 
rulings are followed, and that there are ways of obviating the problems: 
in the case of inheritance through gifts and bequests; and in the case of 
veiling, through the institutions of rida‘ (milk kinship) and the rulings 
associated with being the guardian of a rabibah (foster-daughter), both 
of which entail marriage prohibitions and hence obviate the need for 
veiling. I should say that, whatever the case, where Shiites in Lebanon 
are using these permissions and procedures, they are for now keep-
ing their actions completely secret. Public opinion is lagging behind 
that of these religious specialists here, and the extent to which these 
complex ramifications of kinship may unfold is an open question for 
the future.
Clearly, the adoption of such a “biological” principle of relation has 
profound consequences, and cannot easily be squared with all the rul-
ings of nasab (filiation) of classical Islamic jurisprudence, formulated 
at a time when the existence of the female egg, if suspected, was not 
known for certain. While for the most part the literature available for 
interested parties is rather schematic, following the fatwa (response) 
format or the somewhat bare presentation of the risalah ‘amaliyah 
(legal handbook), Ayatollah ‘Ali al-Sistani’s son, Muhammad Rida al-
Sistani, has chosen to devote an entire volume of richly documented 
fiqh istidlali (legal analysis) to these debates, an invaluable resource 
for other scholars.6 Here a comprehensive range of scenarios—artifi-
cial insemination by husband and donor, egg donation and embryo 
transfer, among many others—are fully explored, with the arguments 
illustrated with a wealth of citations of the Qu-
ranic and riwayat literature, as well as references 
to secondary works and the opinions of the major 
authorities. Paralleling to some extent discussions 
in Western “bioethics” and anthropology, the con-
sequences for relatedness and even the meanings 
of basic kinship terms such as “mother” and “fa-
ther” are debated, as well as more typically Islamic 
concerns such as the ramifications for inheritance 
law and marriage regulation.
Sistani’s work, while perhaps posing more 
questions than clear answers, opens up for other 
scholars a fascinating window into this area of 
Shiite jurisprudential debate, at a time when the 
Western media are just waking up to the vibrant 
engagement Shiite scholars have had with other 
such new technologies, as witnessed by last year’s 
interest in Britain and the United States in Ayatol-
lah Khomeini’s permission of transgender surgery 
some forty years ago.7 These debates are not just 
important in terms of “medical ethics,” defining 
the boundaries of medical practice for Muslims, 
but touch on much more general and important 
issues. They bear witness to the continuing dia-
lectic between revealed religious knowledge and 
the propositions of modern science, and test the 
ability of religious specialists to push the thinking 
of their followers regarding the most fundamen-
tal of social categories in new and unexpected 
directions.
Morgan Clarke has recently completed his D.Phil. at the Institute of Social and Cultural 
Anthropology, University of Oxford, funded by the ESRC.
Email: morgan.clarke@balliol.ox.ac.uk
Notes
1. As medical anthropologist Marcia Inhorn 
has documented: see, for example, her Local 
Babies, Global Science (New York: Routledge, 
2003).
2. As Inhorn has noted: “Religion and 
Reproductive Technologies,” Anthropology 
News 46, no. 2 (2005): 14.
3. Ayatollah ‘Ali al-Khamene’i, Ajwibat al-
Istifta’at (Beirut: al-Dar al-Islamiyah, 2003), 
part 2, 69-71; interview with Shaykh 
Muhammad Tawfiq al-Miqdar, Beirut, 2003.
4. Interviews with Ayatollah Muhammad 
Husayn Fadlallah and Shaykh Muhsin 
‘Atwi, head of Ayatollah Fadlallah’s fatwa 
department, Beirut, 2004.
5. I am drawing on email correspondence and 
interviews with representatives in Beirut, as 
well as published sources here: Ayatollah 
‘Ali al-Sistani, al-Fiqh lil-Mughtaribin (Beirut: 
Dar al-Mu’arrikh al-‘Arabi, 2000); Ayatollah 
Muhammad Sa‘id al-Hakim, Fiqh al-Istinsakh 
al-Bashari (Beirut: al-Murshid, 2001).
6. Muhammad Rida al-Sistani, Wasa’il al-Injab 
al-Sina‘iyah (Beirut: Dar al-Mu’arrikh al-
‘Arabi, 2004).
7. See, for example, Frances Harrison’s BBC 
Newsnight report of 6 January 2005, and 
Nazila Fathi’s piece in the New York Times, 
2 August 2004.
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E L A I N E  H O U S B Y
Islamic House 
Purchase Loans
in Britain
Since the bombs on the London Un-
derground on 7 July 2005, a great deal 
has been heard about the necessity 
for British Muslims to integrate with 
something called the British Way of Life. 
Beyond an assumption that the British 
Way of Life precludes terrorism, the 
definition of this concept is distinctly 
hazy. It has been invoked in the media 
in support of everything from a basic 
commitment to pluralist liberal democ-
racy to getting more Muslim players into premiership football teams, 
via expecting schoolchildren regardless of origin to memorize details 
of the Battle of Trafalgar. 
Beyond all of this newly self-conscious discussion, there is one fea-
ture of the British Way of Life which is taken so completely for granted 
that only eccentrics or foreigners ever question it. The British are a na-
tion of homeowners. Continuing to rent beyond one’s early twenties 
is frequently regarded as a sign of failure in life, and the majority of 
citizens are desperate to free themselves from this stigma, no matter 
how much house purchase may strain their finances.
The Quran forbids riba, which is normally understood to be charg-
ing interest on loans. The prevailing interpretation of this prohibition 
is that not only receiving but also paying interest on a loan is sinful. 
The ubiquity of house purchase through interest-bearing loans in 
contemporary Britain has brought this Islamic prohibition into direct 
confrontation with the habits and aspirations of the vast majority of 
non-Muslim citizens. 
I began work for a Ph.D. in October 2001 and finally submitted my 
thesis in the middle of August 2005. I therefore found that it had inad-
vertently become a record of the period between 9/11 and what is now 
being called 7/7. My topic was the rapid development of Islamic finan-
cial products in Britain during this period, of which the most promi-
nent aspect was the appearance of so-called “Islamic mortgages,” that 
is forms of house purchase loan which claim to be “Sharia-compliant.” 
These loans offer an interesting case study of a phenomenon situated 
right on the interface of cultural differ-
ence and integration.
One perception of the promotion 
of Islamic loans would be that by em-
phasizing cultural difference it works 
against integration. I argue that on the 
contrary it is working to prevent the 
development of genuine cultural dif-
ference by assimilating dissident ele-
ments of a minority religious culture 
into the mainstream of British life.
A notable feature of the emergence 
of Islamic home loans was the degree 
of support given to them by the gov-
ernment. For some years the Treasury, 
the department of the British govern-
ment dealing with financial matters, 
had been involved in a working party 
on Islamic financial products, which 
also included representatives of some 
major banks and Muslim organizations, 
notably the Muslim Council of Britain. 
The remit of this working group was 
to identify obstacles to the creation of 
financial products which conformed to 
Sharia and suggest ways of removing 
these obstacles. 
The most highly publicized result of 
its efforts was the announcement in 
the Budget of 2003 that the burden 
of “double stamp duty” would be re-
moved. “Stamp duty” is a tax payable 
on the registration of a change of title to a property, which in effect 
functions as a tax on house purchase. The usual forms of Islamic home 
purchase loan (described below) involve transferring title twice, and 
therefore used to make the purchaser liable to pay this duty twice. 
After this announcement the relevant regulations were amended to 
say that where change of ownership was merely a technical aspect of 
the financing arrangement it would not attract duty. 
This concession received a considerable amount of coverage in the 
general press. The Muslim organizations which had lobbied for the 
change had an interest in presenting it as a campaigning triumph, and 
the government wished to use it to signal its interest in Muslim voters. 
In fact the loss of revenue involved was, according to the Treasury itself, 
negligible, and arguably the government purchased the goodwill of 
Muslim house-buyers very cheaply.
The two common forms of Islamic contract for house purchase fi-
nance are murabaha and ijara. In the first arrangement, the bank buys 
the house and sells it back to the purchaser at a higher price, which is 
repaid in instalments. In the second, the bank buys the property and 
rents it to the purchaser, who makes payments which cover purchase 
of the equity by instalments and rent for use of the amount of equity 
still owned by the bank. The earliest Islamic house purchase loans of-
fered in Britain were murabaha arrangements, but the second form of 
contract is now becoming more common. This may be partly because 
murabaha has been criticized by some scholars for being no more than 
a device to disguise the charging of what is in effect fixed interest, but it 
seems also to be due to the fact that is 
easier for the bank to vary repayments 
under an ijara contract. The explanation 
of the Manzil house purchase scheme 
of the Ahli bank states explicitly that 
ijara is like a variable rate conventional 
mortgage, while murabaha is like a 
fixed rate mortgage. The Council of 
Mortgage Lenders has also said explic-
itly that these payments will be varied 
to correspond with the variation in the 
rate of interest under a conventional 
mortgage.1
For a long time the only halal house 
purchase loan available was that of-
fered by the United Bank of Kuwait (the 
former name of Ahli bank), which was 
not widely advertised and difficult to 
access, especially for those living out-
side London. The launch in the sum-
mer of 2003 of an “Islamic mortgage” 
In the last few years some British banks have 
begun to offer loans for house purchase which 
satisfy the Quranic prohibition of interest. 
This presents the paradox of a retention of 
cultural difference being used to promote 
integration with the norms of the wider society. 
It raises concerns about the exclusion of less 
affluent Muslims. There is also some question 
as to whether the banks are in tune with the 
thinking of younger British Muslims.
[Islamic loans] prevent the 
development of genuine cultural 
difference by assimilating 
dissident elements of a minority 
religious culture into the 
mainstream of British life.
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by HSBC bank marked a new era of 
availability of halal loans from a main-
stream bank with branches in almost 
every town. Since then other high-
street banks have followed suit, nota-
bly Lloyds TSB in early 2005. There has 
also been interest from banks based 
in the Muslim-majority world, notably 
the oil states, in entering this market, 
although to date none of them offer a 
widely available home loan. 
All of the presently available Islamic 
house purchase loans are more ex-
pensive to repay than a conventional 
loan, and they all require a fairly large 
deposit, normally 20% of the value of 
the property, whereas a conventional 
lender can usually be found prepared 
to settle for a lower deposit. These fac-
tors immediately exclude those who 
are struggling financially, and mean 
that the decision to conform to Islamic 
principles is in itself a luxury. 
Some of the published ruminations 
of participants in the working party on 
Islamic finance indicate an unexam-
ined assumption that Muslims currently living in rented housing would 
become owner-occupiers if only they could access a Sharia-compliant 
loan scheme.2 The government was particularly anxious to dislodge 
those who could in fact afford to buy a property from social hous-
ing, in order to free this for those in the greatest housing need, and 
seem to have believed that a significant number of these would buy if 
they could so without compromising their religious principles. An un-
foreseen factor, which has prevented the opportunity to buy by halal 
means being taken up as widely as hoped, is that a clause in another 
scheme designed to encourage tenants of social housing to buy their 
home, by offering them a discount on the market price, excludes rapid 
re-sale of the property to a third party. This means that murabaha and 
ijara contracts cannot be used to take advantage of this discount. How-
ever, the most important reason why the government’s hopes have not 
been fulfilled is that the majority of those in social housing simply can-
not satisfy the conservative lending criteria of the banks.
The introduction of these so-called “Islamic mortgages” does nothing 
to reduce the fundamental division in British society between home 
owners and non-home owners, especially those living in social hous-
ing. It does not acknowledge that it is poverty, which is the main obsta-
cle to house purchase for those Muslims who are still living in rented 
accommodation, and not the lack of readily available Sharia-compliant 
loans. The increasing availability of “Islamic mortgages” may actually in-
crease this polarization, as banks and other providers of financial serv-
ices make increasing efforts to court affluent Muslim customers while 
disregarding Muslims who are of no commercial interest to them.
The marketing of Islamic loans reduces culture to an aspect of con-
sumer behaviour. While academics and politicians continue to debate 
whether the appearance of British-born bombers demonstrates that 
“multiculturalism” has failed, the commercial world is happy to pro-
mote any aspect of cultural difference, which can be turned into a dis-
tinctive product or unique selling proposition. 
The trend in the development of Islamic financial products is all in the 
direction of merely technical differences from the norm. This is even 
more marked in the area of investment banking than in that of loans. 
Companies advertise the fact that they have teams of experts working 
on ways of producing halal versions of conventional products. There is 
little sign that the ethical concerns which lie behind the Quranic pro-
hibition of riba and of a variety of unfair trade practices are inspiring 
radically new ways of conceiving lending and investment. 
The seal of acceptability of all Islamic financial products is an en-
dorsement by a team of Sharia advisors. Scholars prominent in this spe-
cialized area are retained by the banks to confirm that their products 
are halal. Publicity material produced by the banks is normally worded 
in a way which encourages customers to place total reliance on these 
scholars rather than attempt to understand for themselves the implica-
tions of Islamic thought for their consumer decisions. 
In this, it is possible that the banks may be moving in the opposite direc-
tion from their customers. The affluent, highly educated younger Muslims 
who are their main target market are becoming dissatisfied with an un-
critical acceptance of scholarly authority. An increased scripturalism and 
return to primary sources has been widely observed among this group. 
There may in time be a reaction against the generation of scholars who 
are approving the current spate of Islamic loans and investments. A fac-
tor which makes this particularly likely is the involvement of the same 
scholars with a great many companies. The same names recur again and 
again on the Sharia advisory committees of different banks. (The Paki-
stani judge Muhammad Taqi Usmani is particularly dominant in the field.) 
This is, to be fair, mainly because very few scholars have the necessary 
combination of training in traditional Islamic scholarship with knowledge 
of the extremely complex world of modern finance. It is though leading 
to an undesirable monopolization of the approval of financial products 
by a few people. 
Another aspect of the present situation, which may eventually cause 
a reaction, is the fact that some of the banks most heavily involved in 
developing and promoting Islamic products are non-Muslim institutions 
which see Muslims as simply one more market to target. They are deeply 
involved with riba in all of their other activities. We may see a swing back 
to favouring Muslim owned institutions by the most religiously aware and 
active Muslim customers. 
Although, it is also likely that such potential customers may come to see 
a truer adherence to the ethical spirit of Islam lying in convergence with 
non-Muslim projects in the area of “fair trade” and “ethical finance.” This 
argument has already been made by Tariq Ramadan,3 currently one of the 
most influential of European Muslim thinkers. 
It will, then, be interesting to see whether Muslims who have the 
means to do so decide to fall in with the British Way of Life by purchasing 
a three-bedroom red-brick semi-detached house in the suburbs with a 
loan which is technically riba-free, or whether they will seek other ways 
of reconciling their Islamic inheritance with the national obsession with 
owner-occupation. 
Notes
1. Council of Mortgage Lenders, Islamic Home 
Finance, 2001,  
http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/home
2. Ibid.
3. Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the 
Future of Islam (Oxford University Press, 
2003) 
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Islamization of 
the French Riots
On Thursday, 27 October 2005, a group 
of teenagers were playing football in the 
Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. When 
police officers arrived to check their ID’s, 
they tried to run and hide. Three of them, 
thinking that they were being chased by 
the police, climbed over a wall to hide 
in a power substation. Bouna Traore, 
15 year old and of Malian background, 
and Zyed Benna, 17 year old and of Tu-
nisian origin were both electrocuted by 
a transformer in the electric substation. 
The third boy, Muhittin Altun, 17 (from 
Turkish Kurdish origin) was severely 
injured and brought to hospital. This 
event triggered the riots of October and 
November 2005 that were initially confined to the Paris area. The unrest 
subsequently spread to other areas and cities in France. Thousands of 
vehicles were burned, and, at least, one person was killed by the rioters. 
Close to 2900 rioters were arrested. In this interview French sociologist 
Laurent Chambon talks about his personal and professional engagement 
with these riots and the current social and political circumstances in the 
French banlieues and French society in general. Laurent Chambon was 
born in 1972 in Châtenay-Malabry in France. Living in his younger days in 
the ethnically mixed neighbourhood, he recalls his youth as a happy pe-
riod. Regardless of their ethnic or religious background, he and his friends 
considered themselves as French. 
Martijn: Being a French citizen regardless of your ethnic and religious 
background is an important prerequisite of the French model of inte-
gration. Do you still believe in that model? 
Laurent: This might sound a little bit nationalistic or chauvinistic but 
I believe that the French Republican model is a generous and very 
effective model for emancipation of French civilians. What I worry 
about is that people like Alain Finkielkraut and the French Minister 
of Interior, Sarkozy, are constantly promoting this model, while at 
the same time not living up to the promises of this model such as 
equality and dignity with regard to how they treat the people in the 
French suburbs. In this way they are destroying the model for their 
own benefit and at the cost of the people in the French banlieues; 
people I grew up with, I know their older brothers and sisters. So, you 
could say I’m involved.
Martijn: Can you explain how Sarkozy and Finkielkraut did that and 
why did they do it? I have a hard time in believing that they would 
deliberately want to cause trouble for these people?
Laurent: One of the most important things is that they islamized the 
riots. During the riots, the French Minister of Interior and probable 
presidential candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, stated to the press that the 
rioters were either a band of criminals violating Republican order or 
under the influence of radical Muslims. Everyone thought of Al Qaida, 
of course. Judges were asked to put these criminals in jail, and send 
the ungrateful foreigners back home. Unfortunately for the Minis-
ter, the French Intelligence Services issued a few weeks later a re-
port stating that, firstly, most of the youngsters who had a police file 
were known to belong to problematic families or had been victims of 
violence themselves. Only a very small minority had been involved 
in criminal activities, and those mostly very mild ones, something 
not extremely abnormal in these areas. In other words, one cannot 
speak of a “criminal operation.” Secondly, that it was absolutely not 
planned in any way. The media, through their coverage, did encour-
age youngsters to emulate their companions of misfortune, but one 
cannot speak of a structured movement. Thirdly, to the big despera-
tion of the Extreme-Right and the Mus-
lim fundamentalists, that Islam did not 
play any role in these riots. Sarkozy is-
lamized the riots also by first asking the 
imams to stop the riots and later asking 
for a fatwa that would condemn these 
riots. Unfortunately for him, the young-
sters in question have shown little in-
terest in traditional Islam, and even less 
for first generation preachers. Finally, 
the bands were made of French young 
men. Roughly, over one third was of 
North-African origin, slightly less than 
a third of African origin, and about one 
third of “natives.” If racism and religious 
discrimination were definitely part of 
the problem, the fact that these bands of young men were almost 
systematically ethnically mixed proves the theories of racial riots or 
Islamic conspiracy wrong. These three categories of rioters cannot be 
seen as distinct groups. In fact they see themselves as one group: 
French people from the banlieues. Although Islam played a very 
small role at the origins of the riots, Islam became a very debated 
issue, especially under the influence of culturalists or neo-reactionar-
ies like the philosopher Alain Finkielkraut.
Martijn: What is this Islamized discourse on the riots all about?
Laurent: The main argument of influential politicians and public in-
tellectuals, is that what happened is a living proof of the growing 
cultural gap between a civilized West and a barbarian East, the ri-
oters being its latest avatar. With a legitimacy deeply rooted in the 
analysis of anti-Semitism, Alain Finkielkraut became the herald of the 
culturalists, called “nouveaux réactionnaires” by the French press, as 
he maintained, in an interview given to journalists of the Israeli news-
paper Ha’aretz, that the riots were “anti-white, anti-republican po-
groms” and constituted “a revolt with an ethno-religious character… 
directed against France as a former colonial power, against France as 
a European country. Against France, with its Christian or Judeo-Chris-
tian tradition.”1 While fiercely criticized in France, he had to apologize, 
his analysis became very popular mainly in the United States, Russia 
and the Netherlands, and not by coincidence: these three countries 
are very busy, in their own way, with neo-colonial, imperialist, is-
lamophobic issues and Finkielkraut’s theory did resonate well with 
their internal political obsessions. The goal of this intellectual strat-
egy is to transform the traditional “Freedom versus Solidarity” issue, 
where political parties put their own cursor from right to left, into 
a “Civilized versus Barbarians” one, where nobody can really choose 
for Barbarians. Sarkozy supported Finkielkraut by stating that if there 
is so much criticism of him, it might be just because he says things 
that are correct.2 I am convinced that the call from Minister Sarkozy 
to the imams to stop the riots, with a fatwa if necessary, is part of a 
broader strategy of islamization of social problems and criminaliza-
tion of poverty.3 While, almost from day one, many reliable sources 
indicated that the riots were mostly socially motivated, Mr. Sarkozy 
chose to introduce the Muslim factor to reinforce his own conserva-
tive agenda on security, integration and immigration. 
Martijn: Many analysts also point to the grave social circumstances in 
the banlieues as the cause for these riots. Feelings of humiliation, no 
prospects for having a job, bad housing, and the overt racist behav-
iour of the police, contributed or even caused these riots. You lived in 
these banlieues. Can you tell us something more about that?
Laurent: As stated in different reports, especially from Amnesty Interna-
tional4, the French police are characterized by strong shortcomings: 
In October and November 2005, France 
witnessed a series of riots and violent clashes 
between youths and its police. Laurent 
Chambon, a French sociologist, born in one 
of the Paris banlieues and now living in 
the Netherlands, emerged, at that time, as 
an engaged social scientist worried by the 
islamization of the riots-discourse and by the 
way the French state handles the problems of 
the areas he knows so well from his childhood. 
Instead of riots of “youth gangs inspired by 
radical Muslims,” he argues in this interview 
that these riots should be seen as part of 
a movement against the “precariousness” 
of everyday life in the French banlieues.
Islam, Society & the State
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structural racism and xenophobia, culture of impunity, and abusive 
procedures against victims of misconducts. The culture of the French 
State, focused on exportation of the “French culture” for the good of 
humanity, has produced a very strong colonial culture, not necessar-
ily racist, but strongly ethno-centrist, where the Other is seen as a 
“Barbarian” who needs to be tamed. The relation colonizer/colonized 
can well define the one between the youngsters from the banlieues 
and the police. Besides, especially under a right-wing government, 
the French police enjoy a large impunity when it comes to power 
abuse and misconduct. Even in the case of deadly misconducts, the 
chance of seeing a policeman in jail is close to zero. Finally, the French 
police is in a very poor state: high figures of alcoholism, divorce and 
suicide, a very poor diversity policy, women and migrants are not wel-
comed at all, very low salaries and a toleration for misuses of the law 
to make some extra earnings are endemic problems. The abusive use 
of the “insult to agent” procedure, meant to protect the police from 
harassment, its costs being covered by the prefecture and generat-
ing well-paying compensations, is an easy way to complete a small 
pay-check. It is also a way for the police to cover its misconducts: the 
judge will generally listen first to the policemen if such a procedure 
has been engaged, guaranteeing amnesty for them, even if they have 
gone far over the red line. What is also important, is the structural dis-
crimination and racism of French society, but there is something more 
important going on. Although I might seem a little bit too Marxist in 
my analysis, what is happening nowadays in France is that when you 
are born in the wrong class your chances of having a prosperous future 
are very limited. You can have all the degrees you want, you can be an 
excellent student at an excellent institute, but when you are from the 
banlieues, you have a problem. France often proudly presents itself as 
a meritocracy: if you have the right qualifications, you can find a good 
and steady job and secure your future. But in fact, nowadays, France 
looks more like an aristocracy: with the French upper class securing its 
own positions. For example, I was doing well at university but when 
people found out that I was from the banlieues, they stopped talking 
to me. People from the French upper class, the aristocracy, the estab-
lishment, have no problems in finding well-paid, secure jobs. Others, 
no matter what their ethnic or religious background is, have far fewer 
chances. The question therefore is not if these riots are ethnic or Islamic, 
but “how” and “why” these riots became islamized. By islamizing these 
riots, politicians and public intellectuals are actually diverting their at-
tention from this issue to another one that is far more popular. They 
are avoiding that their own position comes under close scrutiny and 
reforms of the system are implemented. As said, this problem affects 
everyone from the banlieues. When you are a white, middle class man 
like me, and probably more when you are an Arab or black, lower class 
Muslim. Another problem that relates to this aspect of aristocracy is the 
crisis of political representation, something which I have researched.5 
Islam, Society & the State
People from the banlieues are hardly represented in the French politi-
cal system because the way people are elected. Any desire for reform 
to include more women or ethnic minorities, is refused by the political 
elite. Look, for example, at the people in the Assemblee Nationale, only 
10% are women.
Martijn: You characterize these riots as a clash between the lower class 
from the banlieues and the French establishment. Is there any proof 
that this has a broader impact that extends beyond the banlieues 
only?
Laurent: There is, when you look at the unrest in France of March 2006. 
Students are protesting against the new work laws. These are seen by 
students and many on the left as an attack on job security at a time 
when many in France are feeling deeply threatened by globalisation 
and any hint of change at home. What these students fight against is 
actually for a large part the same as for the people in the banlieues in 
2005. The crisis of meritocracy is not only affecting the youths of the 
banlieues but also middle class youth who, with all their university 
qualifications, can only find insecure temporary jobs if any. Both the 
students now and the banlieusards back then, can be seen as part of 
a precarious movement. 
Martijn: “Precarious” means unsure, uncertain, difficult, and delicate. 
Since the early 80s the term has been used more and more in rela-
tion to work. Precarious work refers to all possible shapes of unsure, 
not guaranteed, flexible forms of labor such as illegal, seasonal, and 
temporary employment, subcontractors, freelancers, or so-called self 
employed persons. Is it only about work and is this a new kind of 
workers’ movement?
Laurent: It is more than that. Precariousness refers to living and working 
conditions without any guarantees, to the uncertainty of all material 
and immaterial conditions of life. For example, it is difficult for these 
students who are revolting now, to find a good and steady job as it 
is. The new work laws will make it increasingly difficult because after 
a short period they can be fired without any conditions attached to 
it. For the people from the banlieues it is even more difficult. Not be-
cause they are not that qualified but because they are from the ban-
lieues and lack the necessary networks for social mobility. For Arab 
and black people of the banlieues, racism and discrimination comes 
on top of that and the islamization of the riots makes that worse than 
it already is. The precariousness therefore relates to these so-called 
flexible jobs, but also to identity issues, geographical locations, and 
an uncertain future. And especially in France it also has to do with, 
and again this is what makes me so angry: the French state not living 
up to its own standards of “republican equality.” 
Notes
1. Ha'aretz, 18 November 2005.
2. See for example Ha’aretz, 6 December 2005.
3. See Loïc Wacquant, Punir les pauvres, Le 
nouveau gouvernement de l’insécurité sociale 
(Paris: Agone, 2004); and see also http://lmsi.
net/article.php3?id_article=481.
4. See the report online: http://web.amnesty.
org/report2005/fra-summary-fra.
5. See Laurent Chambon, Le sel de la 
démocratie. L’accès des minorités au 
pouvoir politique en France et aux Pays-Bas 
(Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 
2002), see also http://users.skynet.be/
suffrage-universel/fr/frmiel.htm.
Martijn de Koning is Assistant-Editor of the ISIM Review and a Ph.D. candidate at the Free 
University Amsterdam.
Email: M.koning@isim.nl
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An Anti-Riot Fatwa
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Fatwas are powerful symbols. As state-
ments made in the name of God, they 
often carry an aura of sanctity. Fatwas 
are nevertheless progressively acquir-
ing, in the Muslim world, a meaning 
close to the English “sermon”—a form 
of moralizing religious advice largely 
out of tune with reality. Since the Rush-
die case, fatwas are regarded with even 
greater hostility in the West, denoting, 
if not a death-threat, a normative genre which looks to liberal minds 
uniquely obscure; and committed European Muslims are increasingly 
debating the legitimacy of such texts. When in 1996 the Haut Conseil 
des musulmans de France issued a fatwa condemning the kidnapping 
of Catholic monks in Tibéhirine (Algeria) by Islamist radicals, the Grande 
Mosquée de Paris swiftly responded that, “A fatwa fulfils a number of 
conditions laid out in Quranic Law (sic). We are here under French Law, 
which separates strictly between religion and the Republic. [If we issue 
a fatwa today] why wouldn’t we throw a fatwa tomorrow to demand 
polygamy?”1 Some Muslim institutions have preferred to avoid the 
term “fatwa,” delivering other forms of Islamic advice: the largest con-
federation of Muslim scholars in France, the Conseil des imams, reacted 
to the recent discussion on banning the Muslim headscarf from public 
schools by issuing a press statement which “follows the method of a 
fatwa,” but is not called so “in regard to the sensitivities of the French 
public sphere.”2
These constraints of publicity render the “fatwa 
concerning the troubles affecting France” issued 
at the height of the violence on 6 November 
2005 by the Union des organisations islamiques 
de France all the more remarkable. Drawing on 
Quranic verses condemning destruction and dis-
order, the theological body of the UOIF, Dar al-
Fatwa, ruled the following: “Every Muslim living 
in France, whether citizen or guest, has the right 
to demand the scrupulous respect of his being, 
dignity and belief, as well as to act for greater 
equality and social justice. But this action…must 
never take place against the Islamic 
teachings and the law which regulates 
common life.”3
The fatwa was delivered in response 
to demands from the grassroots, par-
ticularly those Muslim families most af-
fected by the destruction of (their) cars. 
The UOIF reported a high number of tel-
ephone requests to publicly condemn 
the violence. By voicing such loud criti-
cism of the riots in Islamic terms, the leaders of the UOIF were drawing 
on the tradition of the Salafiyya which since the nineteenth century has 
geared Muslim technologies not (only) for individual salvation but for 
purposes of social governance and the formation of moral citizens. The 
fatwa has been one of Muslim reformers’ key instruments in this project. 
The “preventive” text, as the fatwa was described, signalled also an 
attempt to dismiss the insinuations of a religious manipulation behind 
the riots. Under normal circumstances Islam represents for mainstream 
French society all the alterity of the banlieues. Many of the problems of 
these areas had been in recent debates explained through references 
to the spread of Islamic Revivalism. Although the riots themselves were 
mainly understood as the product of social and urban exclusion, some 
politicians did (wrongly) suggest the implication of Islamist groups. By 
issuing a religious statement against the violence, the UOIF was coun-
tering such claims. 
The fatwa fell logically within the expectations of large sections of 
the political establishment, particularly the Interior Minister Nicolas 
Sarkozy, who plays a key role in both maintaining order and manag-
ing religious diversity in France. The Minister included the controversial 
Islamic organization in the official Muslim representative body set up 
in 2003—a decision which greatly improved the UOIF’s access to po-
litical and civil opportunity structures. The successful establishment of 
the representative body has in turn been used by Sarkozy to further 
his political ambitions. When political actors on the left and Muslim 
leaders criticized the fatwa, accusing the UOIF of either tainting social 
problems with a religious colour or of bestowing upon religion an ille-
gitimate public role, Sarkozy’s party promptly issued a press statement 
in defence of the use of fatwas in France. 
The religious statement formalized the mediating function of Islam 
in the French suburbs. Although they did not generate as much public-
ity, religious volunteers had from the beginning attempted to dialogue 
with the young rioters in order to appease the situation. Coherent with 
the UOIF’s imagined role for religion in the public space, the fatwa’s 
wider resonance was made possible by the emergence of new discur-
sive spaces in France: subverting the dominant conception of laïcité, 
which postulates a strict separation of religion and state, French au-
thorities have for two decades now been performing a semantic shift 
between “immigrant” and “Muslim.” Against the backdrop of interna-
tional terrorism and the perceived crisis of the French model of inte-
gration, political leaders have not hesitated to draw the debate back to 
the theological plane, discoursing time and again about the “authentic” 
Islam of “peace” and “social cohesion.” The consequent distinction be-
tween “good” and “bad” Islams drives the call for a French and “Enlight-
ened” Islam—the latest version perhaps of what Olivier Roy has called 
the time-old theological temptation of the French religious “neutral-
ity.”4 In this project of Gallicanization the UOIF occupies an ambivalent 
place. Although suspected of Islamist affiliations and accused of “fun-
damentalism,” its contextualized reading of the Islamic sources and its 
vision of a “civic Islam” falls logically within the French debate.5 They 
respond directly to the expectations of the society and reproduce the 
idea of a necessary aggiornamento as a prerequisite to the integration 
of the Muslims—setting the conditions not for a privatization of faith, 
but for a public Islam. 
A L E X A N D R E  C A E I R O
Alexandre Caeiro is a Ph.D. candidate at ISIM researching processes of religious authority 
among Muslims in Europe. 
Email: caeiroa@yahoo.com
Islam, Society & the State
P
H
O
T
O
 B
Y
 V
IN
C
E
N
T
 K
E
S
S
L
E
R
 /
 ©
 R
E
U
T
E
R
S
, 
2
0
0
5
Cars burned 
during riots of 
8 November 
2005 stacked up 
at Strasbourg’s 
city impound 
lot 
A French fatwa condemning the 2005 riots 
in Islamic terms gave rise to a controversy 
around the legitimacy of this particular Muslim 
technology in a secular polity. To seize the 
significance of the text one must place it in 
the tradition of the Salafiyya, where Islamic 
forms of reasoning acquired a distinctively 
public dimension, and map out the recent—and 
contested—discursive shifts in French laïcité.  
Notes
1. Le Monde, 26 May 1996.
2. Secretary-general of the Conseil des Imams, 
personal communication, Paris 2004.
3. The full text of the fatwa is available from 
the UOIF’s website, www.uoif-online.com.
4. Olivier Roy, La laïcité face à l’islam (Paris: 
Stock, 2005).
5. See Frank Peter, “Towards Civil Islam? 
A Comparison of Islam policies in Britain 
and France,” Recht van de Islam 23 (2006).
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Famine and Democracy
in Mauritania
Islam, Society & the State
S T A C Y  E .  H O L D E NMauritania’s military and the interna-
tional community are at loggerheads 
over the recent coup in this Sahelian 
country. In response to the coup, Nouak-
chott’s residents engaged in a joyful 
street celebration. Despite this sign of 
popular support for the new junta, for-
eign governments denounced the mili-
tary’s confiscation of political power.
Both the Mauritanian military and 
its international critics present them-
selves as champions of democracy, so 
these outwardly opposing sides are in 
fact interchangeable in regard to their 
mutual endorsement of an inaccurate explanation of this political cri-
sis. President Taya held power for twenty-one years. The seventeen 
members of the ruling junta insist that Mauritanians could no longer 
support his harsh rule, and they promise to set up democratic insti-
tutions by 2007. Foreign leaders, however, insist that the junta must 
respect the existing constitution and reinstall President Taya. The op-
posing sides offer different interpretations of the rule of law and fair 
electoral process, but they do not advance contrasting explanations 
either for the coup or for the popular support of it. 
Though journalists and pundits do not give credence to arguments 
that the coup centres on the struggle for democracy, they too offer faulty 
analyses. In some cases, they conclude that an Islamic movement gener-
ated unrest in this North African country. This argument is based on Taya’s 
decision to open diplomatic relations with Israel six years ago, which an-
gered politicized Muslims. In other cases, they conclude that this coup 
represents an effort to control the resources of an emerging rentier state. 
This argument focuses on Taya’s decision to eventually engage in offshore 
oil production. My criticism hinges on the chronological understanding of 
cause and effect. Both arguments look either to the past or to the future 
to explain the present crisis. And right now, today, in a country depend-
ent on rain-fed agriculture, drought and locusts have destroyed its crops. 
The Mauritanian coup builds upon the Sahel’s long history of environ-
mental crisis as a catalyst for political change. Taya himself organized a 
military coup in 1984, the third year of a severe drought. By that time, 
hungry nomads had set up shantytowns on the capital’s 
outskirts, and their arrival doubled the Nouakchott’s pop-
ulation. Mauritania is now in the second year of a similar 
food crisis, and the military, just as Taya and his cohorts 
once did, deposed a ruler who could not prevent famine. In 
this instance, the military’s action sustains the environmen-
tal logic dictating this region’s event history. 
I worked at the US Embassy in Nouakchott in 1998, and 
I observed Taya’s efforts to care for his country’s marginal-
ized masses. I came to Mauritania two months after a visit 
by the Under Secretary of State for Human Rights, who took 
this country off the US list of human rights abusers. When 
I travelled inland through Atar, I saw no evidence that Taya 
abused his power to enrich himself or his supporters. His 
hometown was just as run-down as other villages in the re-
gion. And Taya’s government cared for displaced migrants. 
In showing me Nouakchott, an Embassy official drove a 4 
X 4 along a network of paved roads that led to the shanty-
towns. As a public work, these roads allowed the capital’s 
poorest residents to take buses downtown and to receive 
barrels of fresh water. 
Though Taya’s policies exhibited concern for the lot of 
ordinary people, his efforts to institute democracy were 
superficial. The first presidential election after Taya’s coup 
took place in 1991, and the President was 
re-elected with an implausible 90% of 
the vote. In both 1997 and 2003, the in-
cumbent’s margin of victory was a more 
realistic percentage, but Taya jailed his 
principal opponent in the latter election. 
If Mauritanians loathe authoritarianism 
and aspire instead to representative in-
stitutions, then a popularly supported 
military coup should have taken place 
well before August 2005. 
It was only at the end of pitiful harvest 
season, as Mauritanians faced a second 
year of poor crops, that military officers 
ousted Taya. Even in the best of times, most people in this country hardly 
earn enough to feed their families. The US State Department estimates 
that the average annual income of the 2.5 million people in Mauritania re-
mains close to only $380 a year. Now, locusts and droughts have destroyed 
this region’s crops, so food is costly or, even worse, unavailable. Only three 
days after the coup, the United Nations World Food Programme pointed 
to Mauritania as one country that has been most affected by the current 
environmental crisis in the Sahel. If there is one issue that obsesses most 
Mauritanians right now, it is the cost and availability of staple food.
The reporting on this coup did not take into consideration the agricul-
tural foundation of Mauritania’s political life. At present, the UN estimates 
that famine threatens more than one million people in North and West 
Africa. Environmental catastrophe has long acted as a catalyst for political 
change in North Africa, and this coup perpetuates traditional patterns of 
power transfer in these arid lands. Ensuring public access to food is a basic 
task of any government, so famine in the Sahara’s borderlands contributes 
to the rise and fall of empires. Political instability in other countries will 
surely follow in the wake of more bad harvests. But unmistakably, future 
demonstrators, much like the Mauritanians who danced in the streets last 
August to celebrate the military coup, want food, not democracy. 
Stacy E. Holden is Assistant Professor of History, Purdue University.
Email: sholden@purdue.edu
In August 2005, a military junta engaged in 
a bloodless coup in Mauritania that ousted 
President Maaouya Sid’ Ahmed Ould Taya. 
Supporters and critics of this coup both 
explain this event in terms of a struggle for 
democracy. According to the author this 
analysis can neither explain the coup nor the 
popular support of it. Instead, she argues that 
environmental catastrophe has long acted as a 
catalyst for political change in Mauritania, just 
as in other countries in North Africa. Political 
instability in other countries will surely follow 
in the wake of more bad harvests. 
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Distribution 
of food at a 
village nearby 
Nouakchott, 
9 June 2002
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J U A N  R . I .  C O L E
The Ayatollahs and 
Democracy in Iraq
Leading Shia clerics in Iraq are seek-
ing rapprochement between the prin-
ciples of Shiite Islam and the ideals of 
democracy. One of the key figures in 
this development is Ali Husayni Sistani, 
born in 1930 in Mashhad, eastern Iran. 
Sistani, from a clerical family, carried 
out his initial studies with his father and 
other great clerics in the city of his birth. 
Around 1948 he went off for higher 
studies to Qom, not far from the capital 
of Tehran in the north-central part of the 
country. There he worked with the great-
est Shiite authority of the time, Ayatollah Husayn Burujirdi. Late in 1951, 
the young Sistani went to Najaf in Iraq to complete his education, and 
ended up staying there the rest of his life. For the next decade, he stud-
ied with the leading jurists of that city. To any extent that Sistani thought 
about political matters, he appears to have been shaped by the ideals of 
the Constitutional Revolution in early twentieth century Iran (1905-1911). 
In post-Saddam Iraq, Sistani referred proudly to the role of Najaf clerics in 
theorizing a synthesis of Shiite Islam and Western-style constitutionalism 
in 1905-1911. That experiment ultimately failed, but left behind a body of 
thought on which clerics of Sistani’s generation continued to draw.
In 1968 the secular, Arab nationalist Baath Party came to power in a 
coup. Sistani himself adhered to the quietism of Burujirdi (d. 1961), Grand 
Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim (d. 1970), and Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim 
Khu’i (d. 1992). He therefore avoided coming into 
direct conflict with the one-party state, though he 
clearly rued the way in which the seminary city of 
Najaf was reduced to a shadow of its former self 
and the Shiite clergy were driven into exile or killed 
in the dozens. There is some reason to think that 
Sistani also regretted the excesses of the Islamic 
Republic from 1979 in his homeland, where Ruhul-
lah Khomeini instituted a clerical theocracy. Shiites 
hold that the line of the Imams or descendants of 
the Prophet had ended with the Twelfth Imam, who 
is said to have vanished into a mystical realm in CE 
873, from which he will someday return. Shiites had 
dealt in various ways with the problem of legitimate 
authority that ensued from the Imam’s disappear-
ance or occultation. Khomeini put forward a novel 
theory that in the absence of the Imam, the trained 
Shiite clerics should rule, in accordance with Islamic 
law. He was dismissive of democracy, saying that if 
the people disagreed with the religious texts, the 
people would be wrong. 
In his first major fatwa after the fall of Saddam, cri-
tiquing the American plan to appoint a committee 
to draft the Iraqi constitution, Sistani rejected the 
Khomeinist tradition by accepting the principle of 
popular sovereignty. In his ruling or fatwa of 28 June 
2003, Sistani explained that there was no way of 
being sure that the American-appointed committee “will draft a constitu-
tion that conforms with the highest interests of the Iraqi people and would 
express its national identity, one basis of which is the pure Islamic religion 
and noble social values.” Sistani insisted that any body that drafted the new 
constitution would have to be elected by the people. He said that the draft 
constitution should then be submitted to a national referendum. 
In other statements coming out of Najaf, it was clear that the high cler-
ics, including Sistani, saw governmental legitimacy as deriving from two 
sources. One is the seal of al-imda’ (approval) given by the grand ayatol-
lahs in Najaf. The other is the approval 
or agreement of the people through a 
general election. In the absence of these 
two, the Interim Governing Council 
lacked legitimacy, according to the com-
muniqué. The dual sources of legitimacy 
did not imply, in the thinking of Sistani 
and those around him, any sort of the-
ocracy. 
On 15 November, US civil administra-
tor Paul Bremer made a pact with the In-
terim Governing Council that he himself 
had appointed, which called for coun-
cil-based elections in May 2004. The system Bremer put forward would 
involve voting by members of the provincial and municipal governing 
councils established by the Americans and British. These council members 
had gotten into power because of small, unrepresentative selection proc-
esses overseen by the occupation authorities and companies it hired.
Sistani rejected this plan out of hand. In response to the questions of 
Anthony Shadid of the Washington Post, he gave his most explicit fatwa 
yet on popular sovereignty. Responding to Bremer’s council-based plan, 
he said, “The instrumentality envisaged in it for electing the members of 
the transitional legislature does not guarantee the formation of a parlia-
ment that truly represents the Iraqi people. It must be changed to some 
other method, which would guarantee it. And that is [direct] elections, 
such that the parliament would derive from the will of the Iraqis and 
would represent them in a just manner and will safeguard it from any 
challenge to its legitimacy.”
Other clerics who worked under Sistani’s penumbra, whether in religion 
or politics or both, took up the discourse of the popular will. In December 
of 2003, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq, visited Germany and consulted with Chancellor Ger-
hard Schroeder. While in Berlin, al-Hakim said that he supported a greater 
United Nations role in establishing democracy in Iraq.
When Bremer and his Interim Governing Council rejected Sistani’s 
demands, the grand ayatollah demonstrated the sort of hold he had 
on the Iraqi street. In mid-January 2004, he called tens of thousands of 
demonstrators into the streets of Basra and Baghdad, demanding direct 
elections. He also said that the United Nations should send an envoy to 
investigate the political situation in Iraq and to look into the feasibility 
of holding direct elections in May 2004. The Bush administration imme-
diately backed off, faced with these massive rallies, and cooperated with 
the sending of a UN envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi. In the end, the plan Brahimi 
worked out with his American and Iraqi interlocutors gave Sistani most of 
what he wanted, though he did not get his May elections. Open elections 
were planned for late January 2005, after an initial transition from a purely 
American administration of the country to an American-backed interim 
government. Sistani also got a United Nations resolution midwifing the 
new Iraq, internationalizing the process far beyond what the Bush admin-
istration had wanted.
In a February 2004, interview with the German magazine, Der Spiegel, 
Sistani said that he felt that the only way forward out of the quagmire 
was democratic elections. When the German interviewer inquired as to 
whether they might not produce a tyranny of the Shiite majority, Sis-
tani demurred. “Not at all. Even if a certain community holds a majority 
in numbers, this will not lead to the creation of a political majority, be-
cause in every community there are different political orientations.” He 
felt it was important that governments succeed one another peacefully, 
something that had been rare during his lifetime in Iraq. He added, “Also, 
since the majority of the Iraqi people are Muslims, they are sure to choose 
a system which will respect the principles of the Islamic Shariah, and also 
protect the religious minorities.” 
Professor Juan Cole delivered the ISIM Annual 
Lecture on 1 December 2005 at the Beurs 
van Berlage in Amsterdam. He argued that 
clerically-led Shiism in Iraq is undergoing 
a sort of reformation, in which leading figures 
are attempting to reconcile the principles of 
Islam with those of the Enlightenment. The 
current attempt by ayatollahs to engage with 
the ideals of Jean-Jacques Rousseau is among 
the more thoroughgoing and institutionally 
promising in modern history. This article is 
an adjusted version of his lecture.1
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 [T]hey survived 
the dictatorships 
of Saddam 
and Khomeini 
alike, becoming 
disillusioned both 
with secularism and 
with theocracy.
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim clearly disagreed with Sistani about clerics play-
ing a key role in politics. But he eagerly embraced the new discourse 
of national liberty through parliamentary elections. In early March 
of 2004, he gave a sermon on the ninth of Ashura, commemorating 
the martyrdom of Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, 
the central ritual commemoration of Shiite Islam. It was carried in 
the newspaper al-Adalah [Justice] on 4 March. In the Shiite narrative, 
Husayn had stood against the oppression of the Umayyad Empire, then 
was cut down by the armies sent out by the Caliph Yazid on 10 Muhar-
ram, 680. Al-Hakim said, “We … pledge to our Imam al-Husayn to walk 
along his path, which calls for adherence to right, justice, and freedom, 
and rejects injustice, arbitrariness, and tyranny.” In this litany, “freedom” 
is perhaps the only truly modern element, added by al-Hakim to the 
more traditional values of justice and right. The clerical leader now con-
figures the martyrdom as an element in modern Iraqi nationalism. He 
proclaims, “The land of Iraq is the land of the holy places and the cra-
dle of freedom, and our Imam Al-Husayn may peace be on him, is the 
leader of the martyred and father of the free peoples.” He now suggests 
a cycle of descent into tyranny and ascent into liberation. He says that 
in order to “close the road to all kinds of dictatorships” and to forestall 
any repetition of the bitter experiences of Iraqis under Saddam Hus-
sein, “our demand for this dangerous and sensitive stage of our strug-
gling people’s life is to insist on the holding of free and fair elections to 
enable our peoples to have their say and express their opinion about 
whom they may choose to represent them.” Al-Hakim here sets up a 
neat parallel between the martyrdom of Husayn in the seventh century 
and the rise of democracy in the early twenty-first century. Iraq was the 
scene of both epiphanies. In both cases a long period of tyranny led 
the people to rise up. Inspired by the sacrifice of the Prophet’s scion, 
the Iraqi people now had the opportunity to institutionalize the values 
inherent in Ashura of refusal to countenance oppression. Not only free 
and fair elections but also the rule of law are key to this new, continu-
ous liberty. “The conferring peoples confirm the need to issue a perma-
nent constitution in the country. The constitution should ensure the 
free and effective participation of all sectors of society in the adminis-
tration of their country in legitimate and decentralized ways.” Here we 
hear an early echo of al-Hakim’s other disagreement with Sistani, over 
whether Iraqi governance was best pursued through a strong central 
government or through a decentralized, loose federalism.
Other high Shiite religious authorities also weighed in on democracy 
and popular sovereignty. The Baghdad newspaper al-Furat reported on 
10 October 2004, that Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Ishaq Fayyad, a col-
league in Najaf of Sistani who originally hailed from Afghanistan, also 
supported the electoral process. He demanded that the elections be held 
on schedule (i.e. no later than 30 January 2005) and “added that the elec-
tions represent the first step in the right direction toward building a free 
Iraq and achieving justice and stability for the Iraqis.” He elaborated on 
the security issue, saying “that the security situation is connected to the 
holding of the elections, which would lead to a free and democratic gov-
ernment.” Implicit in the ayatollahs’ statements was a conviction that only 
an elected government would have the authority and legitimacy to begin 
working on ending the foreign occupation of the country. Another Najaf 
grand ayatollah, Muhammad Sa`id al-Hakim, was asked if the religious 
establishment had a plan for the elections. He replied, “Its plan is to hold 
real and national elections that lead to the composition of a truly sov-
ereign and independent government. He stressed that the objective of 
the religious establishment is to unify the national ranks and underscore 
efficiency and national will.” The Rousseauan language of the national or 
general will recurs here, and it shows that Sistani was not alone in his in-
terest in Enlightenment ideals about popular sovereignty.
In conclusion, one can trace from April 2003 through January of 2005 
a remarkable development in Shiite religious and legal thinking about 
democracy in Iraq. The ideals of elections, representation of the people, 
the expression of the national will, and a rule of law are invoked over and 
over again by the most prominent religious leaders. Unlike Khomeini in 
1979, they are completely unafraid of the phrase term “democracy,” and 
generally see no contradiction between it and Islam. These democratic 
convictions, of course, have an immediate context. They give the reli-
gious establishment a means to ensure that the Shiite majority in Iraq 
gains its political voice after decades of severe repression. They also pave 
the way to an independent, sovereign Iraq that may finally escape for-
eign domination. This instrumental utility of democracy, however, cannot 
entirely explain the ayatollahs’ infatuation with it. Rather, they survived 
the dictatorships of Saddam and Khomeini alike, becoming disillusioned 
both with secularism and with theocracy. In the phrase of sociologist Asef 
Bayat, their democratic thinking is a manifestation 
of “post-Islamism,” and very possibly the beginning 
of the Islamic Enlightenment.
Poster urging 
followers of 
Grand Ayatollah 
Ali al-Sistani 
to participate 
in the January 
2005 elections, 
Baghdad, 
December 2004
Juan R. I. Cole is Professor of Modern Middle East and South Asian History at the University 
of Michigan. 
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Note
1. The full text of the lecture will also 
be available as an ISIM paper. 
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The Organization of the Islamic Con-
ference (OIC) was established in 1969 
with the goals of representing the 
Muslim world and support coopera-
tion among Muslim nations and is 
the largest transnational Muslim or-
ganization representing 57 Muslim 
countries. Institutions like the OIC are 
needed not only for political reasons 
but also because of the feeling of 
alienation, insecurity and disposses-
sion among the Muslim masses. This 
feeling is caused by the rapid process 
of tortured modernization and inter-
national politics that surround the 
relationship between Muslim societies and the major power players 
of the modern world. Furthermore, the Euro-centric historiographies 
of our educational systems make it virtually impossible to place 
non-Western histories on world history charts. History is assumed 
to begin with Greece and end somewhere on the two sides of the 
Atlantic.
Newly emerging networks of communication including the OIC are 
seen as potential voices for the Muslim world. Such voices are direly 
needed to express the concerns of Muslim soci-
eties to foster peace, justice, and equality. The 
omnipresent reality of the voices of wisdom, 
compassion, and moderation was a leitmotif 
of the classical Islamic tradition, which has suc-
ceeded in overcoming its own eccentric and ex-
treme sides. Today, the Muslim world is a world 
without a centre. It seems to have lost its spir-
itual dignity and magnanimity. It wants to join a 
battle in which there are no winners. It is a world 
without a voice.
Obviously, there cannot be one single voice 
for a world as vast and complex as the Muslim 
world. No single person, institution, or govern-
ment can claim to speak for the entire Muslim 
world. What I have in mind is not a central au-
thority that issues fatwas or makes declarations 
on issues of concern. Rather, it is something 
that will embody the ideal of finding the middle 
path of the Islamic tradition where the Muslim 
world will once again see itself as the “middle 
community” (ummatan wasatah). It is the “mid-
dle way” of traditional Islam “defined by that 
sophisticated classical consensus which was 
worked out over painful centuries of debate and 
scholarship.”1
Not one but many voices of the “middle way” 
have to emerge to reflect the rich diversity as 
well as the multifaceted concerns and anxieties 
of Muslim communities the world over. This is 
what is happening in different parts of the Mus-
lim world. Countless Muslim organizations, small 
and big, conservative and liberal, local and in-
ternational, are converging on the necessity of 
such platforms where the voices of moderation, 
wisdom, mercy, and serious thinking can flour-
ish. They are seeking the “middle path” to make 
sense of everything from the Danish cartoon 
saga to the mindless killings in Iraq. 
OIC or the saga of an
international organization
Can the OIC be such a platform? Given 
the OIC’s rather uninspiring past in the 
last four decades, it is hard to give an 
answer in the affirmative. Like many 
other Muslim organizations, the OIC is 
hampered by numerous political, eco-
nomic, and structural problems. Since 
its establishment in 1969 and official 
launching in 1972, the OIC has consist-
ently failed to live up to its promise, 
i.e., to represent the Muslim world on 
a global scale, increase economic and 
scientific cooperation among Muslim 
nations, and find a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian problem. 
In none of these areas did the OIC deliver. It failed over and over again 
and each failure led to further failure of many similar attempts. Its inef-
fectiveness in the massacres of Bosnia, Grozny, Palestine, Fallujah, to 
name a few, made the OIC further removed from the minds and hearts 
of Muslims across the world. Sadly, it became a joke: saying “O! I see!” 
and then doing nothing became the motto for the OIC.2
The political and structural problems surrounding the OIC and simi-
lar transnational institutions in the Muslim world are manifold and do 
not lend themselves to neat categorizations. The tension between the 
modern nation-state and any transnational organization that questions 
its legitimacy is clearly present in OIC’s ongoing struggle and often 
disappointing failure to get its 57 members to commit themselves po-
litically and act on key issues unanimously. Most of the member states 
have their own national agenda and lack the political will needed to 
address the issues of the Muslim world without the “rhetoric of blame”3 
and without the patronage of one or another super power. Even the 
name of the OIC has its problems. The word “conference” is out of place 
if the OIC is defined as a permanent organization. The word “Islamic” is 
too value-laden and susceptible to rival interpretations and often, use-
less discussions of what makes something “Islamic.”4
Today, the allegiance of Muslim nations to their nation-states, which 
are constructs of power rather than embodiments of their values and 
aspirations, runs deeper than we may like to think. The rising Turkish 
and Kurdish nationalisms in Turkey, state nationalism in Pakistan, politi-
cal nationalism in Iran, the forced nationalism of resistance in Palestine, 
regional nationalisms in the Arab world and the numerous other forms 
of “nation-statism” make it almost impossible for transnational iden-
tities and institutions to take root in Muslim countries. The legacy of 
colonialism, the mental geography of the nineteenth century, and the 
return of the empire in more oppressive and subtle ways preempt the 
possibility of forging larger and more universal codes of allegiance. 
But it is precisely because of such concerns that institutions like the 
OIC can and should play a constructive role in overcoming the mental 
and spiritual trauma created by the crisis of the nation-state on the one 
hand, and secular modernism and globalization on the other hand. De-
spite its rather disappointing past, the OIC has a chance to bring the 
diverse voices in the Muslim world together and work towards a shared 
sense of common destiny. This is urgently needed at a time when the 
cost of the irresponsible and unjustified acts of a few is higher than 
ever for the entire Muslim world. 
The Mecca Forum and the extraordinary summit
It is with these concerns in mind that the OIC held a meeting in 
Mecca on 9-11 September 2005 under the able leadership of the new 
OIC Secretary-General Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu. The meeting, called 
the “Forum of Muslim Scholars and Intellectuals Preparatory to the Ex-
Islam, Society & the State
The Third Extraordinary Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit held in Mecca 
on 7-8 December 2005 has brought to the 
forefront the question of whether it can serve 
as a voice for the Muslim world in its struggles 
to cope with the political and spiritual 
challenges it faces. Though the OIC has been 
severely criticized for its ineffectiveness, as the 
cartoon crisis in Denmark shows, the author 
argues that it is bound to play a critical role in 
the relations between the Muslim world and 
the West especially at a time when the former 
is struck with a sense of distrust, dislocation, 
and dispossession.
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The other issues discussed included the formation of a joint Islamic soli-
darity fund, cooperation among NGOs, curbing extremism and prevent-
ing ethnic and sectarian clashes, establishing a balance between security 
and freedom, giving a larger role to women, ensuring the protection of 
human and minority rights in Muslim countries, combating terrorism 
and Islamophobia, improving relations between the Muslim world and 
the West, increasing economic and scientific cooperation among the OIC 
members states, investing more in education, and opening new offices of 
the OIC in places where Muslims live as minorities.
Giving just a list of the above issues attests to the enormity of the prob-
lems faced by the Muslim world today. They point to the urgency of tak-
ing action to stop the further alienation and frustration of Muslim com-
munities throughout the world. In the absence of proper representation, 
such lingering problems are bound to result in chaos and further destruc-
tion. At this point, the Danish cartoon crisis gave the OIC a unique chance 
to play the role of a credible negotiator between Europe and the Muslim 
world. It was important for the OIC to make a plea 
of calm and moderation in the name of the Mus-
lim world. Even though these calls did not have an 
immediate impact on street demonstrations, they 
helped start a number of official initiatives to ad-
dress the crisis at an international level. OIC became 
the main institution to convey the message of the 
Muslim masses to the halls of European Union, and 
this is no small matter for the global representation 
of Muslim issues in the West. 
Institutions like the OIC, if endowed with a prop-
er vision and equipped with the necessary means, 
can make a difference to alleviate some of the pain 
suffered by millions of people within and outside 
the Muslim world. Otherwise, the hard realities of 
poverty, corruption, impotence, mistrust, anger 
and indifference are bound to continue to produce 
confused minds and hardened souls. Reversing the 
course of events for the better will be a historic mo-
ment not only for the Muslim world but for all the 
children of Adam.
Islam, Society & the State
traordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference,” was convened 
by HE King Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia. King Abdullah had 
called the meeting to address the issues of “unity” and “joint action” 
and set the Muslim world free from its “state of impotence and disunity 
it is suffering from.” A similar call had been made at the tenth Islamic 
Summit Conference held in Putrajaya, Malaysia, October 2003, where 
the establishment of a Commission of Eminent Persons from the Mem-
ber States was decided “with a view towards formulating a strategy and 
plan of action to enable the Muslim ummah to meet the challenges of 
the twenty first century, to adopt measures and programmes to dis-
seminate the ideas of enlightened moderation in Islam, and to make 
recommendations to reform and reorganize the OIC System in order to 
provide it with new visions, goals and objectives.”5 The Commission of 
Eminent Persons consisting of 18 persons from 18 Muslim nations held 
a meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan, May 29, 2005 and issued a 15-page 
report on the current situation of the Islamic world. The report high-
lighted many of the issues raised at the Mecca Forum.
The main agenda of the Mecca Forum was the reform and restructur-
ing of the OIC in view of the current problems in the Muslim world. In 
the Forum, the participants discussed a long list of issues and made 
a number of suggestions. The themes of the forum were divided into 
three main areas: political, economic and scientific, and cultural-intel-
lectual. Each panel proposed a vision, evaluated the current situation 
and challenges, and made suggestions as to how to achieve the pro-
jected goals. One of the themes that came up recurrently was the lack 
of political will on the part of member states to implement the numer-
ous resolutions of such meetings. The gap between what is said and 
what is done was highlighted as a major defect undermining the cred-
ibility of the OIC and similar institutions.
The recommendations of the Forum were submitted to Heads of 
State in the Third Extraordinary OIC summit held in Mecca, 7-8 Decem-
ber 2005. Fifty-seven presidents, prime ministers, or their representa-
tives attended the Summit. The Forum and the Summit produced three 
documents: the Mecca Declaration, Final Communiqué and the 10-year 
Programme of Action. One of the central messages of the Summit was 
striving for unity and solidarity among Muslim nations, fighting against 
terrorism and extremism of all kinds, and recovering the middle path 
of moderation. Corruption, poverty, illiteracy, and lack of transpar-
ency and political accountability in Muslim countries were singled out 
as among the most pressing issues. It was also emphasized that unity 
among Muslim nations should be strengthened and that Muslim coun-
tries should play a larger role in all the major international organiza-
tions.6
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In 2002, the US opened a new front 
of the War on Terror in Saharan Africa, 
with the Malian government desig-
nated as a key strategic partner. Since 
then it has provided troops, materiel 
and funding to combat what the Bush 
administration regards as an abid-
ing threat: a large, sparsely populated 
expanse sheltering terrorist groups 
linked to al-Qaida. 
Aside from the weakness of evidence 
for such groups operating in the Saha-
ra, the way the US has chosen to both 
carry out and rhetoricize its War on Ter-
ror in Mali has heightened regional tensions and widened pre-existing 
political and economic disparities. Social networks, particularly those 
networks based on different types of Muslim corporate identity, are 
one important area of social and cultural change. Older Sufi-based net-
works are giving way to new kinds of Muslim social organizations often 
funded by outside patrons and to new ways for northern Malians to get 
access to a variety of resources they have been denied. 
Structural adjustment and open revolt
The story begins with the structural adjustment programmes and in-
creasing presence of multinational companies in the 1980s and 1990s. 
During that period the IMF, World Bank, and other foreign donors struck 
a series of agreements with various Malian governments that attempted 
to address spiralling past debt service (most notably in 1982, 1988, 1996, 
and 1998) and underwrote large-scale works projects meant to increase 
foreign direct investment, with the larg-
er goal of development along neo-lib-
eral free-market principles. The impacts 
of these programmes varied across the 
country with the degree of existing so-
cial inequities, the level of government 
corruption and the local structures of 
political and economic control. But by 
1989, Mali spent 100.8% of its GNP on 
debt service. Forced privatization meas-
ures hurt many markets—notably cot-
ton, but also fragile farming in the north. 
At the same time, the Traore government 
cut social and health programme budg-
ets. While Malians across the country felt the impact of these measures, 
they disproportionately affected the crumbling northern economy. Sub-
sequent anti-government protests led to military coup in 1991, and coin-
cided with the outbreak of a protracted armed rebellion in the north. 
During the 1990s, important trends began to emerge in Mali’s Saha-
ran periphery that highlighted the direct and indirect effects of these 
external inputs, as well as aid’s politicization. Reliable total aid figures 
are surprisingly sparse, since they include not only the official IMF and 
Bank loans and grants but also the parallel, often undocumented, mon-
ies invested by large multinational companies, in the wake of privati-
zation, to gain favourable access to new opportunities as well as pri-
vate NGOs and foreign state country aid. What is clear, however, is that 
the benefits flowing from these investments remained in the hands 
of mostly southern elites who actively supported or were part of the 
Bambara-dominated Konaré government. 
1990s: Failing economy 
and new alternatives
Over the nineties, those leaders and 
communities in northern Mali who re-
fused to cooperate with national govern-
ment programmes and policies lost out 
to those who did. These communities re-
ceived proportionally fewer opportuni-
ties than others precisely when in many 
cases they needed this help the most, 
with the slow but inexorable movement 
of the desert southwards and several 
successive years of devastating drought. 
For a social fabric already stretched thin 
by two decades of environmental deg-
radation, neo-liberal economic reforms 
that undermined rural economies, and 
several disease outbreaks, the timing 
could not have been worse.
Local leaders responded in various 
ways. One option was open revolt, the 
choice made by the Ifogas Tuareg and 
allies in the early nineties. Another, more 
common option was simply acquiesc-
ing to government requests, the path 
that many older Songhai, Bellah, and 
Fulani community leaders chose. But a 
Islam, Society & the State
How the US has chosen to carry out and 
rhetoricize its War on Terror with the Malian 
government has had important consequences 
for the political and economic stability of 
northern Mali. Pre-existing political and 
economic disparities have grown since 2002, 
spurring deeper social and cultural shifts and 
bringing a group of young, reformist Muslim 
intellectuals to leadership roles in new kinds 
of community-based organizations. The author 
explores these processes and their implications 
for social networks and corporate identity in 
Malian society north of the Niger Bend.
War on Terror and 
Social Networks
in Mali
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sources and market opportunities and cultural 
practices. Small new madrasas in northern Mali 
provide food, clothing, and education. At the 
same time they serve frequently mixed communi-
ties of Hassaniyya, Tamasheq, Fulbe, and Songhai 
speakers, who learn classical Arabic and a range 
of religious topics together. Small sponsored 
farming cooperatives, such as those based near 
Kidal and Timbuktu, meanwhile provide modest 
economic opportunities and protection for their 
members. 
And yet there is no evidence that discrete ter-
rorist cells are operating in any coordinated way 
in the Malian Sahara and there are few, if any, ties 
between Malian reformist groups and any known 
terrorist group. Moreover, while a reformist move-
ment is making progress broadly in Mali, there are 
competing groups and interests within it as well 
as mixed feelings of Malians towards foreigners 
telling them what is proper worship, let alone 
how to live their everyday lives.
Alternative authority, competing 
claims, rising stakes
The US War on Terror, the conduct of the Amer-
ican military and its proxies in the Sahel, and 
the rhetoric the war has inspired has made the 
possibility of violence more likely, rather than 
unlikely. Stories about inappropriate conduct of 
US personnel, whether fictions created to help 
northern leaders acquire authority and followers 
or not, have begun to spread across the desert 
zone. Further, the US has helped reinsert the 
Malian army in sensitive areas that were part of 
the 1996 cease-fire and are claimed by former rebellion participants. 
The ensuing growth in military and other spending to extend Malian 
government military and intelligence capabilities and protect foreign 
commercial ventures has been a rhetorical gift to that younger genera-
tion of reformist scholars and leaders. More moderate Muslim leaders of 
all ages have lost influence as they have become more strongly identified 
with a national government at the beck and call of what some now imagi-
natively call a new Christian Crusade. 
The US has also pressured the Malian government to shut down smug-
gling networks to starve potential terrorist networks. Control of informal 
capital flows and markets remains a key site of struggle and rumour, 
which, next to aid dollars, bolster northern Mali from the Niger Bend 
north. The question over who gets access to capital of differing types—in-
cluding social prestige, baraka, authenticity, rightful claims to privilege 
as well as property, goods and currency—and the extent to which local 
leaders establish their own social positions as providers of this expansive 
sense of capital reflect the social power they wield.
What the US and its allies have failed to recognize is the multivariate 
nature of these struggles, which comprise in any case more than smug-
gled cigarettes or other goods thought to fund al-Qaida. Informal market-
ing activities are social mechanisms by which communities not only cope 
with serious environmental degradation and deep social change, but 
also the shifting formal sector markets over which they have little control 
and to which they have little access. Further, “formal” markets in Mali are 
themselves often corrupt and manipulated by those who control them. 
Destroying the informal sector in the north only, without providing viable 
alternatives, is having the opposite effect of what most American strate-
gists would intend: growing political and economic instability. 
As the Pan-Sahel Initiative now grows into the larger Trans-Saharan 
Counter-Terrorist Initiative, the composition of social networks and politi-
cal alliances in northern Mali are continuing to shift in response. Whether 
the US and Malian governments recognize the damage PSI has done so 
far and the degree to which they can include northerners more effectively 
in their own governance and economic development remains an open 
question.
Islam, Society & the State
new, third option emerged for community leaders in the nineties with 
the arrival of Islamic NGOs and missionary organizations, as a way of both 
differentiating themselves from those leaders who “sold out” and get-
ting access to needed resources, connections, and clout. Saudi, Libyan, 
and Pakistani organizations brought with them economic opportunities 
as well as community prestige for those who choose to join them. These 
groups also frequently offered scholarships to young students to study 
at religious centres in the Middle East. At the same time, less missionary-
focused Islamic relief organizations stepped into the gap left by both the 
international aid community and local governments, providing crucial 
services where others were not. 
Interviews conducted with members of different generations across 
ethnic groups in northern Mali suggest that the older leaders felt increas-
ingly threatened and pressed as the nineties drew to a close. Many of the 
younger scholars, some returning from the Middle East, had developed 
their own connections to Islamic aid monies and brought in projects to 
areas that Western aid and the Malian government shunned. The late nine-
ties brought a kind of desert bloom in local Muslim grassroots self-help 
organizations, seeded and actively supported by various kinds of Middle 
East-based interest groups. Most of these organizations were more or less 
focused on community development, but some, like the Saudi and Paki-
stani da‘wa organizations, were interested in much more—in spreading 
what they saw as a purer kind of Islam. 
The Bambara-dominated Malian government tried to counter this by 
inviting Libyan organizations to build new mosques and infrastructure 
improvements while also establishing an official Islamic High Council in 
2002 that purports to regulate the quality of preaching and oversees the 
religious affairs of the country. In many cases the government succeeded 
in co-opting the older generation of Islamic leaders from across Malian 
society, particularly Tijani and Qadiri Sufi leaders, pressured by new types 
of community competition. 
In 1991, Mali officially hosted only a handful of large foreign Islamic 
NGOs with mostly modest local operations. In the late 1990s, new Malian 
reformist groups made their voices increasingly heard, including organ-
izing large demonstrations in Bamako to force the government to shut 
down businesses during Ramadan and to protest Christian Evangelical 
missions.1 By the year 2000, Mali had more than 110 officially-sanctioned 
Islamic NGOs and hundreds of smaller unregistered local organizations 
supported by foreign donors—overwhelmingly based in the far north of 
the country.
A new Saharan front on the war on terror
In early 2002, the Pentagon devised a new military programme meant 
to outsource intelligence gathering to African allies and to prevent ter-
rorist organizations from using the Sahara as staging area, which it 
dubbed the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). High-ranking officials and spokes-
men developed a shared rhetoric about the operation, repeating key 
imagery in public statements that evokes an inherently lawless, violent, 
alien nature of the Sahara and those who live there. These statements 
were not only broadcast in American papers to the intended domestic 
constituents, but also quickly appeared on Al-Jazeera, the Internet, Ma-
lian papers, and radio broadcasts throughout the Sahel. 
Many northerners formed their own opinions about PSI long before 
US personnel appeared in Mali. Most Tuareg and Hassani leaders bris-
tled at the prospect of the Malian army being reinserted into their terri-
tories and interfering with the trans-Saharan trade they profit from and 
control. In 2003, rumours began to spread about what the Americans 
were already doing covertly, or would do with the help of Bambara 
military forces. 
Other leaders used War on Terror to assert their claims to authority 
and ramped up their own rhetoric in response. By 2003, young Fu-
lani, Bellah, and Songhai scholars from Timbuktu, Gao, and Mopti had 
transferred blame for local conditions in radio programmes and ser-
mons from “Globalization” and the Bambara to the U.S. and its Malian 
sycophants, who now included older-generation local leaders of the 
Tijani and Qadiri Sufi turuq. Rumours about the War on Terror and the 
rhetoric it has inspired on all sides has given younger Muslim commu-
nity leaders—particularly ones who have established outside funding 
sources—new, more receptive audiences in the north. 
New local Islamic reformist organizations meanwhile have increas-
ingly become sites where individuals can negotiate not only identity 
but also social status, with attendant effects on normative social form, 
the shape and dynamics of social networks, access to productive re-
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Shiite Islam was brought to Senegal 
through the migration of people and 
ideas, and both Lebanese and Iranian 
influences. Lebanese migrants first ar-
rived in West Africa as the result of a co-
lonial fluke. As early as the 1880s, and 
especially during the 1920s, emigrants 
left Lebanon because of economic 
hardship for Marseilles, the transpor-
tation hub of the time. They planned 
to continue on to the United States or 
South America, where there had been 
previous Lebanese immigration, but 
their ship docked at Dakar. The French 
colonial power convinced the Lebanese 
to stay in West Africa to work as intermediaries between the French in 
the cities and the West Africans in the interior in the peanut trade. Re-
ligion, in particular Shiite Islam, had not been featured in the Lebanese 
process of settling in Senegal and forming a new identity. In fact, Shi-
ite Islam in Senegal was not a powerful or identifiable force until the 
arrival in 1969 of Abdul Monem El-Zein, a shaykh from Lebanon who 
had trained in Najaf, Iraq, and came to Dakar only shortly before the 
Lebanese civil war (1975-1992) and the Iranian revolution (1979), two 
important events in the making of a transnational Shiite movement.
There was no formal Shiite religious representation in Senegal until 
the founding of the Lebanese Islamic Institute in 1978. Shaykh El-Zein’s 
two-pronged strategy was to restore religious identity to Lebanese 
Muslims, while also guiding the theological development and numeri-
cal growth of the newly converting Senegalese Shia, a goal he had to 
mask in order to remain in favour in the eyes of the Lebanese commu-
nity and the Senegalese government. 
The Iranian embassy also played a subtle role in encouraging Shiite 
Islam in Dakar. Iran has a history of economic cooperation with Sen-
egal from the time of the Shah, but the embassy was closed in 1984 
for spreading Islamic propaganda. The Iranian embassy reopened in 
the early 1990s and continues (more subtly) to promote Shiite Islam. 
Iranians hold an annual reception for prominent Lebanese and Senega-
lese Muslims for the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, and finance 
Senegalese intellectuals to attend Islamic conferences in Teheran. Ira-
nian president Rafsanjani’s presence at the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference meeting in Dakar in 1991 was highly publicized, as was 
Senegalese President Wade’s 2003 visit to Iran. In addition, an Iranian 
shaykh built the Hauza Al-Rassoul Al-Akram three years ago,1 which is 
located not far from the University of Dakar. 
With the recent discovery of Shiite Islam by the Senegalese, competi-
tion is emerging over who will shape this new movement: Lebanon or 
Iran. Tension between Arab and Persian schools of Shiite thought re-
sults from political views: Iranians believe in Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih, 
which gives religious judges the divine right to rule. Lebanese do not 
support this view, nor do they approve of the propagation of the Ira-
nian revolution. 
Senegalese claim that even though Lebanese Shia began to arrive 
in Senegal over a century ago, today’s movement of Senegalese Shia 
is much more recent, and was brought about by two processes. First, 
books in Arabic, French, and English translation began to circulate 
in Senegal from Iran as early as 1971. Second, the Lebanese Shaykh 
began to teach Shiite Islam to Senegalese. Whereas the Islamic Insti-
tute in Dakar caters primarily to Leba-
nese, Shaykh El-Zein has founded five 
mosques and approximately 130 ma-
drasas, religious schools, located out-
side of Dakar and led by Senegalese 
religious men whom he trained. 
Senegalese conversion 
to Shiite Islam
Despite the efforts of the Iranian 
embassy and the Lebanese shaykh 
to bring them to Shiite Islam, many 
Senegalese Shia came to the religion 
on their own. Typically leaders of Sen-
egal’s small but growing Shiite move-
ment are fluent in Arabic, and many have a university education from 
the Arab world. Alhousseynou,2 the first Senegalese convert to Shiite 
Islam, or so he claims, worked at the library of the Senegalese-Turkish 
school in 1985 at age 22. There he discovered books on Shiism, but 
was told by a librarian that Shiites are heretics and the books were not 
useful. Such comments only sparked his imagination more (as man is 
always curious about what is forbidden to him), and he began to read, 
eventually becoming a Shiite. Assane, on the other hand, discovered 
Shiism as a result of the Iranian revolution. He followed how the press 
portrayed Khomeini, and was disgusted at how he was demonized by 
Western and Senegalese journalists, and how Shias were accused of 
being blasphemous. For him, the Iranian revolution restored dignity 
to Islam and belief to Muslims, and was the only successful revolution 
since the time of Mohammad. He became Shiite in 1987 in his late 
twenties.
Other leaders of the Senegalese Shiite movement encountered Shi-
ism outside of Senegal. Abdou was studying in Canada in 1988 at the 
age of nineteen, and read books on Islam alone in the McGill University 
library. He discovered that the Shiite school of thought convincingly 
answered his questions about Islam that were left unaddressed by the 
Senegalese Sufi brotherhoods. Ibrahima was a student at the Univer-
sity of Dakar and was introduced to Shiism in 1987 through magazines 
from Iran which he found in the Arabic department. After graduating 
he went to Sierra Leone where he studied Sharia and Islamic law in 
a Lebanese and Iranian run hawza. Still others learned about Shiism 
at even younger ages when they were recruited from Sunni religious 
schools by Shaykh El-Zein and given scholarships to study in the Leba-
nese Shiite Collège Al-Zahraa in Dakar. Lebanese and Iranian proselyt-
izing efforts were sometimes successful.
Senegalese men are more active in the Shiite movement than 
women, and female converts tend to be wives or family members of 
male converts. However, a few Senegalese women also found Shiite 
Islam by themselves. Khady began to learn about Islam from the lead-
ers of the Senegalese Shiite movement, who never told her they were 
teaching her Shiite Islam. She began to wear the veil in 1990 in her mid-
30s, and in those days the few veiled women in Senegal befriended 
one another. She had a friend who was a member of Ibadou Rahman, 
a Sunni reformist movement. The friend tried to initiate her into this 
school of thought, bringing her to some of the Ibadou Rahman leaders, 
who called her a Shiite. Khady had never heard this word before. She 
began to read about Shiism, praying at night that God would guide her 
to choose the right path, whether Sunni or Shiite Islam. One night in 
Reformist Movements
Beginning in the mid-1980s, some Senegalese 
Sunni Muslims began to convert to Shiite 
Islam. Converts claimed that Shiite Islam better 
addressed their theological questions, being 
more textually based than the versions of Sufi 
Islam practised in Senegal and dominated 
by marabouts, Islamic leaders, with talibés 
(disciples) who submit to their ultimate 
authority. Senegalese intellectuals disapprove 
of the central role the Sufi brotherhoods play 
in Senegalese politics and society. Choosing 
another branch of Islam enables converts not to 
follow the established marabouts by heading 
their own religious movement. 
Defying Sufism? 
Senegalese Converts 
to Shiite Islam
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gives them more liberty than the formal Lebanese and Iranian institu-
tions allow them. This is important in convincing other Senegalese that 
Shiite Islam is the true path. 
Another distinctly Senegalese Shiite adaptation is the commemora-
tion of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the son of Imam Ali, in the Shi-
ite mourning period known as Ashura. The Lebanese in Senegal invite a 
visiting storyteller from Lebanon, with a full ten days of lectures, food, 
and decorations. The Lebanese conduct activities in the Lebanese dialect, 
which is foreign to Senegalese Shia, who are fluent in standard Arabic. 
Senegalese Shia prefer to organize their own tribute to Hussein in the 
Wolof language. A commemoration in the style of the Lebanese costs 
money and Senegalese Shia have meagre means. They are only able to 
observe the tenth day and night of the month of Muharram, convening 
to listen to a debate concerning the meaning of Ashura. They use what 
resources they have to organize a feast of Senegalese delicacies. 
Although poor financially, the leaders of the Senegalese Shiite move-
ment are rich intellectually. Fluent in the Arabic language, many have 
university degrees from the Arab world. Drawn to the religion for many 
reasons—political, spiritual, philosophical, financial, or because Shiite 
scholars convincingly answered their questions about Islam—their 
mission is to convince others. They spread the word in Wolof or other 
local languages, first to friends and families, and eventually to a larger 
population through teaching, conferences, holiday celebrations and 
media publicity. Senegal’s Shia depend on two independent transna-
tional Shiite networks, one Lebanese (Arab) and the other Iranian (Per-
sian), to help finance their institutions and activities. Most importantly, 
while influenced by the maraja’ of Iran, Iraq, and 
Lebanon, Senegalese Shia emphasize that their 
Shiism is Senegalese (African). Indeed, through 
keeping their feet in both Sunni and Shiite worlds, 
Senegalese Shia hope to find their place in Sen-
egal’s politics of religion. 
Reformist Movements
1993 her prayers were answered. It was the dry season in Senegal, and 
as she prayed to end her confusion, a heavy rain began to fall. She was 
thus convinced, in a mystical moment, to openly identify as a Shiite. 
The Development of the Senegalese Shiite movement 
Senegalese Shia perceive of their calling to be that of missionaries—
to spread the truth regarding Shiite Islam and to encourage the growth 
of their movement. Many Senegalese Shiite schools and institutes were 
built in the 1990s, hidden in Dakar’s suburbs of Guediawaye, Parcelles 
and Yeumbeul, or in the Casamance region of southern Senegal, such 
as Kolda and Ziguinchor. The movement’s leaders know one another 
and speak highly of the other, but tend to work independently in their 
native neighbourhoods, or in areas they think are ripe for change. 
Leaders specialize in different aspects of Shiite Islam. Some are trained 
shaykhs whose expertise ranges from Islamic jurisprudence to Sunni 
and Shiite philosophy; others are laymen who are artists, government 
employees, bankers, teachers, or students. 
Starting in 1994, Shiite converts took advantage of the popularity of 
the radio in Senegal to spread knowledge about Shiite Islam on the 
air. The goal of the radio shows was to counter anti-Shiite stereotypes, 
and debates concerned differences between Sunnism and Shiism, and 
discussed monotheism, the Quran, prophecy, and Islamic history. Pub-
licity for Shiism was also gained through inviting speakers represent-
ing different Islamic schools to voice their opinions. One programme 
paired Youssou N’dour, Senegal’s most famous musician, with a Shiite 
painter to discuss what Islam says about art. 
Senegalese Shiite practices
The efforts of Senegalese Shiite leaders will only be successful if 
they can convince other Senegalese of the message of Shiite Islam. 
Making this global religion more local enables Senegalese to relate 
to Shiite Islam. Senegalese Shiites stress that although they may be 
influenced by Iranian or Lebanese Shiites, the Islam they practice is 
distinct from that in the Middle East or Asia: it is Senegalese. This is 
evident in their adaptation of three provisions of Shiite Islam, the 
marja‘ system, taqiya, and the commemoration of Ashura, to the Sen-
egalese context. 
Many Shia emulate a marja‘, or a religious scholar of Najaf or Qom 
who serves as a reference. While not all Senegalese Shia are knowl-
edgeable about this fundamental Shiite principle, many Senegalese 
draw their influences from a variety of Shiite thinkers. While some of 
them choose the teachings of Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, Khomeini’s suc-
cessor in Iran, others abide by the authority of a combination of others, 
including Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Najaf, Sayyed Mohamed Hussein Fad-
lallah in Lebanon, and Imam Mohamad Shirazi of Iran, who was popular 
among the Shia of the Gulf. This fusion of maraja‘ (pl.) distinguishes 
them from the Lebanese shaykh, who exclusively follows Sistani, and 
the Iranian embassy, which officially carries out the work of Khamene'i. 
One Senegalese informant explained that the marja‘ system resembles 
Senegal’s medical system: when somebody needs surgery and the 
medical specialist for their particular ailment cannot be found in Sen-
egal, they go to France or another country for the operation. The marja‘ 
system works in the same way. If there is an expert in Shiite Islam in 
Senegal, they can approach him with questions, but given the lack of 
expertise they go to Iran or Iraq. 
Taqiya, or dissimulation, is permitted when persecution is imminent. 
Senegal is not a country where people are oppressed, therefore, Sen-
egalese Shia claim, they do not need to practise taqiya. However, many 
of them are not open about being Shiite and do practise dissimula-
tion. For example, when praying in Sunni mosques, Senegal’s Shia hide 
their Shiite customs to avoid lengthy explanations to people who are 
unlearned, who may not have open minds, and who may think that 
the Shia are mistaken in their practice of Islam. Furthermore, a small 
number of Senegalese scholars earned the turban in Iran for their 
knowledge of the Shiite religion. While some of them wear it openly, 
others do not, afraid of being targeted by the anti-Shiite campaign of 
the Wahhabis. One Senegalese Shiite shaykh, who studied in Iran dur-
ing the revolution, does not wear his turban in Senegal so he can con-
tinue to guide both Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Well respected for his 
knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, he is not only a wakil, authorized 
representative, for Khamene'i, but he is also a muqaddam, the Sunni 
equivalent of wakil, for a prominent Senegalese Sufi leader. Senegalese 
use of taqiya to move adeptly between the Sunni and Shiite worlds 
      
Notes
1. A hawza is a traditional Shiite school.
2. All names of converts are pseudonyms to 
protect the identity of my informants.
Senegalese 
Shiite Shaykh, 
date unknown
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Thailand’s southernmost provinces of 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat have seen 
a wave of violence since 4 January 
2004, when simultaneous attacks took 
place on Thai army bases, police posts, 
and schools. Since then, violence in 
these majority Malay-Muslim provinces 
has escalated through the consequent 
siege and storming of the historical 
Krue Se mosque in Pattani province, 
the deaths of 78 demonstrators after 
their arrest in Tak Bai, and the killings 
of policemen, soldiers, and civilians 
claiming more than a thousand lives. Fingers have been pointed at 
Malay-Muslim separatists, renegade soldiers and policemen, crime syn-
dicates, and individuals settling personal feuds.
In the midst of this violence, the principally 
apolitical Tablighi Jamaat continues to carry out 
its da‘wa (call to Islamic practice). Groups of dedi-
cated followers in south Thailand visit the markaz 
(Tablighi Jamaat Centre) in the city of Yala at least 
once a week. They go on khuruj, tours to propa-
gate their version of Islam, to fulfil the Tablighi’s 
religious obligation, further deepen their faith 
and, perhaps, also escape the harsh day-to-day 
reality of violence on the streets. In more than 
one way, the Tablighi Jamaat can be seen as a safe 
haven from worldly affairs. 
The Tablighi Jamaat, an Islamic missionary 
movement originating from the Indian subconti-
nent, first got a foothold in Thailand in the early 
1980’s when ijtima‘ (major gatherings) were held 
in Bangkok and Yala. From then, the movement’s 
ideas spread rapidly among Thailand’s Muslims. 
In the course of my research on Islamic reformism 
in southern Thailand, I was invited by the Tablighi 
movement to participate in one of its three-day 
khuruj trips. The shuras (councils of elders) in 
Bangkok and Yala deliberated whether an outsid-
er could participate and decided positively. In the 
current escalation of violence and suspicion, the 
movement’s leadership felt it had nothing to hide. 
This is an account of my three-day journey with 
the Tablighi Jamaat in the Deep South.1
The markaz in Yala consists of two main buildings: the two-storey head-
quarters and a large mosque used by up to 10,000 to 12,000 people 
during Friday prayers. The markaz is the base from which the Tablighi 
set out to visit villages and communities fulfilling the important duty 
of going on khuruj—the most visible characteristic of the Tablighi. The 
deputy head of the markaz explained that the first goal of khuruj is to 
“develop ourselves” by following in the footsteps of the Prophet. “The 
reward is Paradise. If we don’t do this then we will follow our own de-
sire,” he said.
The Tablighi in south Thailand are of varied occupational back-
grounds: teachers, businessmen, shop owners, students, lawyers, and 
medical doctors. The leaders estimate that 20,000 people go on khuruj 
every year. There is, however, no registration of membership. Most men 
wear a white Saudi style thawb (loose 
long-sleeved ankle-length shirt) and a 
taqiya (skull cap) because that would 
best imitate the dress of the prophet. 
Some men, however, wear the tradi-
tional Malay sarong and songkok (cap).
Preparation
Going on khuruj requires both spir-
itual and logistical preparation. The 
Tablighi use the Guide for Tableegh 
Journey and Six Points, printed in Pa-
kistan, as an instruction manual. The 
leadership reiterated the six principles as presented by Tablighi Jamaat 
founder, Mawlana Ilyas, in India in 1934, namely 1) the belief in Allah 
and practice according to the prophet’s way of life; 2) praying with at-
tention to Allah; 3) knowledge of Islam and remembrance of Allah; 4) 
respect for others, Muslim and non-Muslim; 5) serving Allah without 
benefit; 6) allocating time to da‘wa. 
The leadership also explained the “sixteen rules” which should be 
obeyed while on khuruj: four sets of four practical rules—respectively 
four things to do more of, four things to do less of, four things not to 
do, and four things to ignore. The latter however are not mentioned in 
the Guide. They include the rules to ignore politics, conflict between 
different Islamic groups, one’s own title and position, and donations. 
The leaders explained that the goal of khuruj is to increase one’s per-
sonal belief in Allah and to practice Sunnah as shown by the prophet. 
The leaders did not elaborate on the Guide’s very specific etiquettes of 
eating, sleeping, and going to the toilet. 
In line with the general tenets of the Tablighi movement, its adher-
ents in south Thailand have to go on khuruj three days every month or 
40 days in a year in groups consisting of six to seventeen members. The 
goal is to spend at least four months in a lifetime on khuruj. They have 
to use their own money and time. 
A local shopkeeper was appointed amir (leader) of our small group. 
The destination was decided based on which villages had not been vis-
ited recently. Typically, at a meeting, the destinations of future trips are 
selected, and mosques at those communities contacted to inquire if 
they would be willing to receive a jama‘ah (group). The participants in 
the khuruj had each brought a small bag of clothes, toiletries, a mat to 
sleep on and a mosquito net. Finally, they and the other Tablighi prayed 
together.
Going on khuruj
We set out by car from the markaz to the small town of Prigi in Pattani 
province. The destination, less than an hour away, was a small mosque 
on the main road. The countryside of the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat—where up to 80% of the population are Malay-Muslims 
speaking a local dialect of Malay—is covered by rubber plantations, 
interspersed with kampongs (villages) and paddy fields. About 10 local 
Malay Muslims out on khuruj had already arrived, as well as a jama‘ah of 
seven men from Saudi Arabia. Normally, the participants of a khuruj do 
household chores like cooking, washing, cleaning etc. for themselves. 
But because of the presence of a group from Saudi Arabia, the local 
Malay men at the mosque had taken it upon themselves to perform 
these duties. They prepared several meals a day and served them on 
large platters around which the Tablighi gathered, eating in a commu-
Reformist Movements
Even as the situation in southern Thailand 
degenerates into one of daily violence, 
the Tablighi Jamaat continues to take its 
message to the remotest villages. Ernesto 
Braam accompanied a group of followers 
to a small mosque in the Thai province of 
Pattani. The aim of this missionary movement 
is both to renew the faith of its followers and 
to appeal to villagers to come to the local 
mosque more often. The Tablighi Jamaat has 
attracted thousands of followers in Thailand’s 
predominantly Malay Muslim Deep South.
Travelling with 
the Tablighi Jamaat 
in South Thailand
The aim was to 
strengthen the 
listeners’ faith and 
motivation to carry 
out the duty of 
approaching other 
Muslims with the 
same message.
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The most outgoing part of the khuruj was when the Tablighi left the 
mosque to visit Muslims in the vicinity to invite them to join evening 
prayers at the mosque. No effort was made to convert Thai Buddhists. 
Groups of five to ten Tablighi went in different directions by car, scoot-
er, or on foot. I walked with a group of ten in a queue with a young man 
from the local community as guide and a Saudi Tablighi as group leader 
at the head. The group walked through paddy fields and bushes to pre-
selected houses in the kampong. A loud “as salamu alaykum” by the 
Saudi usually urged the shy resident to come outside. The group leader 
then expressed the greatness of God, stated that man and woman were 
created for worship and invited the resident to come to evening prayers 
at the mosque. This took about five minutes after which, in the same 
fashion, seven to ten other houses were visited. Sometimes people on 
the street or on a football field were addressed. Most of them agreed to 
come to the mosque, but generally did not show up that evening. 
The whole group of Tablighi slept at the mosque on the floor, careful 
not to point their feet in the direction of the Holy Places. However, the 
etiquettes of sleeping under point 4 of the Guide (sleep on the right 
side of the body) were not strictly followed. The other days basically 
followed the same routine. 
It was easy to forget the outside world, in spite of the Thai army truck 
that would show up every morning in front of the mosque, armed sol-
diers jumping off to guard the school across the street. For the duration 
of those three days, those present formed a tightly-knit group shar-
ing a strong sense of fate and solidarity, praying, eating, and sleeping 
together, at the same time and in the same space. As an outsider I felt 
genuinely accepted by the group and included in all activities. The 
rather inconspicuous mosque had become a retreat from the turbulent 
world outside, and provided an oasis of spirituality, bridging language 
and cultural barriers, in fact, rendering them obsolete. 
Reformist Movements
nal fashion using their right hand. The 
locals waited until the visiting Tablighi 
had finished before they took their fill. 
Communication between the Ma-
lays and the Saudis was hampered by 
the language barrier. However, some 
Malays spoke Arabic, which they had 
learned while studying in the Mid-
dle East. The Saudis were travelling 
through Thailand on a 40-day khuruj 
tour. This was quite significant because, 
as they explained, the Tablighi practic-
es are forbidden in the official Wahhabi 
doctrine of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, 
the Saudis had to travel abroad to be 
able to join the Tablighi Jamaat. Com-
ing from the holy city of Medina, they 
were treated with great respect and 
often led the prayers. In Thailand, the 
Tablighi are not welcome in mosques 
affiliated with what local people call 
“Wahhabis” or “Kaum Muda” (Malay: 
“New Group”). In fact, some followers 
of the traditional Malay Islam, hold 
negative views of the Tablighi Jamaat, 
saying it is alien to south Thailand and 
that its followers abandon their fami-
lies when on khuruj. 
As expected, the Tablighi partici-
pated in the mandatory prayers five 
times daily. An extra prayer at 2am was 
optional. At most prayers, local Malay 
men from the kampongs in the vicinity 
joined in. They numbered between 50 and 80, and comprised mainly 
those who were regular visitors to this village mosque. Women appar-
ently sat behind a curtain that cordoned off an area of the mosque. 
They were from the local community and played no noticeable role in 
the khuruj. The leadership had, however, said that women could par-
ticipate in the khuruj with their husbands, but would have to stay sep-
arately at the house of relatives or (female) friends. The prayers were 
generally followed by a bayan (story, sermon) told by one of the Saudis 
and translated into Malay, and sometimes told by a local Tablighi. A 
different bayan teller was chosen earlier in the day at an informal meet-
ing of the more senior Tablighi. A congregation of both Tablighi and 
local non-Tablighi listened to the bayans attentively. The bayans took 
between 30 and 60 minutes and were generally based on stories from 
the Faza’il A‘maal, which is prescribed literature for Tablighi comprising 
stories of companions of the Prophet, virtues of the Holy Quran, virtues 
of salaat (prayer), virtues of zikr (remembrance), virtues of tabligh, vir-
tues of Ramadan and “Muslim degeneration and its only remedy.” They 
were told with a strong conviction and concentrated on virtues and 
morality, applied to current day situations. The aim was to strengthen 
the listeners’ faith and motivation to carry out the duty of approaching 
other Muslims with the same message. 
After the bayan, especially in the evening when the mosque was more 
crowded, another Tablighi would stand up next to the bayan teller and 
appeal to the local non-Tablighi Malay-Muslims to go on khuruj. This was 
the liveliest part of the day in the mosque. First this person would ask 
who wanted to go on khuruj for four months. Sometimes twenty people 
would raise their hands, sometimes ten and occasionally no one. Then 
other people were asked to go on the 40-day khuruj trip. All this was done 
with some encouragement to convince those who looked away with ti-
midity to sign up. Finally, the speaker loudly asked who would go on the 
three-day trip. Attendees often looked at each other and some of the 
younger ones would poke their friends. There was clearly an atmosphere 
of duty more than of coercion. When everyone had had the opportunity 
to raise their hand—by far not all did that—the names of men wanting 
to go on khuruj were taken down. Later, they would visit the markaz to 
talk to Tablighi elders, who would decide if their family situations permit-
ted the volunteers to go on khuruj. After this session, or directly after the 
bayan, the congregation broke into smaller groups to read and discuss 
some stories from the Faza’il A‘maal. At this point most local Muslims re-
turned to their work or families. 
Note 
1. The author would like to thank Mr. Muhamad 
Mukta Koleh for introducing him to the 
Tablighi Jamaat.
Thai reading 
notes on 
origami cranes, 
dropped by 
military planes, 
that promote 
peace, south 
Thailand, 2004
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On our way to visit a local Islamic schol-
ar, my research assistant Fatu ran into 
her cousin. Whereas normally she was 
exuberant, she greeted this young man, 
called Lamin, in an almost shy manner. 
I was surprised not only by Fatu’s atti-
tude but also by Lamin’s appearance. 
During their short conversation, Lamin 
criticized Fatu for wearing a ponytail, 
which made her “look like a camel,” and 
he urged her to put on a veil. When 
we continued our journey, Fatu told 
me that since her cousin is a Mashala 
he wears the “Mashala uniform.” This term is derived from the Arabic 
Ma sha‘ Allah (what God wishes), an expression that is frequently ex-
claimed by people like Lamin. Fatu explained that, following the Proph-
et Muhammad’s example, Mashalas wear a turban 
and trousers above the ankles in order to scare off 
Satan and prevent their feet from burning in hell. 
After I invited him to talk more about Islam, Lamin 
visited Fatu and me in the compound where I was 
staying. My surprise grew when my host, an eld-
erly Muslim man educated in the Sufi tradition, 
greeted him in the following way: “Is your father 
not at home? Where is your mother? Don’t you 
have a wife? How do you feed these people? It is 
better to support them than to sit the whole day 
in the mosque and call people to Islam.” Lamin re-
acted to this offensive greeting by saying that it is 
his duty to worship Allah and “to invite people to 
follow the Prophet’s path.” When my host had left, 
Lamin sighed that he had expected to hear such a 
thing from the “old grandpa.” 
This incident, illustrating the competing Is-
lamic discourses in The Gambia, has to be seen 
against the backdrop of the proliferation of 
the Tablighi Jamaat. This transnational Islamic 
missionary movement, which origi-
nated in the reformist tradition that 
emerged in India in the mid-nine-
teenth century, encourages greater 
religious devotion and observance. 
Its founder, Mawlana Muhammad 
Ilyas, strove for a purification of 
Islam as practised by individual Mus-
lims through following more closely 
the rules laid down in the sunnah. In 
order to make Muslims “true believ-
ers,” Ilyas insisted that it was the duty 
of not just a few learned scholars but 
of all Muslims to carry out Tablighi work. Missionary tours by lay 
preachers became the hallmark of the Jamaat, established officially 
in 1927 in Delhi. 
Over the years, the Tablighi Jamaat has expanded into what is prob-
ably the largest Islamic movement of contemporary times. Despite its 
worldwide influence on the lives of millions of Muslims, scholars have 
paid almost no attention to its spreading in sub-Saharan Africa. An ex-
planation for this indifference is that this region is frequently, but un-
justly, seen as the “periphery” of the Muslim world. I focus on The Gam-
bia, which, despite its small size, has turned into a flourishing centre 
of Tablighi activities in West Africa during the last decade. Adherents 
from other countries regularly assemble here to exchange ideas on the 
proper Tablighi method that is, missionary work aimed at the moral 
transformation of Muslims. 
Jamaat’s rooting in The Gambia
South Asian missionaries reached West Africa in the early 1960s,1 but 
their ideas did not find a fertile breeding ground in The Gambia until 
the 1990s. A factor that has facilitated the spread of Tablighi ideology in 
this country is its colonial heritage. The ideology has been disseminated 
mainly by Pakistanis, who preached in English (which had become the 
national language in colonial times). Due to the recent Islamic resur-
gence, a process that coincided with the assumption of power in 1994 
by Yahya Jammeh—who appealed to Islam to enhance his legitimacy 
and to establish closer relations with the Islamic powers in 
the Gulf States—a growing number of Gambians seemed to 
be receptive to a new interpretation of their faith, and the 
Pakistani preachers took advantage of this need. 
The history of the Tablighi Jamaat in The Gambia started 
with Imam Dukureh, who studied in Saudi Arabia for several 
years. After his studies, this imam returned to his native vil-
lage and set out to make the villagers more aware of their re-
ligion by denouncing their traditional ways of worship. The 
villagers did not agree with his reformist ideas, except for a 
few young men. The latter realized that the village was too 
small for Dukureh’s innovative ideas, and built a compound 
for him in the city of Serrekunda. The ideas of a group of 
itinerant Pakistani preachers fitted in with Dukureh’s, and he 
lodged them in his compound. Over the years the compound 
has expanded, and nowadays a two-storey building accom-
modates Pakistani and other visiting preachers disseminat-
ing the Tablighi ideology. In the early 1990s a mosque was 
constructed adjacent to Dukureh’s compound. 
The striking features of the Jamaat in The Gambia are its 
popularity among the local African population and youth 
in particular. In South and East Africa the Jamaat appeals 
primarily to Muslims of Indian ancestry.2 In The Gambia 
this group is very small. After training by mainly Pakistani 
preachers, the Tablighi effort has been adopted especially 
Reformist Movements
Over the years, the Tablighi Jamaat has 
expanded into what is probably indeed the 
largest Islamic movement of contemporary 
times. Despite its magnitude, its impact in sub-
Saharan Africa has been largely neglected. This 
article, based on ethnographic field research, 
focuses on the Jamaat in The Gambia (West 
Africa) where particularly youth convert to 
Tablighi ideology, in what could be seen as a 
form of rebellion against the authority of their 
elders. In the process, established religious and 
social values are redefined.
The Prophet’s Path
Tablighi Jamaat in The Gambia
Tablighi religiosity 
is a protest against 
the religious 
festivities of the 
“old” and their 
conspicuous 
consumption.
The walls around 
the Jamaat’s mosque 
in The Gambia add 
to the movement’s 
‘obscure’ image
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where he would earn a living as a farmer. He would grow his own food 
crops, so that his wife does not have to leave the home to go to the 
market. In the countryside they would lead an isolated and quiet life: 
“It is not good to mingle too much with others as we must profess 
our religion in our own way. I will not inform others when my wife de-
livers. All I would do is sacrifice a ram, shave the baby’s head and name 
him. Even my parents would not know that my wife had delivered. The 
Prophet incited us to respect our parents, but when they become like a 
millstone round one’s neck, we have to be on the alert.”
Intergenerational conflict
Other young Gambians also noted that their conversion to Tablighi 
ideology resulted in conflicts with their families, and I even heard 
about youth who broke off with their parents. Yet, these youngsters felt 
strongly they had to convert in order to become genuine Muslims. Dur-
ing my field research it emerged that Tablighi adherents validate the 
“authenticity” of their beliefs and practices by contrasting them with 
those of the older generation, and the Jamaat can 
therefore be seen as the younger generation’s 
rejection of their parents. They equate being old 
with being rigid and holding on to sinful custom-
ary practices. As appeared in the introduction, the 
older generation finds it in their turn hard to take 
that inexperienced “children” tell them how they 
should profess their religion. 
As such, the Gambian branch of the Tablighi 
Jamaat represents a new expression of religios-
ity of young Muslims, which could be seen as a 
form of rebellion against the authority of the old. 
This rebellion is expressed in religious terms and 
assumes the character of conversion from the es-
tablished Sufi expressions of Islam toward new 
expressions of Islam, which cultivate modesty 
in dress and demeanour, austerity, and greater 
social equality between the age sets. This shows 
that although “youth” can generally be thought of 
as the period between childhood and adulthood, 
it is also an emergent category,5 which is being 
conceptualized and experienced through Islamic 
reform in The Gambia. 
Reformist Movements
by Mandinka, who form the largest ethnic group in The Gambia. Nev-
ertheless, these local Muslims are frequently considered “outsiders” by 
the more “mainstream” Muslims on account of their ideas, practices, 
and dress code. This applies particularly to the female followers; be-
cause their faces and bodies are usually completely covered, many 
Gambians assume that Saudi Wahhabi women are hidden behind the 
body-covering veils. 
The Tablighi Jamaat holds special attraction for middle-class Gambi-
ans in their twenties, who had a modern, secular education. Its appeal 
to young people—both men and women—could be explained by the 
current economic depression in The Gambia and its drastic social ef-
fects, which influence the ways they perceive their lives. In order to 
stand up to the malaise, a growing number of youth, who are based 
primarily in the urban area, invest in Tablighi work. Although they do 
not get a material reward out of it, they are assured, they believe, of a 
spiritual reward. 
Although the Jamaat’s followers are proliferating in The Gambia, they 
still form a relatively small group. I estimate the number of adherents 
at a few thousand (less than one percent of the Gambian population), 
but in the absence of membership records it is hard to calculate the 
exact number. Despite its small size, the Jamaat is not an insignificant 
group in The Gambia, as it is largely responsible for bringing about a 
religious transformation in the society, especially in the celebration of 
life-cycle rituals. Tablighi religiosity is a protest against the religious 
festivities of the “old” and their conspicuous consumption. Because of 
the movement’s success in transforming ritual practice, a member of 
the Supreme Islamic Council told me he suspected that “the Mashalas 
will dominate The Gambia within a period of five to ten years and will 
eventually destroy the country.” 
“Conversion” stories
Sikand rightly remarks that in the literature on the Tablighi Jamaat 
attention is paid primarily to explicating the movement’s worldview 
and its fundamental tenets, while the question as to how the Tablighi 
ideology plays itself out in the lives of individual Muslims is neglected.3 
In order to gain insight into how doctrine is put into practice, I have 
recorded the “conversion” stories of several young Gambian Tablighi 
devotees. Conversion does not refer here to the transition from one 
religion to another, but to the turning towards a new form of piety. 
Lamin, whom we met in the introduction, described his conversion 
to Tablighi ideology as a process of enlightenment to me: 
“Islam means only two things, that is following the footsteps of the 
Prophet Muhammad and doing good. There is only one path in Islam: 
the path of the Prophet. When I became aware of this, my life changed 
completely. I have seen the light, and I want you to see the light too. In 
fact it is very simple. In order to become enlightened, you have to read 
the Quran and hadith. But one should not only read hadith, one also 
has to practise the sunnah.”
Before Lamin joined the Jamaat about three years ago, he spent his 
time listening to music and going to nightclubs, but he stopped these 
activities upon his conversion. Furthermore, he stopped smoking and 
cut his dreadlocks, which were the outward sign of his preference for 
reggae music. Finally, he stopped dating girls and entered into the ob-
ligations of a married man. When I asked him what caused this trans-
formation, Lamin replied:
“My friend and I attended a naming ceremony in the town of Brika-
ma. During the ceremony we were invited by a visiting jamaat to par-
ticipate in a congregational prayer in the mosque. An old friend, who 
I got to know as a very stubborn boy, preached about our purpose on 
this earth. I was impressed by his change of behaviour and I decided to 
be like him. After the congregational prayer I changed my life. I joined 
the Jamaat for three days in order to learn more about the faith. Even 
after one day, I noticed a difference: I was less occupied with worldly 
affairs. Before the khuruj [Tablighi missionary tour] I prayed and fasted, 
but I did not know much about Islam. I conceived Islam as my right 
and not as a favour from Allah. After the khuruj I tried to observe the 
sunnah more strictly. Nowadays even when I am sleeping I observe the 
sunnah. I worship Allah 24 hours a day.”
Lamin’s narrative illustrates that youth’s conversion to Tablighi ide-
ology has far-reaching social consequences.4 Because of his limited fi-
nancial means, Lamin lives in his family’s compound, but his relatives 
hold different ideas of Islam than he and do not accept his lifestyle. 
Therefore his ideal is to move with his wife and child to the countryside, 
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During my fieldwork in the Madrasatul 
Niswan, a girls’ madrasa in New Delhi 
I was struck by its informal links with 
the lay preachers’ movement known 
as the Tablighi Jamaat. The Madras-
atul Niswan was founded in 1996 with 
the aim of “improving the life of the 
students,” to increase religious con-
sciousness, and to allow for equality of 
access to religious knowledge, as the 
founder stated. He was a trained Ara-
bic teacher who taught in the Kashful 
Uloom madrasa for boys in the nearby 
headquarters of the Tablighi Jamaat.1 
He also opined that there was nothing 
objectionable about a woman taking up a profes-
sional career, provided that she wore a burqa and 
worked in a gender-segregated environment. As 
the manager of the madrasa, a graduate of the 
above-mentioned Kashful Uloom, was his son-in-
law, initially it seemed as if it was mainly the men 
in charge of running the Madrasatul Niswan who 
were associated with the Tablighi Jamaat.2 Over 
time conversations with the two men indicated 
that they were part of a larger network, formed 
by a number of families in the same predomi-
nantly Muslim area in New Delhi. This network 
appeared to be based on common areas of origin 
and above all the men’s active involvement in the 
Tablighi Jamaat. It extended among the teachers 
and students, as two out the fourteen teachers at 
the time of my fieldwork were maternal cousins, 
whose female siblings were also enrolled in the 
Madrasatul Niswan as students or worked there.
Apart from the men in charge of running the 
madrasa, the students and teachers too referred 
to the Tablighi Jamaat in various ways. Although 
they were not actively involved in the tablighi ac-
tivities, they nevertheless frequently voiced their 
admiration for the work they observed among 
the men in their families. At times, the girls’ admi-
ration seemed to be paired with a tinge of envy, 
especially when they talked about how the men 
in their family regularly travelled “in the path of 
God” for the Tablighi Jamaat, as such activities epitomized the mobil-
ity, freedom, and excitement the young women were missing in their 
lives. On many occasions they expressed regret that owing to their ob-
servance of an extremely strict form of female segregation or purdah,3 
activities like travelling were beyond their possibilities. In this particu-
lar community, the women not only donned a burqa or ankle-length 
manteau, combined with the hijab or veil including the niqab or face 
veil, whenever venturing outside the madrasa, as they took pride in 
adding to the above attire thick socks until above their knees and dark 
gloves reaching above their elbows. Although the young women were 
not allowed to participate in the practice of travelling “in the path of 
God,” the core piece of literature or “manual” of the Tablighi Jamaat, 
namely the Fazail-e-Amal (Virtues of Everyday Actions) was included in 
the madrasa curriculum for daily read-
ing throughout the five-year course. 
Besides the internalization of virtues 
associated with the lifestyle promot-
ed by the Tablighi Jamaat, the girls 
were also trained in a particular style 
of dawah, which the students initially 
practised on me on various occasions. 
In other words, apart from kinship, 
the shared worldview influenced by 
the men’s affiliation with the Tablighi 
Jamaat had brought together this 
group, and bonds between the fami-
lies were maintained, reinforced, and 
extended through arranged marriages 
among children of these “core families.” In short, the above-mentioned 
families formed the backbone to a number of important activities in-
side the madrasa, such as looking after everyday affairs and setting 
the curriculum. 
Contents of learning
While the men in charge suggested that the curriculum was based 
on the standardized madrasa curriculum known as the dars-e-nizami,4 
my observations suggested that substantial modifications had been 
made in line with a particular underlying ideal of Islamic woman-
hood. A close comparison of the two curricula indicated that a range 
of subjects was either not taught at all, or the contents were selectively 
shortened, allegedly so as to fit the shorter duration of the course in 
this girls’ madrasa. What was taught in practice again deviated in many 
cases from the formal curriculum. For example, while only eight hours 
of adab or value oriented literature in Arabic,5 were scheduled on the 
timetable, which were not mentioned at all in the formal curriculum, 
value education took up significantly more time than that. Combining 
the daily readings from the Fazail-e-Amal and adab, value education—
formally and informally taught—aimed at all spheres of life, which was 
facilitated by the given that the madrasa was a boarding institution. 
The limited space necessitated discipline, combined with the inter-
nalization of a particular modest dress code, as we saw above. Such 
processes are best subsumed under the madrasa’s “civilizing mission,”6 
because apart from training the often lower caste rural students in Is-
lamic theology, the underlying educational aim of “improving the stu-
dents’ personal lives” hints at something larger. By adopting Arabic as 
the main language of instruction at an advanced stage of the five-year 
course, the importance given to lessons in adab and the emphasis on 
the virtues or fazail taught in the everyday readings from the Tablighi 
Fazail-e-Amal, the students were groomed into a particular worldview, 
lifestyle, and ideal of Islamic womanhood. Nevertheless, the seeming-
ly all-pervading discipline also offered space for deviation as well as 
competition with regard to who was the most pious among the girls. 
Besides personal reform, the grooming and competition at the level 
of piety among the girls represented the strive for upward social mo-
bility. While most of the students and their parents indicated that the 
main reason for the girls’ studies in the madrasa was religious merit for 
them, their families, or the community at large, I often observed that 
the “civilizing mission” served as a preparation for marriage with young 
men from wealthy families, not rarely settled abroad in South Africa or 
in the Gulf States. 
Reformist Movements
The Tablighi Jamaat opposes formal 
associations with educational institutions. 
In this article, based upon a fieldwork in a 
girls’ madrasa in New Delhi, Winkelmann 
argues that a larger network connects that 
madrasa to the Tablighi Jamaat. This network 
is based on common areas of origin and the 
active involvement in the Tablighi Jamaat of 
the men who are in charge of the madrasa. 
This is illustrated by the author’s analysis of a 
particular ideal of Islamic womanhood of the 
Tablighi Jamaat that is part of the curriculum 
of the madrasa and that is different from their 
standardized curriculum.
Informal Links 
A Girls’ Madrasa and 
Tablighi Jamaat
Besides 
personal reform, 
the grooming and 
competition at 
the level of piety 
among the girls 
represented the 
strive for upward 
social mobility.
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A group of teachers from the Madrasatul Niswan frequented the bay-
ans in the Tablighi centre regularly, because apart from hoping to learn 
something new, the short trips to the nearby centre provided an op-
portunity for regular outings, which were rare otherwise. Prior to the 
bayans in the centre, the teachers and students in the Madrasatul 
Niswan held their so-called Thursday Programme around noon.
Here the gatherings generally consisted of the following elements: 
recitations from the Quran; ahadith (traditions of the Prophet); namaz 
(prayer); tafsir (exegesis); fiqh (Islamic law); naath (religious poetry in 
Urdu); tarana (Urdu or Arabic anthems in praise of 
the madrasa); and finally value oriented literature. 
Since the Programme was held in Urdu as well as 
Arabic, the latter was translated for those less famil-
iar with the language. While for the young women 
belonging to the core families, knowledge of “true 
Islam” was closely associated with the mastery of 
Arabic, for the majority of lower caste rural students 
Arabic merely represented another tough subject 
they had to master. For the neighbourhood women 
who came to attend the Programme on a regular 
basis, the event provided an opportunity to learn 
something about Islam and to be reminded of one’s 
moral obligations, which seemed to be the primary 
aim of the weekly meetings. 
Although the Tablighi Jamaat is known to op-
pose formal associations with educational insti-
tutions, let alone with a girls’ madarasa, the links 
and points of overlap mentioned above between 
the Madrasatul Niswan and the Tablighi Jamaat 
indicate that at the informal level the situation is 
far less clear-cut and the boundaries are blurred.
Reformist Movements
A Tablighi perspective on women’s education
As the views of the men in charge suggested a link between their ed-
ucational ideas and the particular worldview promoted by the Tablighi 
Jamaat, I tried to identify relevant literature in the nearby bookshops. 
Here the books studied in the madrasa were sold off the shelf and nu-
merous treatises for women or addressing the topic of women in rela-
tion to a host of related issues were available as well. One such example 
authored by a Tablighi activist is a treatise called Women in the Field of 
Education and Piety wherein Islamic education for women is promoted, 
as “failing to do this women and their innocent offspring will be washed 
away in a flood of irreligiousness, and ruin their worldly and next lives.”7 
It is suggested that women are obliged to know masail (questions per-
taining to Islamic law) and to seek knowledge about creation and law, 
so that they may become aware of evils that may harm their children, 
which include novels, television, cinema, theatre, and fashion. From a 
tablighi point of view, women are seen as equal to men with a view to 
acquiring sawab (merit) for the Hereafter and by a similar token purdah, 
in the reduced sense of modest behaviour, should be observed by men 
and women alike and should not form a hindrance in women’s pursuit 
of knowledge. Characteristic of the Tablighi perspective on women’s 
education are the idealization of past role models, such as the female 
companions of the Prophet, paired with apprehensions concerning 
new areas of studies, especially with regard to non-Islamic or duniyavi 
subjects. Owing to the above reservations, the suggested method of 
learning is that women should be taught by a knowledgeable man 
from behind a curtain at home, while the women in turn should teach 
others in their neighbourhood. 
Weekly women’s meetings
Apart from being taught at home, weekly dini (religious) programmes 
for women should facilitate the process of self-reformation. Such wom-
en’s programmes should include the following elements: a reminder to 
perform the five ritual salat (prayers) regularly; a reminder with regard to 
punctuality in counting tasbihat (rosaries); encouragement to study books 
on fazail (virtues); and an encouragement to send out the men in the path 
of God. Such weekly meetings for women represent yet another parallel 
between the madrasa and the Tablighi Jamaat. While in the Tablighi cen-
tre these bayans (lectures) were held by a man, who spoke from behind 
a curtain every Thursday afternoon, in the Madrasatul Niswan the Pro-
gramme was organized by the teachers and students themselves. 
Notes
1. The Kashful Uloom madrasa for boys was 
established by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, 
founder of the Tablighi Jamaat.
2. Although the name of the madrasa is 
fictitious, it is a name I encountered during 
fieldwork, be it in a different context. 
3. I use “purdah” in a broader sense denoting 
female segregation, modest behaviour, as 
well as modest dress.
4. Regarding the history of the dars-e-nizami 
see Jamal Malik, Islamische Gelehrtenkultur 
in Nordindien. Entwicklungsgeschichte und 
Tendenzen am Beispiel von Lucknow (Leiden, 
Brill, 1997), 522-541. 
5. While adab is often translated as social 
etiquette, in this context what was taught 
incorporated more than just etiquette and 
hence the use of the term “value education.” 
6. With regard to the “civilizing mission” of 
madrasas see Patricia Jeffery, Roger Jeffery 
and Craig Jeffrey, “The First Madrasa. 
Learned Mawlawis and the Educated 
Mother,” in Islamic Education, Diversity and 
National Identity. Dini Madaris in India post 
9/11, ed., Jan-Peter Hartung and Helmut 
Reifeld (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005). 
7. Mohammed Yunus, Women in the Field of 
Education and Piety (Dewsbury: Darul Kutub, 
1994).
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In 2004 Deobandi ulama issued a fatwa 
that forbid watching television. Al-
though the fatwa did not clearly spec-
ify this, critics argued that it had in 
mind the new and increasingly popu-
lar Urdu islamic television channel Q 
TV, which now has millions of viewers 
in India and Pakistan. Based in Dubai, 
Q TV offers a mix of traditional Barelvi 
Sufi piety, regarded by many Deobandi 
ulama as nothing short of anathema, 
and neo-islamist apologist rhetoric by 
“lay” preachers such as the Pakistani Israr Ahmad and the Mumbai-
based Zakir Naik, both of whom are trained medical specialists. Pre-
sumably, being non-ulama, they are regarded by the Deobandi ulama 
as a challenge to their authority. This, in addition to the Barelvi factor, 
probably has much to d with both the timing and the contents of the 
fatwa.
Protagonists of the fatwa
The fatwa has set off a major debate on the “Islamicity” of television. 
A good indication of the issues involved is provided by a few examples 
of the numerous articles on the fatwa that appeared in the New Delhi 
edition of the Urdu Rashtriya Sahara 22 August 2004. Both supporters 
as well as opponents of the fatwa frame the terms of the debate in 
“Islamic” terms, some seeing the fatwa as Islamically valid while others 
viewing it as a gross misinterpretation of Islam. 
A vociferous backer of the fatwa is 
a certain Mufti Aijaz ur-Rashid Qasmi, 
a Deobandi graduate. In his article he 
declares watching any television pro-
gramme prohibited for Muslims. He 
argues that no film can be made in 
an attractive and persuasive manner 
without including pictures of women 
or succumbing to sheer entertain-
ment, both of which he castigates as 
“un-Islamic.” He backs this claim by 
declaring that many Deobandi ulama 
believe that television has “become an expression of Satanic wiles.” 
Seeking to preempt his critics who believe that television could be 
used for Islamic missionary purposes, he writes that while the duty 
of propagation is binding on all Muslims, this should be done only 
through “proper” means. Since television is used largely for “broad-
casting immoral programmes” and is “basically a means of entertain-
ment,” it is not a proper means for Islamic propagation work. 
The Mufti’s defence of the controversial fatwa is backed by a declara-
tion by the deputy rector of the Deoband madrasa, Abdul Khaliq Ma-
drasi, whose article is titled “The Fatwa is Right and True.” He adds that 
another reason why television is impermissible is because photography 
is forbidden in Islam. While thus castigating television, he approves, 
interestingly, of the Internet, which, he claims, is “to a large extent, 
free of pictures.” He declares that the Internet can be used for “legiti-
mate” purposes, provided pictures are not used. Accordingly, Deoband, 
while disapproving of television, has its 
own website and numerous Deobandi 
groups now offer online fatwas.
Its critics
Not all Deobandi ulama agree. A 
number of younger Deobandi gradu-
ates appear to be critical of the fatwa, 
as appears in their articles in the Rash-
triya Sahara. A good example is Waris 
Mazhari, editor of the Tarjuman Dar ul-
’Ulum, the official organ of the Deoband 
madrasa’s alumni association. 
The fatwa’s claim, he writes, that tel-
evision is basically a means of frivolous 
or immoral entertainment, and, hence, 
Islamically impermissible is incorrect. 
Television can also be used for proper 
purposes, such as for providing news 
and information, rebutting “anti-Is-
lamic” propaganda and for explaining 
Islam to Muslims as well as to others. In-
deed, many Arab television companies 
host such Islamic programmes. Hence, 
rather completely shunning television, 
Muslims should stay away from “im-
proper” channels while not hesitating 
to watch other channels that are “use-
ful.” In addition, Mazhari writes, Islamic 
television channels are fully legitimate. 
Reformist Movements
In 2004 the Dar ul-’Ulum at Deoband, India’s 
largest Islamic seminary, issued a fatwa 
declaring watching television, including 
Islamic channels, impermissible. Issued by 
Mufti Mahmud ul-Hasan Bulandshahri, a senior 
scholar at the Deoband madrasa, the fatwa 
declares that television is forbidden to 
Muslims because it was principally “a means 
for [frivolous] entertainment.” Sikand explores 
the debate about television and islam that 
was caused by this fatwa.1
Deoband’s War 
on Television
Fury over a Fatwa
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and arrange to have their rallies broadcast on television channels. Riyaz 
ul-Hasan Nadvi, Convener of the Milli Council of Uttaranchal, points out 
what the contradiction in declaring television wholly impermissible 
(on the grounds that some channels promote immorality) while allow-
ing for the use of the Internet. 
Despite the hue and cry being made by defenders and opponents of 
the fatwa, not many Muslims seem to have taken it seriously. Certainly, 
there has been nothing like the organized smashing of televisions by 
Deobandi activists in Pakistan’s North-Western Frontier Province some 
years ago. Fatwas like this one might be remarkable simply for the 
struggles among the ulama within the Deoband, but they serve little 
positive purpose for Muslims enjoying the new programmes on offer. 
Despite being a trained ‘alim himself, Mazhari comes down heavily on 
the conservative ulama, including the author of the anti-television 
fatwa, for their hostility to progress. He sees the anti-television fatwa 
as part of a long tradition of ulama opposition to new inventions. 
Yet another Deoband graduate who has spoken out against the 
fatwa is Asrar ul- Haq Qasmi. In his article he comments that the fatwa 
is based on ignorance of the real world. Questioning the authority of 
the author of the anti-television fatwa, he says, “If the ‘alim is not well-
versed with the spirit of the Shariah and its aims he does not have the 
right to issue a fatwa and the fatwa that he gives will have a wrong 
effect.” Without naming the author of the fatwa but indirectly referring 
to him and other such ulama, he cites a hadith which castigates ulama 
who hasten to issue fatwas without careful reflection, and promoting 
their personal agendas. 
Anzar Shah Kashmiri, a leading Deobandi 'alim, critiques the fatwa 
for “giving Islam a bad name [by depicting it as] intolerant, narrow-
minded and obscurantist.” To ban it simply because it is also used for 
broadcasting “immoral” programmes is as ridiculous as demanding 
that telephones be banned because they can similarly be misused. He 
believes that the fatwa is based on the outdated views of medieval 
scholars as contained in the books of medieval Islamic jurisprudence, 
and calls upon Muslim scholars to evolve understandings of Islam more 
relevant to today’s context. 
Besides criticizing the fatwa on “Islamic” grounds, Umaid ul-Zaman 
Qasmi Kairanwi, Acting President of the Deoband madrasa’s alumni 
association raised the question of the double-standards in the argu-
ments used by the author of the fatwa. Despite the fatwa’s banning of 
television, numerous Deobandi ulama regularly appear on television 
Note
1. An earlier version of this article was 
published in April 2005 on the Qalander 
website: www.islaminterfaith.org.
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 [T]he fatwa is based on ignorance of the real world.
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In Uridu Hallan, Doreya, a middle-aged 
Egyptian upper class woman, wants to 
divorce her husband. Since her only son 
had grown up and had just left the pa-
rental home in order to study abroad, 
she decided that the time was ripe to 
divorce her unfaithful, alcoholic, and 
abusive husband whom her father had 
forced her to marry twenty years earlier. 
When she requested him to divorce her 
he refused, saying that he could not 
understand that she suddenly wanted a divorce after twenty years of 
marriage unless “her eye was on another man.” As 
a consequence, Doreya was left no other choice 
then to file a divorce case in court. Her case was 
endlessly postponed and she found herself divid-
ing her time between work and going to the court 
without any results. As her case dragged on, she 
became more interested in learning the difference 
between women’s divorce rights in Islam as com-
pared to the divorce rights she had as an Egyptian 
Muslim woman under the Egyptian legal system. 
She discovered that Islam gives women the right 
to divorce their husband unilaterally through a 
procedure called khul‘. One day, she found the po-
lice at her door—sent by her husband—to force 
her back to the marital “home” through a so-called 
“ta‘ah” (obedience) ordinance. Instead of returning 
“home” Doreya ran down the stairs and fled to her 
brother’s apartment.1 There she met a friend of her 
brother and after a while they fell in love. Slowly 
Doreya started getting hopes for a new future.
Yet, the “obedience” ordinance had angered her 
to such an extent that she decided to make an ap-
pointment with the Minister of Justice. During her 
visit she told him about the “khul‘ hadith” in which 
a woman approached the Prophet telling him that 
she hated living with her husband although she 
thought of her husband as a good and 
religious man. The Prophet asked her 
if she was willing to give back to him 
the mahr (dowry) which he had given 
her upon marriage. She agreed, and 
after she returned it to her husband, 
the Prophet divorced her from him. 
The Minister of Justice was impressed 
by her knowledge of Islamic law and he 
promised to study the matter. He abol-
ished the “obedience” ordinance in the 
sense that the police was no longer al-
lowed to force a woman back “home.”2 
However, he did not give women the 
right to divorce by way of khul‘, nor did 
he set out to facilitate the existing di-
vorce procedures so as to put an end to 
a practice which made women spend 
years in court without necessarily ob-
taining a divorce at the end of that pe-
riod as happened to Doreya. After four 
long years the judge refused to grant 
her a divorce. Instead of marrying the 
friend of her brother whom she was in 
love with, she was still legally married 
to a man whom she hated and from 
whom she had already been separated 
for years.
Finally there was khul‘
In actuality Doreya is a character 
played by Fatin Hamama (1931- ), one 
of Egypt’s most famous actresses. Re-
leased in 1975, Uridu Hallan (I Want a 
Solution) had a profound influence on 
the public and many claimed that it revived the reform initiatives of the 
old Personal Status Laws which had last been amended in the 1920s. 
It is difficult to measure its effects, but it is beyond doubt that the film 
reflected the mood of the seventies in which hope, when a new reform 
proposal was introduced, and disappointment, when it was rejected 
again, succeeded each other. While the reform initiatives of 1971, 1975, 
and 1977 were all rejected by Parliament, Sadat pushed through a re-
form of Personal Status Law in 1979 during a period of parliamentary 
recess. The new law aroused a lot of controversy and especially the fact 
that women were given automatically the right to a divorce in case their 
husband married a second wife, enraged religious leaders, as well as 
the general public. However, since Sadat had issued the law when Par-
liament was in recess, some lawyers appealed the constitutionality of 
the law in the High Court which declared it unconstitutional on formal 
grounds in May 1985. The High Court did not declare the law uncon-
stitutional on the ground that its content violated the Sharia. Although 
in July 1985 a new, adapted version of the 1979 law (law no.100/1985) 
was accepted by the Parliament, women felt disappointed. They again 
set out to reform Personal Status Law. 
Where in the film, Doreya went to visit the Minister of Justice in order 
to ask him to change the “obedience” ordinance and urge him to intro-
duce unilateral divorce by way of khul‘ instead, more than a decade 
later, women’s activists also went to see the Minister of Justice, in order 
to discuss how they could facilitate the procedures governing judicial 
divorce cases initiated by women. After years of working with the Min-
istry of Justice, government officials, well known lawyers, and religious 
authorities, the women’s activists made a big step forward when the 
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In the mid 1970s, a film, Uridu Hallan (I Want 
a Solution), drew attention to the plight of 
women applying for divorce under Egyptian 
law. Three decades later, Egyptian women 
are the first in the Middle East to have gained 
the right to unilateral divorce through a 
procedure called khul‘. Cartoons and two films 
now depict khul‘ as a law designed mainly 
for immoral westernized Egyptian women 
from the upper classes.
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Cartoons appeared 
to provide a very 
popular means for 
those opposing 
reform of divorce 
rules to express 
their criticism of the 
new “khul‘ law.”
A woman 
tells her new 
lover: “Just a 
minute please... 
I will divorce 
my husband 
(through khul') 
and come to you 
immediately!” 
 Al Wafd 
Newspaper, 
8 February 
2000
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People’s Assembly passed Law no. 1/2000 on the Reorgani-
zation of Certain Terms and Procedures of Litigation in Per-
sonal Status Matters.3 Soon the law became known as the 
“khul‘ law” after one of its 79 clauses which allowed for a 
khul‘ without the consent of the husband. According to 
this interpretation of khul‘: “A married couple may mutually 
agree to separation. However, if they do not agree and the 
wife sues demanding it; separates herself from her husband 
by forfeiting all her financial legal rights; and restores to him 
the sadaq (dowry) he gave to her, then the court is to divorce 
her from him” (article 20).
The “khul‘ law” criticized
In contrast to what one might expect, khul‘ was criti-
cized by many defenders of women’s rights, one of whom 
was Husna Shah, the scriptwriter of I Want a Solution. In an 
interview in an Egyptian newspaper in 2000 she said that 
khul‘ will only be used in case of extreme necessity since the 
wife will have to forgo her financial rights such as alimony. 
For this reason, a woman will hesitate to approach a court. 
Husna Shah even predicted that women who do not opt for 
khul‘ but who continue to live in discordant marriages, will 
resort again to “the cleaver and the plastics bags,” a refer-
ence to criminal cases in which women, unable to obtain a 
divorce, ended up murdering their husbands.
Husna Shah did not stand alone in her criticism. Other pro-
ponents of women’s rights also were of the opinion that khul‘ 
would only be an option for richer women since they were 
the only ones likely to be able to pay back the dower as well 
as give up their financial rights. Opponents of reform of the 
existing divorce rules articulated much fiercer criticism. They 
also stated that giving women unilateral divorce rights would lead to sky-
rocketing divorce rates, and hence the destruction of the Egyptian family 
since women were too emotional to be given this right. As long as women 
remained obedient to their husband, family life and society in general 
would prosper. However, when women would leave their husband and 
ask for a khul‘, this would lead to the breakdown of the Egyptian family 
and, hence, to that of Egyptian society at large. Often opponents called 
women applying for khul‘ nashiz (disobedient). 
Cartoons appeared to provide a very popular means for those oppos-
ing reform of divorce rules to express their criticism of the new “khul‘ 
law.” They depicted women with moustaches, women flirting with 
other men, men in shackles and men pushing prams, all conveying the 
same message: once women were giving the right to unilateral divorce, 
they would misuse it. As a result Egyptian family life would fall apart. 
What is particularly interesting is that many, if not all, cartoons depict-
ed women as westernized Egyptian women who did not wear the veil, 
but instead wore tight garments and who walked on high heels.
The issue of westernization and women’s (dis)obedience was also a 
central theme in two films which dealt with the development of khul‘ 
after its introduction in 2000. Both films were comedies and in both 
cases they showed how two women from the higher classes tried to 
divorce their husbands. The first film, Muhami Khul‘ (Khul‘ Lawyer) was 
released in 2003 and showed how a young and attractive woman of 
the high heels and tight clothes type, who owned a factory wanted 
to divorce her husband because he was snoring. For this purpose she 
approached a lawyer who accepted her case but only on the condition 
that they would construe snoring as sexual impotence, otherwise they 
would have no chance of winning the case.4 During the process they 
(not surprisingly) fell in love with each other. She won the case but in 
the end the two did not marry each other after she caused a scandal 
by swimming in her bikini in the river which ran along the house of his 
parents in the village. 
The title of the second film Uridu Khul’an (I Want Khul‘) is a pun on the 
film Uridu Hallan and was released in late 2005. Again, we see how an 
upper class woman with two children resorts to khul‘ in order to pres-
sure her husband to give her permission to leave the house in order to 
work again. He had refused to let her work after he had come home 
one afternoon only to find out that his two children had changed the 
house into a chaos during his wife’s absence. Since he thinks that her 
main responsibility is in the house, he refuses to let her work again 
after which the wife files the first khul‘ case in the country. The media, 
eager to cover this first khul‘ case, starts to cover her case in every na-
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foresees that, 
after the 
passing of the 
new Personal 
Status Law, 
women will 
be in control, 
27 January 
2000.
Nadia Sonneveld is a Ph.D. candidate at ISIM, doing research on the implementation of 
the Egyptian “khul‘ law” of 2000 in the courts and in daily life.
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tional paper and on television. As a consequence the husband, afraid 
of his high position, becomes so embarrassed that he starts to give in 
to her wishes bit by bit. 
Both the cartoons and the two films use the imagery of westernized 
Egyptian women to suggest that khul‘ is only in the interest of already 
liberated and immoral rich elite women who will only use it for frivo-
lous reasons. In fact, however, the majority of those filing for a divorce 
through khul‘ are Egyptian women from the lower middle classes who 
do not wish to divorce their husband merely because they snore or be-
cause they forbid them to work, but because their lives have in some 
way been made impossible. Many of these women have husbands 
who do not have jobs and refuse to work, or husbands who have left 
them for another woman without divorcing them, thereby forcing 
them to run the household alone and to work outside the house as 
well as making it impossible for them to remarry. In such cases it is 
ironic that husbands frequently react to their wife’s khul‘ case by filing 
an “obedience” ordinance. Apart from attempting to save their honour 
by putting the blame on their wife, they hope to make it difficult for 
her to obtain a divorce or they hope that the “obedience” ordinance 
will scare her to such an extent that she will withdraw her case. 
The problems of these women are not easily recognized as the main 
discourse still relates khul‘ to women’s disobedi-
ence and consequently the destruction of the 
Egyptian family. Approximately 35 years after 
Doreya’s Uridu Hallan Egyptian women are in a 
position to say Uridu Khul‘an. The relationship be-
tween khul‘ and disobedience, however, makes 
filing for a divorce through khul‘ a stigmatizing 
experience. What is more, this problem is not lim-
ited to a small group of westernized elite women 
as most women who resort to khul‘ are from mod-
est backgrounds. 
Notes
1. When a wife left the marital home without 
her husband’s permission he was legally 
permitted to force her home by police force.
2. It was really abolished in 1967.
3. For more information, see Diane Singerman, 
“Rewriting Divorce in Egypt: Reclaiming 
Islam, Legal Activisim, and Coalition Politics,” 
in Remaking Muslim Politics, Democratization 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 
161-188.
4. This clearly goes against the idea of the 
“khul‘ law” of 2000 under which women no 
longer need to prove that they have “valid” 
reasons for divorce.
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Back in his student days, the young 
Douwes worked his summer holidays 
in a factory in order to finance his 
travel to the Middle East. On one of his 
journeys in Syria, while travelling from 
Aleppo to Abu Kamal, he met on the 
bus a dealer in used car parts who in-
vited him to his house in Salamiyya, a 
rural town to the southeast of Hama. 
Martijn: There, you found out that this 
man, as most of the inhabitants, was 
an Ismaili whose grandparents had 
migrated from the coastal mountains 
to the inland plains in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Dick: Yes, he was not a religious man 
and was often dressed like the Arab 
nomads with whom he traded spare car parts. As an M.A. student I was 
primarily interested in the migration to and re-cultivation of the areas 
adjacent to the Syrian steppes. In the process I happened to stumble 
on the curious history of the recognition of the Bombay-based Aga 
Khan by a part of the Syrian Ismaili community at the end of the nine-
teenth century. The problems ensuing from that recognition, includ-
ing the trial for treason of their religious shaykhs, caught my attention. 
My later Ph.D. research aimed at examining the non-mainstream Mus-
lim communities in the closing decades of Ottoman Syria, but dur-
ing my research in the Syrian National Archives I discovered unique 
material on the rural crisis of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries and decided then to elaborate on that topic. 
Martijn: Coincidence may have played its part in your career but the Ismai-
lis (and later the Alawis), Lebanon, and Syria remain important themes 
in your research interests. Why direct your gaze at the marginal?
Dick: I am concerned with the—so to speak—“multicultural drama” ac-
companying the demise of the Ottoman Commonwealth; how eth-
nic, linguistic, and religious plurality 
became increasingly tested by forces 
of colonialism and post-colonialism, by 
the market, and, most of all, by various 
brands of nationalism. Differences in 
ways of life, religious convictions ap-
peared to have been less problematic 
in the early modern era, certainly when 
compared to more recent conditions 
in the successor national states. What 
interests me is the process in which 
traditions and ways of interaction be-
tween people become problematized 
and politicized through the discourses 
of colonialism, nationalism and, more 
recently, Islamism. As a consequence 
some people feel less at home than 
they used to. In some way this is related 
to what we witness now globally, in debates about identity, conduct, 
and visibility of minority communities. It is not at all restricted to the 
Middle East but one can find it in Europe, and in particular, in the 
Netherlands. It is the majority that critically evaluates the conduct 
of others with their own principles and ideals—and not necessarily 
their actual behaviour—as is the case in the Netherlands, the result 
is that for an individual Muslim it is difficult to feel at ease and to 
express oneself freely. 
Martijn: Your work is mostly historical. Do we need the historical per-
spective in order to understand current developments?
Dick: It is useful to reconsider earlier experiences as well as uses of 
the past. For instance, when one works with a historical perspec-
tive one immediately sees the rapid changes in the public debate; 
in the Netherlands, the initial positive approach of multiculturalism 
was faded out by severe criticism within the span of only a few years. 
A historical perspective is, in my opinion, also important for ISIM to 
keep in mind, because every group acts and develops action based 
on historical experiences, at the least generational but often span-
ning longer cycles. Moreover, the use of the past offers rich avenues 
for research. Within religion it is often habitual to refer to historic 
precedent. This is also true for Islam. For example, a century ago the 
paradigm of the prophet Muhammad evolved primarily around ritual 
and pious behaviour, aspects that have remained of great concern for 
practising Muslims. However, within that century he has assumed an 
ever more political role and his quality as a man of state has gained 
considerable strength.
From Newsletter to Review
Martijn: Apart from your involvement with organizational matters, 
your main contribution to the ISIM enterprise was as editor of the 
ISIM Newsletter/Review. What shaped the ISIM Newsletter?
Dick: The first ISIM Newsletter was the combined effort of a very small 
team that had to deliver a product in only three months to accom-
pany the formal opening of the Institute. The opening was in October 
1998 but I was actually involved, with others, in the bringing about 
of the institute from 1996 onwards. The ISIM Newsletter has contin-
ued to rely on the exceptional skills and commitment of people like 
Gabrielle Constant in the early days and later on also Noel Lambert, 
Linda Herrera and, of course, Dennis Janssen. ISIM and the ISIM News-
letter were always meant as a platform to stimulate a more diverse 
scientific discourse on research in social, political, and religious proc-
esses. First of all we wanted to demonstrate through the articles in 
the Newsletter that a religious life is actually a very normal life; when 
looking at religion, religious movements, religious conduct, one al-
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Resisting Uniformity
1
Now, more than ever, with Islamic voices
contesting politics, culture and society in prac-
tically every country with a Muslim population,
Islam would appear to have a unity and a com-
mon purpose across political and cultural fron-
tiers: to provide a common identity for Mus-
lims who wish to live in a society of their faith
and be ruled by their sacred law. This picture
can only confirm in the public mind the idea of
Islam as a common essence of all these soci-
eties, one that rules and determines their cul-
ture and their social and political processes. 
The views asserting the uniqueness, unity
and exceptionalism of Muslim society and his-
tory are all the more potent in the current
intellectual climate which has seen the demise
of universalist theories of historical causation
and social analysis such as Marxism. The idea
of cultural and civilizational essences and iden-
tities underlying unique histories of particular
civilizations have been most prominently stat-
ed in Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’ thesis. Even though this has been widely
criticized, the assumptions behind it are equal-
ly widely held, not least by many Muslim and
Arab intellectuals.
Muslim exceptionalism and uniqueness and
the centrality of religion to Muslim society and
history are, of course, the pillars of Islamist
political advocacy. Many ‘secular’ intellectuals,
specially in Egypt, while challenging Islamist
illiberal interpretations, would, nevertheless,
wish to base their own advocacies on ‘authen-
tic’ Muslim and Arab ‘culture’. Many advocates
of Human Rights, for instance, insist on deriv-
ing these rights from liberal (and strained)
interpretations of the Qu'ran and the tradi-
tions. I have encountered strong hostility to
my argument that the modern discourses of
Human Rights are products of recent political
struggles and ideologies, many of them
against the establishments of state, church
and dominant classes, and which have no
ancestry in the much older ethical and legal
discourses of any religion.
What is unique about Islam? I argue, along-
side many colleagues, against this cultural
essentialization of an exceptional ‘Islamic
world’, contrasted implicitly or explicitly with
an equally exceptional and totalized ‘West’. Of
course, every history is unique. The conceptual
tools of social and historical analyses are how-
ever common, and are used to analyse diverse
unique histories. The question also arises of
what is the object whose unique history is
being told? Does ‘Islamic society’ constitute a
unitary entity with a common and consistent
history extending to the present and underly-
ing the current ‘Islamic phenomenon’? Many
eminent writers such as the historian H.A.R.
Gibb and the anthropologist and philosopher
Ernest Gellner, have advanced arguments to
that effect. These arguments are the products
of deep scholarship and often thorough famili-
arity with the histories and cultures of the
region. The question however is conceptual:
the essentialism rests on a totalization of histo-
ries and societies as ‘Islamic’. This label cannot
be denied: yet, what commonality does it
entail? It can be argued for instance, that the
modern history (from the eighteenth century)
of Iran shows a totally different political and
social structure to that of Turkey or Egypt, let
alone Arabia. It can be plausibly argued that
the Christian and Muslim shores of the
Mediterranean shared many common features
of popular culture: Tunisian coastal cities had
more in common with Sicily and the Italian
south than with Arabia or Iraq. The manifest
reality, for instance, of women in southern
Europe covering their heads in a similar man-
ner to their Mediterranean Muslim counter-
parts seems to have escaped the notice of
observers intent on totalized contrasts!
Indeed, we can date the divergence from pre-
vious common elements between the two
shores of the Mediterranean to the second half
of the twentieth century as many Muslim
Mediterranean cities, such as Alexandria or
Algiers, became ‘peasantized’ by the great
rural influx, and European Mediterranean cities
increasingly integrated into a national culture
dominated by the North, a process accelerated
by the regional policies of the European Com-
munity.
I still have to deal with the question of what
it is that lends credence to the essentialist
arguments: what is the common denominator
which makes diverse societies Muslim beyond
the obvious fact of religion? Perhaps a good
way of answering this question is by drawing
parallels with European Christianity. The Chris-
tian world shares a universe of discourse refer-
ring to sets of institutions, doctrines and per-
sonnel: the church, the priesthood, the Holy
Trinity, the Bible, the problems of salvation and
grace. These are not restricted to the religious
sphere but have involved many spheres of cul-
ture, law, morality and family. Divorce, homo-
sexuality and abortion, for instance, continue
to be issues in the politics of several Western
countries. A good historian of Europe will tell
you however, that these entities of Church,
scriptures, law and so on, have taken vastly dif-
ferent forms and social significance at various
points in European history and in different
regions. The Medieval Catholic Church, for
instance, was a very different institution from
the eighteenth century Church and with a very
different role in society and politics.
Similarly, we find in Islam a common set of
vocabularies referring to institutions, doctrines
and personnel: the Qu'ran and Hadith (tradi-
tions of the Prophet), the ulama, the Sharica
(religious law) and many others. These have
similarly varying structures, forms of organiza-
tion and social significance over the centuries
and in different societies. Ernest Gellner in his
characterization of a constant pattern of Mus-
lim history and society, attributes a central role
to the ulama and the Sharica. His model, how-
ever, crumbles before the many different
forms of ulama organization, power, and insti-
tutions, not only in different societies and his-
tories but even within the class structure of the
same society. The elite ulama of late Ottoman
times, for instance, were integrated into the
ruling institutions and bureaucracies, while
their Iranian counterparts of the same time
constituted parts of local, decentralized power
elites with their own revenues and institutions
separate from the govenment. Both were dis-
tinct from the ulama ‘proletariat’ of their own
time, the multitude of students, preachers,
dervishes and mendicants, performing ser-
vices for the poor. Similarly, Sufism and sufi
brotherhoods, regular features of practically all
Muslim societies display a great variety of
manifestation and of relations to the main-
stream religious institutions, from elite intel-
lectual mystics counting the higher ulama in
their ranks, to illiterate rural charismatic saints
ruling peasant communities with magic, medi-
cine and ceremony.
And how do we understand these social for-
mations and their historical and geographical
variations and transformations, the logic of
their coherence and contradiction? Well, by
the same repertoire of social and historical
concepts and analyses which we use for West-
ern or any other societies. It is by these means
that we grasp the uniqueness of each manifes-
tation, not of a totalized history with an Islamic
essence.
Finally, does the current ‘Islamic resurgence’
vindicate the essentialist position that Islam
remains the essence of Muslim society, which
is peculiarly resistant to secularization and to
separating religion from politics? I am more
convinced by the opposite argument: that cur-
rent political Islam is partly a reaction and a
defence against the secularizing processes
that have inevitably come with modernity and
which continue to have their effect on all soci-
eties in the region. Law, even where elements
of religion have remained within it, has
become codified state law, subject to political
and social exigencies; education has been
largely removed from religious spheres and
authorities (that is why these authorities are
trying, in vain, to hang on); religious authori-
ties cannot, try as they may, control the mani-
fold channels of information and entertain-
ment of the modern media; modern economic
exigencies have forced women into the labour
market and the public spheres, subverting
patriarchal authority and traditional values
(associated with religion). Only in a society so
thoroughly destroyed by successive wars such
as Afghanistan can the religious reactionaries
succeed in reversing these inexorable process-
es. Saudi Arabia, where wealth from petrol has
partly exempted the authorities from the exi-
gencies of modern socio-economic processes,
has also partly succeeded in arresting these
trends, but for how long? In Iran, the ‘mullocra-
cy’ of the Islamic Republic has had to retreat
repeatedly (but discreetly) in the face of these
contingencies. Family planning, for instance,
initially denounced by Khomeini as contrary to
Islam and an imperialist measure against Mus-
lims, was restored after a few years as govern-
ment policy. Family law, after initial reversals,
has now restored most of the Shah’s reforms
and more. Regarding working women, the
level of employment in the work force was
mostly maintained, and there is increasing par-
ticipation of women in public life, politics, the
arts, sport and even as junior judges. Crucially,
Khomeini, faced with the exigencies of gover-
nance, ruled in 1988 that in the interests of the
whole Islamic Umma, the Islamic government
is empowered to suspend any provision of the
Sharica, including prayer and fasting! Since
then the category of ‘interest’ (maslaha) has
been written into the constitution and institu-
tionalized, opening the gates wide for prag-
matic legislation and policy. I rest my case.♦
Dr Sami Zubaida is a reader in Politics,
Department of Politics and Sociology,
Birkbeck College, University of London.
It is often claimed that Islam is not only a religion but a
culture and a civilization. ‘The Islamic world’ and ‘Islam-
ic history’ are commonly used terms, both in popular
public discourse and in academic writing, suggesting
some kind of coherent unity. At the same time, writers
point to the diversity of Muslim countries from Morocco
to Indonesia, from Nigeria to Turkey. Is there a unity
behind the diversity, at least in the ‘heartlands’ of Islam
in the Middle East and North Africa, as Ernest Gellner
and others have claimed?
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After a career of seven years as Academic 
Coordinator (later Executive Director) and 
Editor of the ISIM Newsletter/Review, Dick 
Douwes now joins the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam as Chair of History of Non-Western 
Societies and Dean of Faculty of History 
and Arts. In this interview he talks about his 
research interests, the building of ISIM, and 
the development of the ISIM Newsletter into 
the ISIM Review. One of his growing concerns is 
over what he sees to be an increasing pressure 
to conform to the “acceptable,” which allows 
for very little chance for the expression of 
authentic identities; a regrettable development 
that he witnesses not only in the Middle 
East but also in Europe, and in particular, 
the Netherlands.
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positional angles was continued, not only in issues concerning the 
Netherlands and the USA but also in Muslim countries. This probably 
also explains why ISIM has experienced some difficulties in manifest-
ing itself in mainstream media and debates, in particular in the Neth-
erlands itself. The public visibility of ISIM is an issue, also because it 
impacts upon the fundraising capacities of the Institute. Of course, 
the visibility of ISIM not only relies upon the ISIM Review; ISIM has 
developed a number of activities for various audiences, offering ex-
pertise and offering a platform for public debate. In this we work to-
gether with a growing number of partners, including on the national 
and local levels. We also make available materials in Dutch and will 
probably do more so in the future in order to cater to the Dutch soci-
ety and in particular on the level of municipalities. There, of course, is 
where it all happens, not in the debates in the media. These debates 
are important, but I think ISIM should be there where the debates are 
transformed into policies that directly influence people. 
Martijn: The global and local conditions are important for ISIM and for 
the position of ISIM. What kind of future do you see for ISIM or institu-
tions such as ISIM?
Dick: The greatest achievement for ISIM is the international recogni-
tion and research. ISIM, of course, has to maintain this: it constitutes a 
sound basis from which to expand. Being situated in Western Europe 
and relying primarily on national funds, a clearer focus on Muslim 
presence in Europe seems inevitable. Currently, ISIM hosts several 
programmes on Europe on Ph.D. and Post-doctoral levels, but estab-
lishing an ISIM Chair for Muslim Communities in Europe would be a 
great asset. Because ISIM is situated in Europe it is able to tap on the 
varied European currents in academia and public debate. After all, 
the very strength of Europe lies in its diversity.
ways has to look at the contexts in which religion plays 
a role, such as family, schooling, work, politics etc. When, 
why, where, and how does religion play a role? Some Is-
lamologists present Muslims as living in a habitat defined 
by Quran, hadith, and Sharia, in other words, as religious 
creatures living in a—according to their view—obscuran-
tist world. In a sense, they are not that far removed form 
the type of Islamist activism that claims that the Sharia 
alone defines and brings about comfort and prosperity. 
The idea that “Islam” explains everything, something in 
which both Salafists and some of their critics find their 
common denominator, is certainly challenged by ISIM. 
Conversely, we have had articles dealing with more secu-
lar concerns and with issues that may be seen as challeng-
ing dominant religious views, such as the recent “Queer 
Jihad”(ISIM Review 16). We also wanted to show that Islam 
does not only manifest itself in the Middle East but that 
the majority of Muslims live elsewhere, primarily in South 
and Southeast Asia, but also in Africa and in unexpected 
places like, for example, Poland where a few villages of 
Tatar Muslims survive. We have always paid attention to 
details of local forms of Islam. In this and other ways we 
try to turn away from the more dominant perspectives on 
Islam and Muslim, not only among non-Muslims but, also, 
among Muslims.
Martijn: By focusing on specific authentic approaches to Muslim so-
cieties and Muslim communities ISIM took a different stand com-
pared to those of certain participants in the Islam-debate. Can you 
tell us something about the responses to ISIM?
Dick: ISIM was criticized for this approach; allegedly we were too dis-
tant from scriptural Islam, if not religion for that matter, and too 
much informed by social sciences in our understanding of Muslim 
societies and communities at the expense of philological and the-
ological readings. I disagree with this critique; when one looks at 
the past and current work of the ISIM Chairs religion is very much 
present, also in its more formal appearances. I have always found it 
odd to hear that ISIM was not fully qualified for its tasks because it 
lacked an input of knowledge based on readings of religious texts 
considering the fact that from the very start Martin van Bruines-
sen was involved in the project and that Muhammad Khalid Masud 
acted as its first Academic Director. What was striking for the News-
letter/Review is the lack of critical reactions. We do get occasional 
letters to the editor, but most of them very positive. There was this 
one reaction, curious, about the cover article of the first Newsletter. 
A known US professor praised us for having a Muslim on the cover 
page. When I pointed out that the author, Sami Zubaida, was not of 
Muslim background, the person was quite embarrassed about his 
remark. It may be that political correctness or in-correctness cannot 
always be avoided but I think that ISIM avoided it for most of the 
time. The highest instance of negative reactions was regarding the 
article “Between Pipes and Esposito.” Most of these reactions were 
not about Pipes, as some might expect, but about the fact that the 
author was deemed to be too critical of Esposito. It was only then 
that Pipes contacted the ISIM secretariat asking for a subscription 
for the Newsletter. It seems that people who would basically disa-
gree with us, may sometimes read us but usually, just ignore us. 
Many others read us and feel at home. One of the questions for the 
future of the Review is if, and how, the Review would like to be a plat-
form for debate? The articles of the Review are now more academic 
compared to those of earlier issues and this affects the different 
types of audiences you aim at. In my view ISIM and the ISIM Review 
should also develop into a platform for debate and it should be no 
problem if there are, occasionally, articles included with which the 
editors disagree, as long as the matter concerns a sound text. 
Alternate approaches
Martijn: The intention of showing the other side and offering alternate 
readings to the dominant culture, was that present from the start?
Dick: Yes, and I think that the international success of ISIM is partly root-
ed in that attitude because it gave expression to a broadly felt need 
for alternate approaches. The tendency within ISIM to keep a certain 
distance from the dominant groups and to view things from the op-
Dick Douwes
Martijn de Koning is Assistant-Editor of the ISIM Review and a Ph.D. Candidate at the Free 
University Amsterdam.
Email: M.koning@isim.nl
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In South Africa, a mere 1.4 percent of 
the population is Muslim. In the South 
African public sphere however, South 
African Muslims have a far more sig-
nificant presence than what their ac-
tual numbers would suggest. In the 
media and in the arts, Muslims feature 
prominently; think of names such 
as novelists Achmat Dangor, Ahmed 
Essop, Ishtiyaq Shukri, and Rayda Jacobs; poets Gabeeba Baderoon 
and Shabbir Bhanoobhai; and the filmmaker Zulfah Otto-Sallies. 
Among the lesser known emerging young female Muslim voices in 
South African documentary filmmaking is Cape Town-based Akiedah 
Mohamed (b.1971). A single mother living in the suburb of Woodstock 
in Cape Town, her work has been screened domestically as well as in-
ternationally. Mohamed had her debut with the film The Malawian Kiss 
(1999), a documentary about the first Muslim in South Africa to openly 
declare her HIV-positive status, Faghmeda Miller. She has also made a 
documentary about a Muslim couple in a polygamous marriage in Cape 
Town, The Second Wife (2001); a documentary about Muslim women 
involved in the work of ritually cleansing the bodies of the deceased, 
Tales of the Tukamanies (2001), and a documentary about the month 
of fasting, Ramadan, and its significance for Cape Muslims, Portraits of 
Ramadan (2003); and finally Freedom is a Personal Journey (2004), about 
two South African ex-prisoners. She is 
currently working on a drama series for 
the South African Broadcasting Corpo-
ration (SABC) based on a story by the 
South African author Ahmed Essop 
about love across the colour line. Mo-
hamed grew up in a foster family in a 
southern suburb of Cape Town, has an 
undergraduate degree in Islamic Stud-
ies from the University of Cape Town (1994), and worked with various 
film production companies before her cinematic debut. I interviewed 
her at her home in February 2005. In the interview, Mohamed talked 
about her filmmaking, her problems with being labelled a “Muslim” 
filmmaker and her sources of inspiration. 
“Muslim” filmmaker
Sindre: Would you define yourself as a “Muslim” filmmaker, and what, if 
anything, does being a “Muslim” filmmaker entail?
Akiedah: “Muslim” is such a loaded term in the same way as “Christian” 
or “Hindu” is in terms of identity. I deal with issues that affect me as a 
person who is Muslim, you know. That’s the best way I can describe 
the work that I do. I think the filmmakers and the writers often oc-
cupy the space of the outsider in order to see clearly. But at the end of 
the day, my experience of the world is so limited. My understanding 
of life, and of religion is only contained in what experiences I’ve had 
in life. So, I can’t speak with authority, and I don’t want to be seen as 
doing that.
Sindre: In an era in which the visual representations of Muslims world-
wide is often limited to veiled Muslim women and gun-wielding Mus-
lim men,1 the documentaries of filmmakers such as Mohamed, which 
concentrate on the daily lives of ordinary Muslims in a secular con-
text, seem to me to have a humanizing potential. How do you look 
upon the media representations of Muslims?
Akiedah: Often I think that even our understanding of what it means 
being a Muslim is quite limited. It’s limited to being in a mosque, or 
being on a musallah (prayer rug), or being in a prayer, or protesting 
against the situation in Israel and Palestine, or to being a terrorist. I 
think that there’s a frail human face to being Muslim that we don’t 
see in the media, one that Muslims experience in their intimate day 
to day lives, and this frailty is very important to me because it talks 
about our limitations and our struggle in a complex modern world. 
And in that lies the seed in a way, of our liberation, if we can find a 
way to accept our imperfections, and to make it an acceptable part 
of our journey through life. 
Sindre: From your films I sense a very strong tendency towards repre-
senting voices that are, to a certain extent, marginal within the gen-
eral Cape Muslim community: such as the co-wife in a polygamous 
marriage, the Muslim living with HIV/AIDS, the Qadari Sufi?
Akiedah: Yah, I think it’s a very conscious decision to explore a wider 
range of experiences of being Muslim. What you see generally in the 
public sphere are those who are in positions of authority. They have 
the voice, and their voice is what is represented as the ideal. Most 
of the documentaries I have made deal with women because I’m 
a woman, and there are issues which women face that are gender 
specific. Also, in terms of literature and in terms of the visual media, 
women are underrepresented. They make up the other half of the 
Muslim population. In some traditional aspects of religion women 
Media & Representation
In this interview, Akiedah Mohamed, a young 
female filmmaker from Cape Town, talks 
about her work and what being a Muslim 
means to her in the context of her filmmaking. 
She argues that in spite of all the usual 
representations to the contrary, the visual 
media have a potential for humanizing 
Muslims in the contemporary world.
Interview Akiedah Mohamed
Humanizing Muslims 
through Visual Media
Akiedah 
Mohamed at 
the filmset 
of Freedom 
is a Personal 
Journey, 
2004
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social issues raised in the documentaries. I am interested in learning 
more about how you got along with the ulama in the process of mak-
ing some of your documentaries. In your documentaries, you have 
worked closely with quite conservative ulama in Cape Town. What 
kind of specific challenges did you face in your interaction with them, 
given that you are a Muslim woman who doesn’t wear a scarf, who 
raises her voice in public, and—to the extent that they know this—is 
a single mother—characteristics that you previously indicated might 
be seen as problematic by some conservative Muslims? 
Akiedah: Let’s just say that I’m very fond of them… I mean, they’re con-
servative, but I don’t see that as a bad thing, you know, conservatism 
isn’t a bad thing. I think because I understand that they are protect-
ing certain issues that they believe in. They want to protect the sa-
credness of family and the sacredness of life. They want an order, they 
want calmness, you know. So it’s not that they’re bad people—they’re 
not. I don’t generally go into attack. I go into dialogue with them, to 
speak to them, and to respect their position and who they are, you 
know, because that’s how I would like them to treat me. And gener-
ally in my interactions I try to focus on the issue, and I do solicit their 
help, and I do want to give expression to their voice. Because 
that is part of the dialogue of understanding. Because I don’t 
want to go and distort what anybody says, or who they are, 
or what they believe in—that’s not the point. To engage in 
dialogue is more important. To move away from being judg-
mental of oneself and of others is the greatest challenge, 
and through a documentary, this aspect of one’s approach is 
always tested, and sometimes one succeeds and sometimes 
not, but that is part of the process.
Sindre: Do you think that the visual media has a potential 
for humanizing Muslims, in spite of all the media representa-
tions to the contrary?
Akiedah: I think the media doesn’t humanize well. I think the 
media lends itself towards fragmentation. Because the images, 
I mean the way we experience life, as John Berger says,2 before 
we even speak, we see things and we read through the visuals. 
Our reality’s made up in that way: and then we start to con-
nect our words to this visual world around us. I think the key 
lies in how we build that relationship: that’s why words are so 
essential. The media can be used—as we 
have already seen—to portray a kind of 
demonized expression of being Muslim. It can be 
used that way. So it stands to reason that it can 
also be used for its opposite. The key, I think, in 
the humanizing process, is twofold—it relies on 
how that reality is built up in the media, as well as 
on people’s relationship to the media. 
Media & Representation
are encouraged to cast their eyes down, not to speak too 
loudly, not to draw any attention to themselves in any way. 
This is seen as an ideal personality…I think that perhaps 
I’ve struggled with that because that hasn’t been who I 
was… What I like is that there exists within the Cape Mus-
lim community an acceptance for being yourself. The Mus-
lim women’s voices aren’t silent. They do laugh, they do 
talk, they do speak their minds. 
Creating meaning through the “word”
Sindre: You have started writing poetry in primary school, 
and was further encouraged in your artistic endeavours by 
your former Jewish high school teacher. There is a connec-
tion between your foster father’s story-telling at weddings 
and funerals and your own need to express yourself artis-
tically. The desire to integrate words and visuals is most 
apparent in Tales of the Tukamanies where poems by the 
Sufi poet Mevlana Jalaluddin Rumi is interwoven with the 
visuals. Does this point to you being a filmmaker whose 
inspiration is drawn from poetry?
Akiedah: For me, there’s something that is very, very magi-
cal about creating a meaning through the “word.” I always 
wanted to write. In terms of filmmaking, I’m still finding my feet, try-
ing to understand filmmaking. What excites me about the film media 
is its ability to connect to people through the sharing of an experi-
ence, and perhaps by stimulating them to think about their experi-
ence. I think it is important to be able to find ways to share truth, or 
share ideas. We have lots of experiences of our own reality, or this 
world, that we don’t share with other people. But the assumption is 
that our experience of the world is the same as that of other peo-
ple, but this is not so. The visual media allows me to portray to some 
extent, or to share with someone, how I’m experiencing this reality. 
This is difficult in light of the fact that reality or experience is affected 
by our current emotions or state of mind. This reality is not an abso-
lute truth. It is only one way in order to begin to understand or make 
sense of our world, and to start engaging in that sort of dialogue.
The human connection
Sindre: Most of your documentaries have been commissioned by the 
state broadcaster in South Africa, the SABC. Being an independent 
filmmaker in a developing country where art is hardly the first of the 
state’s priorities and the limited market is at present satu-
rated with documentary filmmakers is demanding. The in-
dependent broadcaster E-TV, based in Cape Town, hoped 
to offer some opportunities for independent documentary 
filmmakers, has not commissioned local documentaries for 
years. SABC first started TV broadcasts in 1976, and these 
served as a propaganda instrument for the apartheid state 
until 1990. Ongoing conflicts relating to transformation 
and editorial policies within the SABC notwithstanding, 
charges of being aligned to the ANC have frequently been 
levelled against the SABC, and the SABC News in particu-
lar, in the post-apartheid era. From the point of view of 
an outsider, it seems however that there is less editorial 
oversight on the part of the SABC with regards to commis-
sioned work like documentaries. Most of your documenta-
ries have been commissioned by Issues of Faith, a weekly 
SABC programme about religious issues in various com-
munities in South Africa.
Akiedah: Look, they’re [the SABC’s commissioning editors] 
based in Johannesburg, so there is a great physical dis-
tance between us. It impacts on the kind of relationship 
one is able to build. I cannot walk into their offices to have a meeting. 
Even within the broadcasting scenario, the human connection is so 
important. If they do not relate to you, you are merely a number on 
a proposal. The warmth of human interaction permeates all levels of 
society, including work. I’ve dealt mostly with religious programmes 
perhaps because the broadcaster considers that I have a degree in 
Islamic studies, or because I come from the Muslim community, and 
hence may have some insight into the documentaries directed.
Sindre: Even though your documentaries more often than not focus 
specifically on Muslim women, the documentaries also include inter-
views with the ulama of Cape Town about some of the moral and 
Notes
1. This is largely true of representations of 
Muslims in South African post-apartheid 
media too. This topic is explored in a recent 
Ph.D. by Gabeba Baderoon titled Oblique 
Figures: Representations of Islam in South 
African Media and Culture (University of Cape 
Town, 2004).
2. John Berger, British novelist and art critic, 
probably best known for Ways of Seeing 
(reprint edition, Penguin 1995), which is the 
work being referred to here.
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Sindre Bangstad is a Ph.D. candidate at ISIM.
Email: s.bangstad@isim.nl
[T]here’s 
a frail 
human 
face to 
being 
Muslim.
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The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the 
Modern World (ISIM) invites applications for an ISIM 
post-doctoral fellowship. The fellowship is available to 
scholars who have recently (within five years) obtained 
a Ph.D. degree in anthropology, sociology, religious 
studies, cultural studies or political science.
ISIM conducts and promotes interdisciplinary research 
on contemporary social, political, cultural, and 
intellectual trends and movements in Muslim societies 
and communities. ISIM welcomes research proposals 
which are informed particularly by a social science 
perspective and fit in with the research profile of 
ISIM in general, or related to the specific research 
programmes (see www.isim.nl).
ISIM post-doctoral fellowship at a glance:
• granted for a period of one year
• monthly stipend
• office space, a personal computer, telephone  
on the premises of the ISIM in Leiden
• preferable starting date 1 September 2006
The deadline for applications is 15 June 2006.
ISIM is located in the historic city of Leiden with 
convenient links to the coast, the airport, and major 
European cities. Fellows have full access to extensive 
libraries, research centres, and the facilities of the 
universities participating in ISIM: the University of 
Amsterdam, Leiden University, Radboud University 
Nijmegen and Utrecht University.
For more details on ISIM post-doctoral fellowship and 
an online application form, please refer to the ISIM 
website http://www.isim.nl under the link “Fellowships” 
or contact the ISIM secretariat:
ISIM, P.O. Box 11089
2301 EB Leiden, The Netherlands
Tel: +31-(0)71-527 7905
Fax: +31-(0)71-527 7906
E-mail: info@isim.nl
Website: http://www.isim.nl 
Changes in directorship
Dick Douwes has left ISIM on 1 January 2006 to take a new 
position at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. Douwes 
joined ISIM as the Academic Coordinator from the very incep-
tion of the Institute in 1998. In 2002, he became ISIM Executive 
Director where he managed the internal affairs of the ISIM, 
taking care of finance, outreach, and ISIM external relations 
with Dutch institutions. At the same time, Douwes acted as 
Editor of the ISIM Newsletter (later the ISIM Review) beginning 
with the first issue in October 1998. Both in his managerial 
capacity and as Editor of the ISIM Newsletter, Douwes made 
a valuable contribution to the institutional formation of ISIM 
during its formative years, and to the growth of its main pub-
lications and outreach. Before joining ISIM Douwes taught 
History of the Modern Middle East at Radboud University 
of Nijmegen, where he had obtained his Ph.D. in History. He 
holds various publications on Modern History of the Middle 
East and on Muslims in the Netherlands. Currently, Douwes 
has joined the Erasmus University of Rotterdam as the Chair 
of Non-Western History and the Dean of Faculty of History 
and Arts. We wish him every success in his future work.
With the departure of Dick Douwes, Marlous Willemsen 
became the Deputy Director of ISIM, as per 1 March. Mar-
lous studied Arabic Language and Culture with specializa-
tion in Islamic Art at both Utrecht University and Bamberg 
University. She brings with her a vast experience in man-
agement and outreach from the Prince Claus Fund where 
she worked as Policy Officer for the Prince Claus Awards 
programme and as Executive Secretary of the Cultural 
Emergency Response programme. In these capacities, she 
also edited and contributed to the bi-annual Prince Claus 
Fund Journal as well as other publications on art and cul-
ture. Currently she serves as advisor for various cultural 
organisations, such as the Prince Claus Fund, Fatusch 
Productions and the European Cultural Foundation. At 
ISIM she will take charge in the areas of general manage-
ment, outreach, fundraising, and fellowships. We cordially 
welcome Marlous Willemsen to ISIM and look forward to 
working with her for years to come. 
ISIM invites applications and research proposals 
for visiting fellowships for its various programmes.
Applications from candidates in anthropology, 
sociology, religious studies, cultural studies and 
political science will be considered.
For more information on the visiting fellowships and 
for application forms, please consult www.isim.nl
V I S I T I N G  F E L L O W S H I P SI S I M  P O S T - D O C T O R A L  F E L L O W S H I P
2 May 2006
ISIM Ph.D. Seminar
Towkays and Islam: Religious Leadership of 
Chinese-Indonesian Muslim Merchants and 
Economic Thinking of Chinese-Indonesian 
Muslim Preachers
Lecture by Thomas Chiou
Venue: ISIM
16 May 2006
ISIM Ph.D. Seminar
Occidentalisms: Moving Beyond “Ambiguity” 
in Assessing Egyptian Images of the West
Lecture by Robbert Woltering
Venue: ISIM
30 May 2006
ISIM Staff Seminar
On Merits and Modalities of Writing and 
Comparing: Methodological Remarks
Lecture by Asef Bayat
Venue: ISIM
28 June 2006
Workshop
Islam in Africa: Globalization  
and Moving Frontiers
Venue: ISIM
Convenors: Peter Geschiere  
& Abdulkader Tayob
6–7 October 2006
Workshop
The Making of Muslim Youth II
Venue: Institute for Social Studies (ISS), 
The Hague
Organizers: ISS & ISIM
Convenors: Asef Bayat & Linda Herrera
13–15 October 2006
Conference
Youth and the Global South: Religion, 
Politics, and the Making of Youth in Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East
Venue: Dakar, Senegal
Organizers: African Studies Centre (ASC), 
Council for the Development of Social 
Science in Africa (CODESRIA), International 
Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) & ISIM
For more information on these and other 
events please consult the ISIM website 
or contact the ISIM secretariat at: 
Tel: +31 71 5277905
Fax: +31 71 5277906
Email: info@isim.nl
www.isim.nl
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ISIM/Workshop
InVisible Histories
The Politics of Placing the Past
Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali was a post-doctoral fellow at ISIM from September 2003 till December 
2005. Currently she is Assistant Professor in the Department of History at Brown University, 
Providence.
Email: vfyz@brown.edu
The ISIM and the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research (ASSR) 
jointly organized the workshop InVisible Histories: The Politics of Plac-
ing the Past, which was held on the second and third of September 
2005. The workshop took place at the University of Amsterdam with 
additional financial support from Nederlandse Organisatie voor Weten-
schappelijk Onderzoek (NWO) and the International Institute for Asian 
Studies (IIAS). The workshop engaged two kinds of enquiry—research 
on the spatially fixed and research on the visually mobile aspects of 
material culture—and proposed a dialogue between them. 
This multidisciplinary workshop brought together anthropologists, 
historians, art historians, and a cultural activist, who work on South 
Asia and the Middle East, to focus on material culture—to examine, on 
the one hand, how specific sites and buildings acquired significance in 
discourses of archaeology, heritage and civilization, and on the other 
hand, how images of sites and on sites transformed the meaning of 
places as they circulated through catalogues, calendars, posters, and 
postcards to make national, ethnic, or religious claims between people 
and places. 
In a panel entitled Ruined Histories, Sitting Politics, the papers exam-
ined the construction and circulation of antiquity and world heritage. 
Ayfer Bartu Candan focused on the politics of a 9000 years old, world 
famous Neolithic site of Çatalhöyük in Turkey, to examine how a global 
archaeological community, heritage and art groups, tourists including 
“goddess” groups, as well as local government officials and villagers 
made multiple claims on the site, and argued that it is “through the 
encounters of these publics of Çatalhöyük that the public memory of 
the site is constructed” which “cross-cut, complement, and trouble one 
another.” Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali drew upon her ISIM based research on 
the World Heritage site of Takht-e-Bahi in northern Pakistan to track 
the historical transformation of “local ruins” into a Gandharan Buddhist 
religious site. She argued that the ideological inscriptions of emerging 
colonial archaeology, which “fixed” the meaning of the site, placed Bud-
dhism at the apex of Indian civilization, and Islam as its nemesis, a reli-
gion of destruction and barbarism. Elizabeth Smith’s research examined 
how Robert Fernea’s “salvage ethnography” and photographs, taken at 
the time of the flooding of ancient Nubia because of the Aswan dam, 
continue to be produced and reproduced to authorize the placing of 
memory and identity amongst different Nubian communities. 
In the panel Muslim Pasts, National Places, the emphasis shifted 
largely to the Indian sub-continent. Catherine Asher focused on the 
Taj Mahal as the premier icon of an imagined India. She traced its art 
historical significance from the time of its building by Mughal emperor 
Shah Jahan to the present, to argue that while the building was not 
considered of extraordinary importance at the time it was built, Euro-
pean aesthetics established it as the most sublime representative of 
Indian architecture. However, she particularly paid attention to the 
ways in which the Muslim mausoleum is imagined and claimed as a 
Hindu palace or temple, and its complex relationship to Muslim com-
munities, in contentious contemporary Indian politics. Sandria Freitag 
and Yousuf Saeed examined a vibrant genre of print culture—popu-
lar posters from what Freitag called the “Indian Muslim niche market.” 
Freitag used her archives of posters to examine the two ways in which 
“Indian Muslims participate in a larger world of ocular practices’ as well 
as ‘consume mass-produced visuals that belong to a specialized set of 
understandings.” Saeed, a cultural activist, on the other hand, focused 
on the production and circulation of these posters and saw them as a 
visual expression of an increasingly fragile “pluralism” in India. 
In another panel Touring Histories, Alternative Geographies, the 
focus was on the Middle East. Martina Reiker critically engaged ten-
sions between “mobility” and “locality,” as she examined the “museu-
mification” and “re-scripting of heritage” in old urban spaces of Cairo 
located in global visions of EuroMed Heritage programmes, against 
the experiences of the working poor and middle classes that histori-
cally inhabited these spaces. She powerfully captured “a new local that, 
unlike capital, cannot or refuses to flow,” in the words of a displaced 
woman kiosk owner now selling fruit on a blanket in the street in his-
toric Cairo—“They speak of change? Change to what? I do not speak 
the language of antiquities? How can I possibly learn that language?” 
Mona Harb, on the other hand, explored the makings of an “alterna-
tive Islamic sphere” through Hizbullah inscriptions of cultural spaces 
in a southern suburb of Beirut in post-war Lebanon. Examining diverse 
sites such as al-Saha, an entertainment “village,” al-Sayf, a summer 
youth camp, as well as martyr posters and the Al-Khiyam Detention 
Centre where Israeli forces held and tortured Hizbullah inmates, she 
raised questions about the relationship between consumer entertain-
ment and resistance ideology in the making of Hizbullah’s new cultural 
economy. 
Different anthropological readings of contestations over sacred spac-
es in Pakistan were presented by Pnina Werbner and Naveeda Khan 
in the panel entitled: Sacred Spaces, Contested Meanings. They were 
paying particular attention to the sensory and affective experiences of 
social relationships in these spaces. Khan’s paper on neighbourhood 
mosques and their “entanglements with ordinary life and sectarian pol-
itics,” explored what she called the “violence of the ordinary.” Werbner 
revisited the burial site of a living Sufi saint that she had been doing 
research on, and is the basis for her book Pilgrims of Love, to reflect on 
the ways in which the stage by stage building of the shrine of the saint 
transformed his presence and his relationship to his followers. 
A rich and engaged discussion was provided by an array of notable 
discussants. Indra Sengupta, a Research Fellow at the German Histori-
cal Institute in London, and David Geary, a doctoral student at the Uni-
versity of British Columbia in Vancouver, traveled at their own expense 
to participate in the workshop as discussants. Annelies Moors, the ISIM 
Chair at the University of Amsterdam, provided the opening discus-
sion, and Peter van der Veer from University of Utrecht, Patricia Spyer 
from Leiden University and Kamran Asdar Ali, a visiting ISIM scholar, 
served as valuable discussants.
V A Z I R A  F A Z I L A -  
Y A C O O B A L I
– Ayfer Bartu Candan, Bogaziçi University, Istanbul
 Public Pasts: Multiple Claims on a Prehistoric Landscape
– Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali, ISIM
 Where have the Buddhas Gone? Ruined and Recovered Histories in North-Western Pakistan
– Elizabeth Smith, New York University
 The Photographic Production and Reproduction of Nubians in Egypt
– Catherine Asher, University of Minnesota
 Supersizing the Taj 
– Sandria Freitag, University of North Carolina
 Situating the Self: South Asian Visual Culture and Muslim Identity
– Yousuf Saeed, Delhi, India
 Contemporary Challenges to Pluralism in Popular Devotional Art of South Asian Muslims
– Martina Rieker, American University in Cairo
 Envisioning Motion Before and After Barcelona: Inscribing Heritage in the Southern 
Mediterranean
– Mona Harb, American University in Beirut
 Islamizing Entertainment and Tourism Activities in Lebanon (or the Cultural 
Materialization of Hizbullah’s Islamic Sphere) 
– Naveeda Khan, John Hopkins University, Baltimore
 What is it to build a Mosque? Or, the Violence of the Ordinary
– Pnina Werbner, University of Keele
 Ziyarat: Words and Deeds, Death, and Rebirth of a Living Saint
P A P E R S  P R E S E N T E D
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ISIM/Conference
Contemporary Islamic 
Movements 
Ideology, Aesthetics, Politics
The Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, South Asia Institute, the Centre 
for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, and the Centre for 
European Studies, the Religious Studies and College of Liberal Arts at 
the University of Texas at Austin collaborated with ISIM to organize an 
international conference on Contemporary Islamic Movements: Ideol-
ogy, Aesthetics, Politics (16-17 February 2006).
The conference sought to explore Islamic thought, politics, and so-
cial life through an interdisciplinary approach. The representation of 
Muslim life and Islam in public and private forums leaves much to be 
desired in terms of its depiction of the complexity of Muslim experi-
ences and practices across the globe. By assembling scholars who 
have first hand knowledge of Muslim societies and of Islam, the con-
ference addressed and engaged with these representational themes. 
The presenters had conducted scholarly investigations in the Middle 
East, South Asia, Central Asia, Europe, and Africa and spoke on Islamist 
movements, theological debates, Muslim aesthetics, gender categories 
and politics, and on Muslims living as demographic minorities, all of 
which are extremely pertinent issues in the contemporary moment. 
The endeavour was to bring forward a comprehensive and broad un-
derstanding of the variety of ways Muslims lead and experience social 
life and practise their religion over a range of geographical spaces and 
political circumstances. 
The conference got off to a rousing and somewhat controversial start 
with the presentation by keynote speaker Reza Aslan, discussing his 
celebrated book No god but God. He began by speculating that the 
rumours of Bin Laden’s death were greatly exaggerated, but it would 
not be too early to speculate how he will be remembered 100 years 
from now: as a murderous criminal or character in the “Islamic Reforma-
tion” like Thomas Muenster and Martin Luther, Christian Reformation 
radicals. Aslan used the term Reformation deliberately to emphasize 
that the current bloodshed and violence are 1) not an expression of 
a “clash of civilizations” but rather an “internal civil war in Islam”; and 
that 2) these current conflicts are questions all religions grapple with 
while confronting modernity. Thus, the Christian reformation itself was 
a “bloody” argument, Aslan argued, that extended for over a century 
about who defines faith: the institution or individual. Aslan’s thesis was 
that the current friction in Islam is a more complicated version of the 
same process. The audience did not seem to totally agree with Aslan’s 
postulations as they put forward many historically based challenging 
questions, forcing him to reconsider some of his more generalized ar-
guments. 
The subsequent day and half were taken up by a series of panels. The 
first, Pushing Boundaries: Gendered Lives in Muslim Context, sought to 
explore the multiple ways gender and religious practice intersect in di-
verse Muslim societies. In his paper Scott Kugle showed how groups of 
believing Muslim homosexual and transgender populations in South 
Africa struggle to balance their faith with their participation in the poli-
tics of rights and sexual freedoms. Another panellist, Lara Deeb, pre-
sented ethnography of women activists in the Shia politics of Lebanon, 
while Schirin Moazami read a critical piece on Muslim feminist intel-
lectuals in Europe. The panel on Muslim Aesthetics, Popular Politics 
included papers by Moustafa Bayoumi, who spoke on Iraqi immigrants 
and their everyday life in Lebanon. This was followed by Iftikhar Dadi’s 
exposition on the modern usage of the forms of Mogul Miniature in the 
art of contemporary Pakistan and concluded by Asef Bayat’s sociologi-
cal investigation of the question whether Islam allows for fun or not. 
The first panel on the next day was Jihadis in Action: Social Movement 
Actors, Anarchists or anti-Globalization Activists. The three speakers on 
this provocative panel explored the multiple ways in which contempo-
rary Jihadis need to be understood in relation to their particular histo-
ries and social milieu. One panellist (Devji), borrowing from his recent 
book, argued that Jihadis should be looked at in terms of global social 
movements, such as the environmental movement. The next panel on 
Islam: “Traditional” or “Modern” included papers by Abdulkader Tayob 
and Laura Adams that explored the role of Shariah and Muslim identity 
in different geographies. The final panel on State and Civil Actors: Islam 
in Diverse Spaces, discussed secular Muslim cultures that are trying to 
reclaim Islam, especially in Central Asia and Turkey. 
The conference drew to a close with the remarks by Barbara Metcalf, 
Professor of South Asian history at the University of Michigan, who 
asked the question “what other Islamic movements got missed?” in the 
discussions that ensued. She also observed how the two days of delib-
eration seemed to coalesce around the nation-state and its boundaries, 
and this was in direct contrast to the constant discussion one hears in 
academia of trans-boundary issues linked to Islam. In her opinion, all 
papers sought to de-‘exoticize’ Islam and contextualize their research 
by placing their arguments within the modern nation-state and, in par-
ticular, geographies and histories. The conference was adjourned after 
a vote of thanks. 
L I S T  O F  P A R T I C I P A N T S
– Reza Aslan, University of California, 
Santa Barbara, Author of No god but God, 
Keynote Speaker
– Laura Adams, Princeton University 
Ideology and Elites in Post-Soviet Central 
Asia
– Irfan Ahmad, University of Amsterdam 
Erosion of Secularism, Explosion of Jihad: 
Explaining Islamist Radicalization in India
– Schirin Amir-Moazami, University of 
Frankfurt-Oder 
Feminism, Islam, and Liberal Public Spheres 
in Europe: A Case Study on Secular-Feminist 
Intellectuals in France and Germany
– Asef Bayat, ISIM / Leiden University 
Does Islam Have No Fun?
– Moustafa Bayoumi, City University of 
New York 
A Grammar of Motives, or How to Read 
Flags, Keffiyas, and Hijabs in Brooklyn New 
York
– Iftikhar Dadi, Cornell University 
Historicizing the Mughal Miniature in 
Contemporary Pakistani Art
– Lara Deeb, University of California, Irvine 
Pious Modern: Lebanese Shii Women and 
Transformations in Religiosity
– Georgi Derluguian, Northwestern 
University, Chicago 
The Young Anarchists with Qurans in the 
Northern Caucasus
– Faisal Devji, New School University 
Landscapes of Jihad
– Najeeb Jan, University of Michigan 
Having a Party Ulama Style: The Deoband 
and the Politics of Blasphemy
– Scott Kugle, ISIM 
Queer Jihad: Gay and Lesbian Muslim 
Activists Between Virtual and Actual 
Communities
– Barbara Metcalf, University of Michigan 
Concluding Remarks
– Nazif M. Shahrani, Central Asian 
and Middle Eastern Studies, Indiana 
University 
Reclaiming Islam in Uzbekistan: Soviet 
Legacies and Post-Soviet Realities
– Abdulkader Tayob, ISIM / Radboud 
University Nijmegen  
Shariah Between Law, Religion, and 
Identity
– Jenny B. White, Boston University 
The Sacred and the Profane: Turkish Islam 
in Transition
Hillary Hutchinson is Special Events Coordinator at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies 
of the University of Texas (Austin). Her main research interest is around issues concerning 
academic freedom in US post 9/11.
Email: Hillary_hutchinson@mail.utexas.edu
H I L L A R Y  H U T C H I N S O N
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ISIM/Workshop
Religious Authority in Western Europe
A workshop dedicated to the topic of Muslim Religious Au-
thority in Western Europe took place from 30 September – 
1 October at the ISIM in Leiden. The aim of the workshop, 
which was convened by Frank Peter (ISIM/Free University of 
Berlin) and Elena Arigita (ISIM/University of Granada), was to 
bring together scholars working in what is arguably one of 
the most dynamic research fields in the study of European 
Islam, in order to stimulate exchange and reflection on cur-
rent and future research agendas. 18 papers were presented 
before an audience of 40 persons, comprising academics, 
policy-makers, and journalists.
F R A N K  P E T E R  &  
E L E N A  A R I G I T A   
– Martin van Bruinessen, ISIM / Utrecht University
– Christine M. Jacobsen, University of Bergen
– Tina G. Jensen, University of Copenhagen
– Martijn de Koning, ISIM / Free University, Amsterdam
– Nico Landman, Utrecht University
– Lena Larsen, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo
– Riem Spielhaus, Humboldt University, Berlin
– Thijl Sunier, University of Amsterdam
– Mohammed Amer, ISIM
 Dressing up for your Shaykh: the Minhajul Quran Movement in London
– Schirin Amir-Moazami, University of Frankfurt-Oder
 Muslim Women in French and German Mosques: Pioneers for Transformations 
of Gender Conceptions and Religious Authority?
– Elena Arigita, ISIM / University of Granada
 Muslim Leaders in Spain: Discourses about Representation and Authority after 
March 11
– Jonathan Birt, University of Oxford / Islamic Foundation
 Muslim Religious Leaderships, Civic Religion and Paradigms of National 
Integration in Britain post-9/11
– Welmoet Boender, ISIM
 From Periphery to Centre: Muslim Female Leadership in Milli Görüs in the 
Netherlands
– Amel Boubekeur, École des hautes études en sciences sociales Paris / École 
normale supérieure
 Muslim Stars, Islamic Ethics, and Religious Authority in France
– Alexandre Caeiro, ISIM
 The Functions of the Mufti in the West: Tradition & Change in the Practice of Ifta’
– Nathal Dessing, ISIM 
 Authority among Muslims in Europe: The Role of New Organizational Forms
– Bettina Gräf, Centre for Modern Oriental Studies, Berlin
 Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Cyberspace: Representing Translocal Authority
– Dilwar Hussain, Islamic Foundation, Leicester 
 Young Muslim Leaders and Shifting Boundaries in British Islam
– Jeanette Jouili, University of Frankfurt-Oder / École des hautes études en 
sciences sociales, Paris
 Reflections on the Relationship between Pious Muslim Women and Religious 
Authority in Germany
– Melanie Kamp, Free University, Berlin
 Fatwa-Councils, Muftis and their Fatwas—A Preliminary Study of Concepts, 
Institutions, and Actors of Islamic Legal Counselling in Germany
– Moussa Khedimellah, École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris
 Leadership and Legitimacy in the Jamaat Tabligh in France
– Inge Liengaard, University of Aarhus
 Leading the Prayer in Denmark: A Variety of Mosques and Imams 
– Brigitte Maréchal, Université Catholique de Louvain
 The Muslim Brotherhood and Religious Authority in Western Europe
– Ruth Mas, University of Colorado-Boulder
 Liminal Cases: Liberal Muslim Intellectuals in France
– Frank Peter, ISIM / Free University, Berlin
 Islamic Reformism and Authority: A Study of Imam Khatibs in France
– Levent Tezcan, University of Bielefeld
 State-Administered Religion in Cross-Cultural Communication: The Islam of 
Priests
L I S T  O F  D I S C U S S A N T S
P A P E R S  P R E S E N T E D
ISIM joined in mid 2005 a research project on current debates on Islam 
and integration in response to 9/11 and the murder of Van Gogh. The 
project is organized by the Ethnobarometer programme. This is a pro-
gramme of concerned social scientists who provide independent and 
research-based reports on levels of racism, xenophobia, and ethnic con-
flict in selected countries of Europe (see: www.ethnobarometer.org). It 
aims to monitor events, highlight areas of tension and identify relevant 
topics for further research and inquiry. The current research project 
is carried out in the form of moderated and closely monitored focus 
group discussions in Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, the UK, and now 
the Netherlands. The focus groups are held in locations where there 
has been inter-ethnic or inter-religious tension or conflict, and their 
composition more or less represents the various groups involved.
Ethnobarometer:
Europe’s Muslim 
Communities
If the topic of Muslim religious authority has been high on the agenda of scholarship 
for the last decade or so, this can be partially attributed to the rapid institutionaliza-
tion of Islam in Europe as well as the public and political interest in it. Undoubtedly, 
this context has strongly impacted the framing of current research, which is in some 
respects but a reflection of the preoccupations of national policy agendas. However, 
particularly in recent years, scholarly approaches and concerns have diversified con-
siderably. Today, any attempt to bring into dialogue the different research traditions 
intermingling in the study of European Islam seems more than ever, both challeng-
ing and rewarding, and it is to this new situation that the workshop in Leiden aimed 
to respond.
The meeting was divided into six panels supplemented by two discussion pan-
els. The papers and ensuing discussions addressed a variety of intersecting topics 
(see box for complete list of participants and titles). Several presentations engaged 
with state policies regarding the institutionalization of Islam, pointing in particular 
to their increasing proximity to variously defined policies of integration. The position 
of young Muslim women towards and inside religious hierarchies was a second focus 
of attention where questions of education, generational change, and organizational 
patterns were discussed in relation to more general reflections on concepts of au-
thority. Not surprisingly, a sizeable number of participants analyzed specific types 
of authority, intellectuals, preachers, muftis, and imams. The impact of new media, 
mass education, and state policies on the scope and shape of authority was at the 
centre of discussions here. The study of Islamic movements and organizations, such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat al-Tabligh, and Minhaj ul-Quran, highlighted 
both distinct structures of organization and general patterns of configurations of 
religious authority.
The workshop highlighted the salience of connecting the study of Muslim religious 
authority to broader questions of power. It provided further evidence that the study 
of religious authority is inextricably bound in reciprocal relation to the analysis of the 
multi-sited process of defining religion. Finally, the discussions revealed the difficulty 
of conceptualizing “Islamic” in ways that do without the regularly voiced restrictions 
placed on the use of these concepts. From this perspective, the lively discussions 
around analytical approaches to Islam as a religious tradition were particularly ap-
propriate and merit expansion.
A selection of presented papers will be published in a special issue of Muslim World 
in October 2006.
Frank Peter is Affiliated Fellow at ISIM. Email:f.peter@isim.nl
Elena Arigita is a member of the research group on contemporary Arab studies at the University Granada and 
was a post-doctoral fellow at ISIM from April 2004 till March 2006. Email:elenarigita@hotmail.com 
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ISIM/Workshop
Social Change and Identity
in Muslim Societies
SEPHIS, in collaboration with ISIM, organized a training Workshop on 
Identity and Social Change in Muslim Societies at the Orient Institut, Bei-
rut (7-14 December, 2005). Convened by Asef Bayat and Shamil Jeppie, 
the workshop drew in young scholars from around the world working on 
Muslim societies.
The workshop aimed at familiarizing the participants with some of the 
issues, which dominate current research on Muslim societies, and basic 
methodological approaches that are being (or can be) deployed in such 
research. The workshop pivoted principally around the location of in-
dividuals vis-à-vis the matrices of civil society and the state. In both re-
spects, the issue of gender relations featured quite prominently in course 
of the ensuing discussions.
Shamil Jeppie, Asef Bayat, and Dick Douwes were the principal resource 
persons at the workshop for discussions on research methodology, which 
revolved around the notion of identity in the contemporary discourse 
on area studies. The thrust of such discussions was to underline the sig-
nificance of historical contexts in which the notions of identity and the 
dynamics of social change evolve. In this respect, the twin discourses of 
“modernity” and “orientalism” were treated in some depth, and situated 
almost as sub-discourses within the larger discourse of “power.” A cave-
at was issued, however, against the temptations of essentialization that 
characterizes a considerable part of the discourse of power, lest the wide-
ranging diversities that have occasioned the emergence of the discipline 
of “area studies” be subsumed within the broader discourse of power. This 
came out best in discussions on the broader question of “pluralism” in 
modern states, which focused on the manner in which the category of 
minorities have tended to be constructed, and how the state of Lebanon 
handled the issue since its creation in the twentieth century.
Papers presented at the workshop could be classified into two types. 
Those that handled the nature of Muslim identities “as a whole,” and those 
that dealt with women in Muslim societies. Comparison of experiences 
of Muslim societies from across the globe, suggested the clearly political 
character of construction of identities within the parameters of the mod-
ern state. Case studies indicated the convergence of political compulsions 
and reworking of the Islamic identities prompted by several factors—viz. 
use of Islamic discourse as a legitimating tool for purposes of political 
reform (Cameroon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) or resistance (Iran, Malaysia); 
use of Islamic organizational networks either to complement (Nigeria) or 
supplement (Indonesia, South Africa) the state apparatus, etc. There was 
a general consensus that, leaving aside only the broadest confessional 
implications, the identity of a Muslim in the modern world was a product 
almost entirely of its local societal, political, cultural, and economic dy-
namics, and that it was almost entirely transmutable across time.
The other set of papers challenged the very notion of any Muslim iden-
tity “‘as a whole”’ (within, however, localized a space), by breaking most 
of such identities down in terms of their gender attributes. Focus on the 
position of women in widely divergent societies (India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Sri Lanka, Tanzania) revealed a widely prevalent (although not necessar-
ily Islamic) tendency to subsume the identity of women underneath the 
shibboleth of a heavily patriarchal construct of the Muslim “self.” Most of 
the papers of this category pertained to how women negotiated with 
those who wield power (societal and political) in contemporary Muslim 
societies in order to assert their own existence. Strategies of negotiation 
that were highlighted ranged between deriving benefits of confessional 
conformism (Sri Lanka, Iran, Saudi Arabia) and tacit resistance by inter-
rogating the limits of traditionally acceptable behaviour in the realms of 
society (Iran, Tanzania) or polity (India). Admittedly the fortunes of such 
negotiating strategies have been far from uniform, not least because they 
are in different stages of progression. Far more importantly, something 
like a consensus evolved in the workshop to suggest that hitherto differ-
ential outcomes were not the result of different strategies, but rather that 
divergent strategies of negotiation were owing to the divergences of the 
social, cultural, and institutional setting of the polities within which the 
negotiations were being worked out—no uniformly applicable panacea 
was suggested.
Participants in the workshop were, further, familiarized with some of 
the dynamics operating in modern Lebanon, especially with reference 
to the situation evolving after the decade long civil war that came to an 
end in the 1990s. Interactions with local journalists and social activists 
helped the participants to understand the complex “history” of a country 
The objective of the Ethnobarometer research is to assess the consequenc-
es of the various responses to 11 September and the murder of Van Gogh 
in November 2004 for both the Muslim communities and European socie-
ties at large and, in particular, the relations between Muslim communities 
and the rest of the population. We decided to start with a small number of 
focus groups in Gouda, a middle-sized town of 70,000 inhabitants in the 
western part of the Netherlands (at equal distances from Rotterdam, The 
Hague, and Utrecht), which is in many respects representative for many 
such towns—a Dutch “Middletown.” Almost 10 per cent of the population 
has a Muslim background: Moroccans with 6,000 constituting the largest 
group, Turks a distant second with 400; there has been a history of conflict 
in several districts of the city. Right wing and xenophobic populists have 
a certain following in Gouda, though they are less prominent than in Rot-
terdam. We made an effort to form focus groups that were broadly repre-
sentative of the population in terms of age, political attitude, and ethnic-
ity. To this end, we recruited participants through appeals communicated 
in a range of media: an interview in a 
widely read regional newspaper, ap-
peals placed on various Dutch and 
Moroccan internet discussion lists, 
direct invitations to people who at-
tended a “multicultural” day in one 
of the neighbourhood centres, and 
through street interviews. The overall 
report of the Ethnobarometer project 
will appear by the end of 2006. 
that came into being in the twentieth century and only then 
began to “remember” its past(s)—a process that, among other 
material considerations, serves to keep Lebanon dangerously 
poised between civil war and peace. Resource persons from 
the host, the Orient Institut, took the participants on guided 
tours—Ralph Bodenstein around the city of Beirut and Stefan 
Weber in Tripoli and Byblos—which told the history of Leba-
non through the prism of urban architecture. This was a par-
ticularly instructive way of getting across Lebanon’s character 
as a cultural mosaic, because Tripoli (Trablus in Arabic) is a 
city (going back to the Umayyad rule, seventh century) over-
whelmingly Muslim in its social composition; Byblos is over-
whelmingly Christian (dating back to the Roman times); and 
despite the persuasively thorough architectural reordering of 
Beirut in the past decade, the scars of the civil war are quite 
obvious in the sectarian character of the various localities of 
the city. 
– Ethnobarometer supervisor at ISIM: 
Martin van Bruinessen
– Researcher: Martijn de Koning 
Email: m.koning@isim.nl
– Research-Assistant: Shanti Tuinstra
– Interns: Birgül Özmen, Nora Asrami, 
Talita Groenendijk and Bea Hekhuis
R E S E A R C H  T E A M
Kingshuk Chatterjee teaches History at Scottish Church College, Calcutta. He is 
working on the intellectual origins of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, 1979 for his 
Ph.D. from the Department of History, Calcutta University.
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Barbara Thériault is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Montreal. 
Email: barbara.theriault@umontreal.ca
Frank Peter is Affiliated Fellow at ISIM.
Email: f.peter@isim.nl
Islam and the “Carriers” of 
European National Identities
On 24–25 February 2006 in Frankfurt-Oder, Barbara Thériault and Frank 
Peter convened a workshop on Islam, European Societies, and the “Carriers” 
of National Identities. The workshop, co-organized by the CCEAE (Centre 
canadien d’études allemandes et européennes) at Université de Montréal 
and ISIM, dealt with the incorporation of Islam in different national con-
texts. This workshop suggested a new perspective on the transformations 
triggered by the presence of Muslims in European societies by recasting 
attention to those who deal with the incorporation of Islam in Europe: the 
“carriers” of national identities.
Today, the dominant approaches in studies of the incorporation of Islam 
typically centre on the importance of national traditions, primarily church-
state relations and citizenship laws, to account for the nature of debates and 
practices related to the incorporation of Muslims. Alluding to Max Weber’s 
sociology, the concept of “carrier” was introduced in order to initiate a more 
systematic and comparative study of the reworking of national identities by 
specific groups and configurations of actors, both Muslim and non Muslim, 
such as civil servants, religious specialists, or social scientists. These configu-
rations of actors distinguish the countries surveyed at the workshop. While 
these actors might contribute to changes in the understanding of national 
identities, the papers have shown that 
this is not necessarily their intention. 
As such, not only the intentions un-
derlying their actions, but their con-
sequences as well, were underscored 
by the participants—an aspect the 
term “carrier” expresses more sharply 
than that of “agent.” Building and sup-
plementing on the literature on the 
incorporation of Islam, participants 
of the workshop thus took a fresh 
look at this growing body of literature 
from the vantage point of particu-
lar types of actors, those who could 
be referred to as “border crossers” or 
those who contribute—knowingly 
or unwittingly—to the incorporation 
of Islam and thus often challenge the 
borders of national identities.
Among the different actor constel-
lations who impact processes of in-
stitutionalization of Islam in Europe, 
Tina Jensen analyzed the ambiguous 
role played by converts in Denmark. 
Surveying mosques in the same 
country, Lene Kühle also pointed to 
the importance of municipal authori-
ties in the process of Muslim institu-
tion building while challenging the 
use of the category “religion” for ana-
lyzing contemporary “Islam” in Den-
mark. In the case of Germany, Barbara 
Thériault drew attention to the role 
of civil servants and conservative 
forces in incorporating Islam. Study-
ing a conflict around the construction 
of a mosque in Germany, Jörg Hüt-
termann pointed to the prevailing 
importance of “rules of hospitality” 
in his analysis of the actions taken 
by parties in favour or against the 
religious building. Concentrating on 
the figure of intellectuals of Islamic 
background and social scientists in 
general, Schirin Amir-Moazami, Ruth 
Mas, and Frank Peter examined discursive constructions of Islam in France 
and Germany while Nadia Fadil critically engaged in her study on Muslim 
believers in Belgium with the private/public dichotomy as a technique of 
liberal governance.
To be sure, the stress on “carriers,” both Muslim and non-Muslim, does not 
exhaust our understanding of the incorporation of Islam and changing na-
tional identities. However, it introduces a shift of perspective, which puts in 
the hot seat particular constellations of actors and how they negotiate, in 
their daily work and intellectual production, the tensions between the uni-
versal and the particular. They do so, as was stressed by Till van Rahden and 
Denise Helly, from distinctive positions of power within specific national 
and/or religious traditions. Such an analysis also opens up a new perspec-
tive for understanding the ongoing debates set off by the new Muslim pres-
ence as has been exemplarily illustrated by Martijn de Koning in his enquiry 
on the diverging meanings conferred on the concept of tolerance in the 
Netherlands. Concepts such as tolerance, Thijl Sunier compellingly argued 
in the case of the construction of religious buildings in Amsterdam, should 
not be taken for granted. They reflect on past and ongoing struggles for the 
appropriation of space within the history of different national states.
Considering the incorporation of Islam from the standpoint of particular 
“carriers” has both opened up a new perspective and raised an array of new 
issues, which will be hopefully discussed at an upcoming workshop.
B A R B A R A  T H É R I A U LT  
&  F R A N K  P E T E R
– Schirin Amir-Moazami, Humboldt University / 
University of Frankfurt-Oder 
 Feminism, Islam and Liberal Public Spheres 
in Europe: A Case Study on Secular-Feminist 
Intellectuals in France and Germany 
– Ruth Mas, University of Colorado-Boulder
 The Franco-Maghrebi Subject: Culture and 
the Decentering of the Quran
– Nadia Fadil, University of Leuven 
 Observing Transgressive Religious Practices: The 
Performance of the Public and the Private 
– Barbara Thériault, University of Montreal
 The “Carriers of Diversity” within Police Forces 
in Germany: Contemporary Manifestations of 
Religion?
– Frank Peter, ISIM / Free University of Berlin 
 Immigrant Youths, Education, and the 
Incorporation of Islam in France 
– Tina Jensen, University of Copenhagen 
 Danish Muslims: Mediators as Tricksters or 
Catalysts of National Identity? 
– Jörg Hüttermann, Institut für interdisziplinäre 
Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung (IKG), Bielefeld 
 Neighbourhood Conflict as a Ritual of 
Incorporation: Case-Based Remarks on a Conflict 
about a Minaret-Building
– Thijl Sunier, University of Amsterdam 
 No White Sugarbread in Our Neighbourhood! 
Religion and the Politics of Space in Amsterdam 
– Lene Kühle, University of Aarhus
 Organizing the Mosque as a Religious 
Community 
– Martijn de Koning, ISIM / Free University of 
Amsterdam 
 “Dreaming in Dutch”: Conflicts and Tolerance in 
Dutch Society
L I S T  O F  P A R T I C I P A N T S
– Till van Rahden, University of Cologne
– Denise Helly, INRS, Montreal
L I S T  O F  D I S C U S S A N T S
– Scott Kugle, ISIM
 Restraint of Violence in Modern Islamic History: The Intellectual 
Legacy and Ethical Challenge of Abul Kalam Azad
– Benjamin Soares, Africa Studies Centre, Leiden
 Muslim Public Intellectuals in Contemporary West Africa
– Roel Meijer, ISIM / Radboud University Nijmegen
 Intellectuals and Politics in Iraq: The Association of Muslim Scholars 
and its Ideological Justification of the Sunni Resistance
– Recep Senturk, Centre for Islamic Research (ISAM), Istanbul
 Intellectual Dependency: Muslim Intellectuals in Search for Human 
Rights?
– Samuli Schielke, ISIM
 The Making of Popular Religion: Nationalism, Islamic Reform, and 
The Construction of Mawlid Festivals as an Other of Modern Egypt 
(1880-1950)
– Patrick Desplat, Johannes Gutenberg-University, Mainz
 On the Confessions of a British Spy and “New” Readings of Tawhid 
- Contemporary Interpretations in Islam and their Contextualization 
in Ethiopia
– Farzin Vahdat, Harvard University, Cambridge
 Critical Theory and the Islamic Encounter with Modernity
– Richard Martin, Emory University, Atlanta
 Enlightenment in Islam: Denied, Rejected, Forgotten, Remembered
– Annemarike Stremmelaar, Leiden University
 The Islamic Ethic and the Spirit of Modernity: The Protestantisation 
of Islam according to Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey
– Michael Feener, University of California, Riverside
 Cross-Cultural Contexts of Modern Muslim Intellectualism: 
Reflections on a History of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia
– Michiel Leezenberg, University of Amsterdam
 Laying Down the Law: State, Religion, and Gendered Violence in Iraq
– Abdulkader Tayob, ISIM / Radboud University Nijmegen
 Religion in Modern Islamic Thought and Practice
L I S T  O F  P A R T I C I P A N T S
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Abdulkader Tayob holds the ISIM Chair at Radboud University Nijmegen.
Email: a.tayob@let.ru.nl
Modern Islamic Intellectual History 
in Comparative Perspective
On 29-30 September 2005 a two-day conference on Modern Islamic Intel-
lectual History in Comparative Perspective, was held in Utrecht. Altogeth-
er, the conference papers raised issues and questions about the produc-
tion, transformation, and reception of Islamic intellectual discourse. 
On the first day, presentations focused more on the contextual dimen-
sion of the modern intellectual production, whilst on the second they 
stressed the theoretical questions that have been raised for the last one 
hundred years by and about Muslims. Despite the difficulty of neatly di-
viding the individual papers along these lines, these processes, however, 
overarched the lively and critical discussion that ensued.
Soares opened the conference with his paper on Islam and Its Expres-
sion in Twentieth-century West Africa. He drew from a rich sample of case 
studies on the appeal and influence of public intellectuals in West Africa, 
a challenge to the adequacy of Weberian categories of rationalization and 
disenchantment to explain these movements. On the other hand, Schiel-
ke’s paper on the debate over mawlids in Egypt revealed a religious trend 
(even though a minority) that matched Weber’s predictions. And a case 
study of a small group of intellectuals in Turkey by Stremmelaar, showed 
how Weber was used as an anti-symbol to deride an emerging Protestant 
Islam among the middle classes of Turkey. The conclusions drawn from 
the discussions pointed to the persistence of Weber’s thesis despite its 
inadequacy.
Another set of papers highlighted the production of intellectual capi-
tal in certain very specific contexts, and through very different resources. 
Kugle’s paper on Advocates of non-Violence in Modern Islamic Theology 
traced this ethic in the Quran, and more significantly, in modern Indian 
history in the Khudai Khidmatgar (servants of God). Senturk’s paper: In-
tellectual Dependency: Muslim Intellectuals in search for Human Rights 
in Islam, argued that an Islamic justification for human rights in late mo-
dernity was both necessary and unavoidable. While Meijer’s paper traced 
the emergence of new Islamic politics in the posturing and missives of the 
Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq, Desplat’s paper showed how or-
thodoxy was constructed partly also by conspiracies, forged documents, 
and the Internet. 
The conference also featured papers on the theoretical conception of 
modern Islamic thought. Vahdat launched the second day with a paper on 
the possibility of critical theory among contemporary Muslim intellectuals. 
Martin’s paper reflected on a Muslim Enlightenment that was not restrict-
ed to the eighteenth century, but alternatively to a set of ideas and dispo-
sitions about the religious and the secular. Leezenberg considered the ap-
plication of Foucault or Stalinism to better understand Saddam Hussein’s 
reign of terror. Tayob concluded the presentation of papers by appealing 
to a discursive employment of religion among Muslim modernists. 
The conference ended with a general discussion on the two-day meet-
ing. Three possible areas of attention were highlighted. The first, on a bet-
ter comparative understanding of public intellectuals; second, attention 
to explicit and implicit modern definitions of Islam; and last, attention to 
adequate theoretical tools to develop our understanding of the trajectory 
of Modern Islamic intellectual discourses. 
A B D U L K A D E R  T A Y O B
Kalimat Press
Books of interest in Iranian Studies, Islamic Studies 
and Babi-Bahai studies
www.kal imat .com           orders@kal imat .com
Modernity and the Millennium: the Genesis of the Baha'i Faith 
in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East by Juan R. I. Cole. 
Columbia University Press.          $19.50 paper; $45.00 cloth
Cole examines Baha'u'llah's response to the issues of his time-- religious liberty,
the separation of church and state, the need for peace and collective security, the rights of
women, the dangers of unbridled nationalism.  He demonstrates how the early teachings of
Baha'u'llah both engage with and critique modernity. 
A Traveller's Narrative written to illustrate the Episode of the Bab by
'Abdu'l-Baha, translated and edited by E. G. Browne 
Originally published in 1891, the main body of the book
is Browne's translation of 'Abdu'l-Baha's own history of
the Bab and his religion. Browne provides hundreds of
notes and dozens of essays on the history of the Baha'i
religion. 
Church and State: a Postmodern
Political Theology by Sen McGlinn
Includes a new interpretation of Muhammad
at Medina and a new reading of relevant
Quranic texts, to show that the separation of
state and religion is a universal ideal.
Resurrection and Renewal: the Making of the Babi Movement 
in Iran, 1844-1850 by Abbas Amanat 
"Resurrection and Renewal is in my judgment one of the most impor-
tant books written on nineteenth-century Iran, and perhaps the fullest
account we have of the development of any ideological movement in
the Islamic Middle East in the nineteenth century.  The story of how
eschatological expectations became converted into a new religion is
told here with exacting scholarship and an abundance of detail."
--Roy Mottahedeh, Professor of Islamic History, Harvard University
Second Paperback Edition, US $29.95
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Rights at Home
Advanced Training Manual
The ISIM “Rights at Home” Project rounded up its activities on 1 Octo-
ber 2005. The four-year Project focused on challenges and opportuni-
ties facing human rights activists in Muslim societies and communities. 
The overall purpose of the Project’s sounding board meetings, regional 
workshops, advanced training workshops, and follow-up programmes 
was to rethink strategies, theories, and histories of human rights and 
Islamic legal theory. The Advanced Training manual gives a good im-
pression of the process of reflection throughout the years. It includes 
the approaches developed to thinking about and struggling for human 
rights, its methodology, results, and findings. 
The Advanced Training manual was developed in the run to the Ad-
vanced Training, the most important training component of the pro-
gramme that took place in 2004 in Leba-
non. During the training, the manual was 
intensively used, and in the aftermath 
evaluated and adjusted by the Advanced 
Training programme director/manual de-
veloper Cassandra Balchin, and all advo-
cacy oriented trainers and Islamic Legal 
Theory experts involved. Significantly, 
the input of cases by the 43 participants 
from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Tanzania, and Yemen to the Ad-
vanced Training manual reflects the daily 
reality of local activist organizations and 
agents of change. The cases make clear 
that human rights were not to be under-
stood exclusively as social, political, and 
intellectual goals: living human rights de-
mands, above all, a personal transformation. Legal codes might go a 
long way to ensure rights in social and political contexts, but it was 
the appropriate disposition and commitment that could turn societies 
around. 
The story of Khadija
The life story of Khadija from Tanzania is one of many examples given 
in the Advanced Training manual. The very young Khadija was married 
off to a middle-aged man who seemed respectable. He introduced him-
self as a businessman, but what Khadija and her family did not know 
was that he was a widower having lost his wife earlier to AIDS. Khadija 
gave birth twice, but both children died three months after birth. Soon 
thereafter, her husband’s health deteriorated. He admitted his HIV sta-
tus and asked Khadija for forgiveness for knowingly infecting her. Not 
only was Khadija a widow before twenty but she was also childless and 
infected with the HIV virus. Moreover, her in-laws took all her property, 
including her cooking pots! When she challenged the matter in a re-
ligious institution, her in-laws ended up with a bigger share than she 
got. She did not even get her entitled quarter of the property.
The distribution did not take account of the fact that her husband 
could not work for a significant period in which they were married. Ac-
tually, it was Khadija who had paid all the bills and looked after the 
home from her catering business. While she had expected justice, her 
in-laws and religious institutions did not think she was entitled to claim 
her contribution in the matrimonial property or to be compensated for 
the harm deliberately done to her. Khadija now is one of the few people 
in Tanzania who are open about her HIV status and is a member of a 
national network of people living with HIV/AIDS. 
Human rights and Islamic legal theory
The Rights at Home Advanced Training manual uses cases like these as 
starting points for the examination of the relationship between human 
rights and Islamic Legal Theory. The programme carefully discusses the 
best way to get a direct hands-on approach to a creative understanding 
and application of Islamic Legal Theory, which would take the rights of 
the marginalized like Khadija into consideration. It contains a useful 
appendix entitled Outline of the Islamic 
Legal Theory Component that gives an 
overview of the approach adopted. In this 
view, the Islamic tradition provides some 
fundamental resources for thinking and 
acting on human rights. However, in order 
to draw on these resources, there was an 
important need for a paradigm shift in 
how Muslims think about the Sharia. So-
cial justice must be the key or main value 
in the reconstruction of Muslim laws. 
Two bottom-line goals for the Rights 
at Home Advanced Training programme 
have been identified: there are no easy 
answers in Muslim law; and, you can trust 
yourself to use the same tools to advance 
legal theory that others have used in the 
past. These goals have been thoroughly integrated in the structure and 
contents of the Advanced Training manual. But the Manual does not 
only propose new strategies for Islamic law. Basically, it describes an in-
tensive training programme of 14 days—each training day focusing on 
a theme and providing a time schedule, interactive exercises, handouts 
and relevant documents to treat this theme. The programme consists 
of a unique balance of elements of Islamic Legal Theory and practical 
strategies and skills ranging from sessions on hadith and gender as a 
social construction, to workshops on the development of advocacy 
plans. Experiences of both trainers and participants during all parts 
of the training are given in “How it worked” sections throughout the 
whole manual. 
Results of the Rights at Home Project
The Rights at Home Advanced Training manual is one of the main 
results of the project as a whole, to be used in broader settings, and in 
accordance with the attempt to sustain and further refine the Rights at 
Home approach through ongoing critical debate, and exchange of cre-
ative and constructive solutions. In Summer 2005 the Advanced Train-
ing manual was temporarily attached to the ISIM website, after which 
the Rights at Home website took it over. For those target groups of the 
Rights at Home Project, which could not gain easy access to the Inter-
net to download the Advanced Training files, hard copies were printed 
and dispersed. Next to the training manual, video recordings of several 
parts of the Rights at Home Advanced Training were put on CD-ROM’s 
and made available for future trainings. Moreover, complementary 
documents on the priority issues of the Rights at Home project can 
be found on the Rights at Home website. Some of the documents are 
available in Arabic and Swahili.
M A R I Ë T T E  V A N  B E E K
– Cassandra Balchin (Compiler/Editor), Advanced Training Manual 
for Social Agents of Change in Human Rights Advocacy and the 
Family. 23 June-8 July, 2004, Zahlé, Lebanon, Leiden: ISIM 2005.  
ISBN-10: 9090197117 
ISBN-13: 9789090197117
– The manual can be downloaded at www.rightsathome.org or 
ordered through info@isim.nl. 
I N F O
Mariëtte van Beek was Project Manager of the Rights at Home project. Currently she is Project 
Manager of the Morocco Fund. 
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New ISIM Book Series
In cooperation with the Amsterdam 
University Press, ISIM has taken the 
initiative to launch the ISIM Book 
Series. The Series will publish in-
novative and interdisciplinary re-
search on trends and movements in 
contemporary Muslim societies and 
communities, bringing together ex-
pertise in anthropology, sociology, 
political science, social history, cul-
ISIM Paper 5,6 and 7 and the ISIM Dissertation Series can be ordered online 
through www.isim.nl or www.aup.nl or by email: orders@aup.nl. 
Earlier Publications in the ISIM Papers Series are available on the ISIM website.
ISIM Papers
■ Paper 5: Abdulaziz Sachedina
 The Role of Islam in The Public Square: 
Guidance or Governance?
Abdulaziz Sachedina’s paper deals with 
the role of religion in the development 
of democratic institutions in the light 
of the American intervention in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. With this interven-
tion, constitutional debates have as yet 
to tackle the role of religious convic-
tions and values in the development of 
democratic institutions to guarantee 
basic freedoms and rights in those 
countries. A major stumbling block to 
democratization, Sachedina argues, is 
the way the role of religious values is 
currently defined. He pleads for devel-
oping an inclusive sense of citizenship 
without insisting upon doctrinal and 
theological uniformity. 
Abdulaziz Sachedina is Professor of 
Religious Studies at the University of 
Virginia, Charlottesville.
24 pages ISBN 90 5356 825 5 € 13,50
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■ Paper 6: Lila Abu-Lughod
 Local Contexts of Islamism 
in Popular Media
It is well known that after the events of 
11 September 2001 media representa-
tions of Islamists, and Muslims more 
generally, in the West became even 
more negative and stereotyped than 
previously. What is less well known 
is that in the 1990s many regimes 
in the Arab Muslim world perceived 
Islamists as a threat, a perception that 
was reflected in popular Arab media. 
Through attention to television media, 
particularly in Egypt, Lila Abu-Lughod 
analyzes portrayals of Islamism and 
“religious extremism”. She poses press-
ing questions about how these new 
representations of Islamists, and the 
debates they sparked nationally, have 
contributed to a reconfiguration of 
“religion” itself.
Lila Abu-Lughod is Professor of An-
thropology and Gender Studies, and 
Director of the Institute for Research 
on Women and Gender, Columbia Uni-
versity, New York.
24 pages ISBN 90 5356 824 7 € 13,50
■ Paper 7: Juan R. I. Cole
 The Ayatollahs and Democracy 
in Contemporary Iraq
Iraqi Shiism is undergoing profound 
changes, leading to new elaborations 
of the relationship between clerics and 
democratic principles in an Islamic 
state. The Najaf tradition of thinking 
about Shiite Islam and the modern state 
in Iraq, which first developed during 
the Iranian constitutional revolution of 
1905–1911, rejects the principle that 
supreme power in an Islamic state must 
be in clerical hands. Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Sistani of Iraq stands in this tradition, 
and he has striven to uphold and devel-
op it since the fall of Saddam Hussein. 
At key points he came into conflict with 
the Bush administration, which was not 
eager for direct democracy. Parliamen-
tary politics have also drawn in clerics 
of the Dawa Party, the Sadr movement, 
and the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq, all of which had 
earlier been authoritarian in outlook. Is 
Iraqi Shiism experiencing its enlighten-
ment moment?
Juan R. I. Cole is Professor of Modern 
Middle East and South Asian History at 
the University of Michigan. (Available 
summer 2006)
■ Mareike Winkelmann
 ‘From Behind the Curtain’:  
A Study of a Girls’ Madrasa in India
In the aftermath of 9/11 Islamic 
seminaries or madrasas received much 
media attention in India, mostly owing 
to the alleged link between madrasa 
education and forms of violence. Yet, 
while ample information on madrasas 
for boys in available, similar institu-
tions of Islamic learning for girls have 
for the greater part escaped public 
attention so far. This study investigates 
how madrasas for girls emerged in 
India, how they differ from madrasas 
for boys, and how female students 
come to interpret Islam through 
the teachings they receive in these 
schools. 
Mareike Winkelmann defended her 
thesis at the University of Amsterdam 
(December 2005).
176 pages ISBN 90 5356 907 3 €29,50
■ Joseph Alagha
 The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: 
Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, 
and Political Program
The Lebanese Shiite resistance move-
ment, Hizbullah, is going through a 
remarkable political and ideological 
transformation. The line of argument 
in this dissertation is that Hizbullah 
has been adjusting its identity by 
shifting emphasis among its three 
components: (1) from propagating an 
exclusivist religious ideology (2) to a 
more encompassing political ideology, 
and (3) to a down-to-earth political 
programme. 
Joseph Alagha is Assistant Profes-
sor of Islamic Studies at the Lebanese 
American University. He defended his 
thesis at the Free University Amster-
dam (February 2006).
384 pages ISBN 90 5356 910 3 €49,50
ISIM Dissertations
tural studies, and religious studies. The 
aim of the Series is to present the best 
and leading scholarship on Islam and 
Muslim societies in different parts of 
the globe. It will particularly expose 
both the distinctive and comparable 
aspects of trends and developments in 
Muslim societies. Monographs and ed-
ited volumes are invited that are both 
theoretically informed and grounded 
in empirical research in specific geo-
graphical areas or across cultural and 
regional boundaries and interests. 
Proposals will be reviewed by experts 
in the field, under the direction of an 
international editorial board. Titles 
from Amsterdam University Press in 
the US and Canada are distributed by 
the University of Chicago Press. 
For more information about 
the Series and guidelines for authors, 
please contact the coordinating 
editors at review@isim.nl
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Editors’ Picks
Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: 
Gender and the Seductions of 
Islamism
By Janet Afary and Kevin B. 
Anderson
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2005.
Foucault and the Iranian Revolution is 
the first book-length analysis of the es-
says of Michel Foucault on Iran. Afary 
and Anderson illuminate Foucault’s 
support of the Islamist movement and 
show how Foucault’s experiences in Iran 
contributed to a turning point in his 
thought, influencing his ideas on the 
Enlightenment, homosexuality, and his 
search for political spirituality. The au-
thors argue that Foucault’s provocative 
writings are essential for understanding 
the history and the future of the West’s 
relationship with Iran and, more gener-
ally, to political Islam. 
The Dark Side of Democracy: 
Explaining Ethnic Cleansing
By Michael Mann
New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005.
This book presents a new theory of 
ethnic cleansing based on the most 
terrible cases (colonial genocides, 
Armenia, the Nazi Holocaust, Cambo-
dia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda) and cases of 
lesser violence (early modern Europe, 
contemporary India, and Indonesia). 
The author argues that murderous 
cleansing is modern: it is “the dark side 
of democracy.” Among other things, it 
results where the demos (democracy) 
is confused with the ethnos (the eth-
nic group). 
Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, 
and Fundamentalism: 
Episode and Discourse
By Mansoor Moaddel
London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2005.
This is an extensive review of the 
three main intellectual and social 
movements in contemporary Muslim 
societies. Islamic modernism, secular 
trends, and fundamentalism are pre-
sented in rich detail and contextual 
location. 
Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival 
and the Feminist Subject
By Saba Mahmood
Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005.
Politics of Piety is a groundbreaking 
analysis of Islamist cultural politics 
through the ethnography of a 
grassroots women’s piety movement 
in the mosques of Cairo. This study 
shows how the ethical and the 
political are indelibly linked within 
the context of such movements. It 
thoroughly challenges conventional 
notions of agency, religion, liberalism, 
and feminism.
Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas 
and Islamic Education in India
By Yoginder Sikand
New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 
2005.
An excellent, well-informed study of 
the history and organization of the 
madrasa in the Indian subcontinent, 
with special attention to efforts at 
reform of this institution. A large 
section is devoted to a clear-headed 
discussion of the alleged role of Indian 
and Pakistani madrasas as hotbeds of 
potentially violent radicalism and of 
the wider political context of inter-reli-
gious tension.
Islam and the Prayer Economy: 
History and Authority in a Malian 
Town
By Benjamin F. Soares
Edinburgh; Ann Arbor: Edinburgh 
University Press; University of 
Michigan Press for the International 
African Institute, 2005.
The book races the changing mean-
ing of Islam in Mali from the colonial 
period to the present. It particularly 
focuses on the meaning of power 
and authority in a Malian town, and 
the changing patterns of Islam at the 
hands of colonial and post-colonial 
political leaders, Sufis, reformists, and 
secularists. 
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Without Boundary
Seventeen W
ays of Looking “Islam
ic or not”
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The Museum of Modern Art in New York (www.moma.org) exhib-
its seventeen artists who come from the “Islamic” world but do 
not live there. Depictions here show two perspectives used in 
Without Boundary to defy the binary oppositions of current poli-
tics by resisting essentialist notions of who they are such as: “Is-
lamic or not.” First, Ghada Amer looks at “Islamic art” as a matter of 
identity and, in particular, the relationship between gender and 
identity. While this often entails a focus on women wearing veils, 
Amer tries to undermine this expectation by depicting nude and 
near-nude women. Her Eight Women in Black and White (2004) are 
actually veiled by embroidery, tangles of thread, and the differ-
ent layers of stitching. Eight Women expresses her opposition to 
the attempts of fundamentalists or feminists to make the female 
body asexual. Secondly, Raqib Shaw’s Garden of Earthly Delights III 
(2003) is inspired by the Garden of Delights of the Dutch painter 
Hieronymus Bosch, but Shaw also draws from other sources such 
as Japanese Hokusai prints and traditional Persian Miniatures. 
It breathes in a permissive and celebratory way the generation 
of new, hybrid possibilities. (Description based upon an excerpt 
from the publication Without Boundary: Seventeen Ways of Look-
ing “Islamic or Not” by Fereshteh Daftari, 2006)
Ghada Amer (b. 1963 in Cairo, Egypt, lives and works 
in New York). Eight Women in Black and White, 2004
Acrylic, embroidery and gel medium on canvas
7’ x 6’ 4” (213.4 x 193 cm)
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Raqib Shaw (b. 1974 in Calcutta, India, lives and works in London). The Garden of Earthly Delights III, 2003
Mixed media on board. Three panels, overall: 10 x 15’ (305 x 407.5 cm), each panel: 10 x 5’ (305 x 152.5 cm)
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Photo Commentary
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Members of the 
Amputee Soccer 
Team of Sierra 
Leone at a beach 
in Freetown, 
April 2006: Team 
members are victims 
of amputations by 
rebels during the 
civil war. The team 
is a joint effort 
of Christians and 
Muslims from 
different tribal 
and cultural 
backgrounds. 
 3  
Group of Afghan 
athletes who have 
lost their leg to 
mines in Olympic 
outfits: Taking 
part in a ceremony 
marking the 
International Mine 
Action Day, Kabul, 
April 2006.
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transcending differences, overcoming atrocities of the past, 
moving forward to a new future, and challenging stereotypes
Sports: 
